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ABSTRACT 
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Year: 2017 
An archival study was conducted to determine the influence of stall warning system 
performance on aircrew decision-making outcomes during airborne icing encounters.  A 
Conservative Icing Response Bias (CIRB) model was developed to explain the historical 
variability in aircrew performance in the face of airframe icing.  The model combined 
Bayes’ Theorem with Signal Detection Theory (SDT) concepts to yield testable 
predictions that were evaluated using a Binary Logistic Regression (BLR) multivariate 
technique applied to two archives: the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
incident database, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident 
databases, both covering the period January 1, 1988 to October 2, 2015. 
The CIRB model predicted that aircrew would experience more incorrect 
response outcomes in the face of missed stall warnings than with stall warning False 
Alarms.  These predicted outcomes were observed at high significance levels in the final 
sample of 132 NASA/NTSB cases.  The CIRB model had high sensitivity and specificity, 
and explained 71.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance of aircrew decision-making 
outcomes during the icing encounters.  The reliability and validity metrics derived from 
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this study suggest indicate that the findings are generalizable to the population of U.S. 
registered turbine-powered aircraft.    
These findings suggest that icing-related stall events could be reduced if the 
incidence of stall warning Misses could be minimized.  Observed stall warning Misses 
stemmed from three principal causes: aerodynamic icing effects, which reduced the stall 
angle-of-attack (AoA) to below the stall warning calibration threshold; tail stalls, which 
are not monitored by contemporary protection systems; and icing-induced system issues 
(such as frozen pitot tubes), which compromised stall warning system effectiveness and 
airframe envelope protections.  Each of these sources of missed stall warnings could be 
addressed by Aerodynamic Performance Monitoring (APM) systems that directly 
measure the boundary layer airflow adjacent to the affected aerodynamic surfaces, 
independent of other aircraft stall protection, air data, and AoA systems.  In addition to 
investigating APM systems, measures should also be taken to include the CIRB 
phenomenon in aircrew training to better prepare crews to cope with airborne icing 
encounters.  The SDT/BLR technique would allow the forecast gains from these 
improved systems and training processes to be evaluated objectively and quantitatively.  
The SDT/BLR model developed for this study has broad application outside the 
realm of airborne icing.  The SDT technique has been extensively validated by prior 
research, and the BLR is a very robust multivariate technique.  Combined, they could be 
applied to evaluate high order constructs (such as stall awareness for this study), in 
complex and dynamic environments.  The union of SDT and BLR reduces the modeling 
complexities for each variable into the four binary SDT categories of Hit, Miss, False 
Alarm, and Correct Rejection, which is the optimum format for the BLR.  Despite this 
  
v 
reductionist approach to complex situations, the method has demonstrated very high 
statistical and practical significance, as well as excellent predictive power, when applied 
to the airborne icing scenario. 
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Chapter I  Introduction 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Airframe icing has caused severe difficulties for aviators since the dawn of human 
flight.  Aircraft are still lost to icing almost a century after Alcock and Brown’s record-
setting first trans-Atlantic crossing was nearly thwarted by airframe and engine icing (S. 
Green, Bettcher, Brachen, & Erickson, 1996).  Almost 90 years later, and despite 
enormous advances in aircraft systems, meteorology, and pilot training, icing continues to 
cause accidents and loss of life.  As a result, the issue remained on the National 
Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) Most Wanted List of safety improvements for 14 
years (NTSB, 2012).   
This study addresses the development and testing of a new theoretical 
Conservative Icing Response Bias (CIRB) model for evaluating the effect of stall 
warning system performance on aircrew decision-making outcomes during icing 
encounters, based on a Signal Detection Theory (SDT) framework.  The model was 
tested via an exploratory archival analysis of NTSB and National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) archives.  A non-
linear Binary Logistic Regression (BLR) multivariate technique was used to perform the 
analysis and the related hypothesis tests.   
The topic treatment begins with an overview of airframe icing and stall warning 
systems and the relationship between them.  This introduction is followed by a historical 
review of airframe research, case studies, and regulatory considerations, which provide 
the operational context for the subsequent theoretical material.  The theory sections begin 
with a review of the basic SDT concepts, vigilance tasks, and Bayes’ Theorem.  These 
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collectively form the foundation of the CIRB hypothesis, which is introduced and 
developed in the next section.  The CIRB discussion is followed by an overview of the 
BLR technique and its application to the evaluation of the CIRB hypothesis using the 
NTSB and ASRS databases.  Chapter I concludes with a review of the delimitations, 
limitations, and assumptions inherent in the research.  The literature review (Chapter II) 
and methodology section (Chapter III) follow the same general format and sequence as 
the first chapter.  Results and Conclusions are presented in Chapters IV and V, 
respectively.  As airframe icing is the catalyst for every aspect of this proposal, the 
discussion necessarily begins with a review of icing and its effect on airfoils and the 
aircraft to which they are attached.  
Airframe Icing 
Airframe icing adds weight, affects controllability, and, most seriously, can 
severely compromise an airfoil’s ability to create lift “by an unknown amount” 
(Zeppetelli & Habashi, 2012, p. 612).  Innocuous-seeming icing accretions, similar to a 
thin strip of coarse sandpaper on the critical leading-edge of an airfoil, can result in a 
30% loss of lift and a 40% drag increase (Bergrun, 1995).  Worse, such icing can cause a 
stall, which represents a significant degradation of airfoil performance, before the 
aircraft’s stall protection systems can alert the crew.  The lack of warning arises because 
current stall warning systems cannot quantify the influence of ice accretions, and the 
regulations for artificial stall warning systems simply impose fixed, and possibly 
inadequate, safety margins for flights in icing conditions (FAA, 2011b).  Under certain 
icing conditions, these pre-set margins have proven inadequate, resulting in a spate of 
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aircraft accidents and Loss of Control (LOC) incidents.  The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has struggled to address the problem by issuing more than 200 
airworthiness directives (AD) and four regulatory amendments (FAA, 2010e), yet LOC 
incidents and accidents still occur as a result of airborne icing.  An analysis of NTSB, 
FAA, and NASA ASRS data between 1991 and 2010 revealed that LOC was the leading 
cause of fatalities in the large commercial jet and business jet sectors, accounting for 
4,717 lives lost and 44% of all U.S. business aircraft accidents during the period 
(Veillette, 2012).  The same data also showed that icing caused 29% of these fatal LOC 
events.  Weener (2011) noted a continuing safety threat posed by airborne icing, and the 
icing issue remained on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of transportation safety 
improvements for small and large aircraft from 1997 to 2011 (NTSB, 2012b). 
Commuter airlines are even more susceptible to icing effects than the group 
studied by Veillette because commuter carriers generally operate lower performance 
aircraft, over shorter sectors, at lower altitudes than the major carriers.  These factors 
confine commuter operators to the atmospheric strata where icing is prevalent.  The risk 
is compounded because commuters are exposed to a greater number of takeoffs and 
landings than long-range operators, when aircraft performance margins are at their lowest 
and the stall probability is at its highest. 
Airframe icing remains a continuing problem despite the best efforts of the FAA 
and NTSB.  Petty & Floyd (2004) explored NTSB data from 1982 to 2000 and noted that 
icing accident rates for commuter aircraft operations had not declined during the period.  
Using U.S. NTSB 2006 – 2010 online accident synopsis data, Appiah-Kubi, Martos, 
Atuahene, & William (2013) recorded 228 accidents and 30 incidents across all aircraft 
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categories related to aerodynamic events arising from icing encounters.  More recently, 
the FAA published its 112th icing-related AD, which barred known-icing operations by 
approximately 4,200 small U.S. registered general aviation (GA) aircraft, based on the 
ongoing losses caused by icing within this group through a period spanning 30 years 
(FAA, 2014g; K. Lynch, 2014).  Veillette (2012) conducted a study of business aviation 
LOC accidents between 1991 and 2010.  Citing Veillette’s results, the National Business 
Aviation Association (NBAA) found “no cause was nearly as prevalent as aerodynamic 
stalls.”  The NBAA also noted that 9 of the 31 stall events (29%) were related to airspeed 
management in icing conditions (NBAA, 2015).  In a study conducted by Boeing of fatal 
accidents to the worldwide commercial jet fleet, LOC accounted for twice the number of 
fatalities (1,656) of the second leading cause, Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT), 
which cost 803 lives (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2015, p. 22).  It is reasonable to 
assume that the relative incidence of icing accidents in the Boeing study mirrored the 
29% observed by Veillette (2012). 
In an effort to reverse this trend, there has been a constant evolution of the laws 
pertaining to icing certification, but Zeppetelli & Habashi (2012) note a number of 
shortcomings in the icing certification regulations, including subjective and conflicting 
icing terminology and problems with unrepresentative ice shapes used for certification 
flight-testing.  Furthermore, many of the icing issues cannot easily be addressed by 
regulatory action alone because they are linked to limitations of Angle of Attack (AoA) -
based stall warning systems, to which the discussion now turns. 
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Stalls, Angle of Attack, and Airfoil Contamination 
This section introduces a number of key aerodynamic concepts that have a direct 
bearing on the icing topic.  Figure 1 illustrates several important airfoil definitions used 
throughout this work.  Of particular significance is the geometric Angle of Attack (AoA 
or αG), which is the angle subtended between the undisturbed free-stream relative airflow 
and the wing chord line that joins the leading and trailing edges of the airfoil (Figure 1).  
The AoA can be positive, as shown in the figure, or negative, when the relative wind 
impinges on the airfoil from above the chord line.  Figure 1 also illustrates a number of 
differing AoA definitions that have application in the fields of Computational Fluid 
Design (CFD) and aircraft certification.  The Absolute AoA (αabs) is measured from the 
datum at which the airfoil produces zero lift.  For positively cambered airfoils, as 
depicted in Figure 1, αzl occurs at a negative AoA, so: 
α𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 =  αG +  α𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧                                                  (1)   
The Induced Downwash angle (ε) is characteristic of all 3-dimensional airfoils 
operating out of ground effect.  This downwash is caused by wingtip vortices that reduce 
the effective AoA (αε) experienced by the airfoil, which, in turn, is the root cause of 
Induced Drag.  The downwash and corresponding AoA decrement vary across the span of 
the airfoil, as a function of the wing’s Aspect Ratio.  This is relevant to the present study 
because the changing effective AoA across the span can affect the location and type of 
icing accumulation. 
For commuter and transport category aircraft with an aft-mounted (i.e., 
conventional) horizontal stabilizer, the main wing almost invariably operates at a positive 
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AoA, while the tail normally operates at a negative AoA, particularly during slow speed 
operations with the main wing trailing-edge flaps extended.  The relevance of this factor 
is that icing often accumulates underneath the horizontal stabilizer where it cannot be 
viewed or monitored by the crew.  In addition, the extension of flaps can counter-
intuitively exacerbate the potential for a tail stall, even as the flaps increase the stall 
margin on the main wing.  The effect of these important distinctions between wing and 
tail stalls is explicitly explored in the research design discussed in Chapter III.  Figure 1 
illustrates the typical location for airborne ice accretions on the leading edge of the airfoil 
surface at positive angles of attack.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Airfoil definitions.  The angle of attack is the angle between the relative wind 
and the airfoil chord line.  A positive AoA is shown in the figure.  The icing location and 
form factor are shown for illustrative purposes only.  Actual icing can accrete in an 
almost limitless number of shapes and coverage extent.   
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For a given wing planform operating at a fixed Equivalent Airspeed (EAS), the 
lift force is directly proportional to AoA up to a critical AoA, as shown in Figure 2.  The 
peak of the Lift Coefficient (CL) vs. α curve, CLmax, defines the stalling AoA of the 
airfoil, which is characterized by significant separation of the airflow across the low-
pressure side of the airfoil.  Stalls result in a significant loss of lift and an increase in drag 
that can lead to severe performance, stability, and control problems.  This study only 
examines wing and tail stalls and not engine compressor stalls, which are related 
phenomena that affect the airfoils of the compressor stages of a turbine engine.  This 
distinction between airfoil stalls and engine stalls is not simply semantic; it had important 
ramifications for the design of the sampling process, in order to avoid the inclusion of the 
inapplicable engine-related events that would confound the analysis.  
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Figure 2.  Lift Coefficient (CL) vs. AoA (α).  An airfoil in a clean state (i.e., without any 
icing accumulation) can achieve a higher critical AoA and a greater corresponding lift 
coefficient than an airfoil contaminated with leading-edge ice, as exemplified by the 
Accident 1 trace (Zeppetelli & Habashi, 2012, p. 618).  Reprinted with permission. 
 
 
Stall Warning Systems 
Aircraft stall warning systems are designed to alert the crew of an imminent stall 
by issuing some combination of tactile, visual, or aural cues at a safe margin below the 
critical AoA (i.e., at a speed margin above the stalling speed).  Most contemporary stall 
warning systems rely on AoA sensors because the critical AoA remains essentially 
constant, regardless of the aircraft’s speed, weight, load-factor, attitude, or other 
parameters (FAA, 2004, p. 4-3).  Unfortunately, these AoA sensors are usually mounted 
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on the fuselage sides near the nose of the aircraft, where they cannot directly sense the 
local aerodynamic conditions experienced by the wing or tail surfaces.  This is an 
important shortcoming of AoA-based stall warning systems because even small amounts 
of airfoil contamination can drastically and unpredictably reduce the stalling AoA from 
the calibrated warning-threshold value.  Current stall warning systems are also unable to 
provide real-time indication of aircraft performance and controllability margins in icing 
conditions.  The accident record is replete with instances of aircraft control being lost due 
to the effects of icing, before any warning was presented to the crew.  For example, the 
American Eagle 4184 Roselawn accident was a classic instance of an aircraft departing 
controlled flight due to airframe icing, prior to the actuation of the stall warning system 
(NTSB, 1996b).  Occasionally, the safety margins built into AoA systems for icing 
encounters can make the systems too sensitive, generating false stall warning alarms.  
The Colgan Air 3407 accident sequence began with a 20-knot premature stall warning 
indication, caused by the incorrect setting of the stall warning reference speed switch by 
the crew in response to the icing conditions (NTSB, 2010a).  This switch is used to 
recalibrate the stall warning threshold speed to account for the higher approach speeds 
used in icing conditions.  Transport Category aircraft approach speeds are based on a 
reference landing speed (Vref) (FAA, 2010a, §1.2), which is the minimum acceptable 
calibrated approach airspeed that must be maintained to a point 50 feet above the landing 
threshold.  Vref must not be less than 1.23 times the stall speed for the selected landing 
configuration in non-icing conditions (FAA, 2009c, §125).  With the datum switch set to 
the increase position, the stall warning system activates at a higher speed to 
accommodate the greater required speed safety margin.  Unfortunately, the Colgan crew 
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used the standard approach speed, which was 13 knots slower than the stick shaker 
activation threshold caused by the miss-set switch.  This resulted in an unexpected stall 
warning stick-shaker actuation – an SDT False Alarm (FA) – that startled the crew into a 
response more suited to a tail stall than a main wing stall.  The crew raised the flaps, 
applied aggressive nose up control inputs, and failed to apply maximum power.  These 
inappropriate inputs started the chain of events that led to a main wing stall, loss of 
control, and the destruction of the aircraft with the loss of all on board (NTSB, 2010a).  
Although ice was not a direct contributing aerodynamic factor for the Colgan accident, 
the FA generated by the stall warning system and the crew’s perception of the icing 
severity were both clearly pivotal to the catastrophic outcome.  The American Eagle and 
Colgan Air case studies clearly illustrate why stall warning FAs and missed warnings in 
icing conditions were important factors to be considered for the upcoming analysis.  
Tail Stalls 
Aircraft horizontal and vertical stabilizers (collectively called the empennage) are 
airfoils, like the main wing, and are therefore capable of stalling.  In particular, the 
horizontal stabilizer is more susceptible to icing effects than the main wing because its 
airfoil has a smaller leading-edge radius (i.e., a sharper leading-edge) than the wing, 
which increases the stabilizer’s efficiency as an ice collector (F. T. Lynch & Khodadoust, 
2001, p. 760; Manningham, 1997).  As a result, the tail can collect significant ice while 
the wing remains ice-free.  This is a serious problem because the empennage is typically 
outside the field of view of the aircrew so icing can accumulate undetected, particularly 
on the horizontal stabilizer’s critical underside suction surface.  As a complicating factor, 
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there is no Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) certification requirement for tail stall 
warning systems, and none are currently installed on 14 CFR Part 23 or 14 CFR Part 25 
aircraft (FAA, 2014e).  The lack of a tail stall warning system is important because the 
initial symptoms of a tail stall can be subtle and hard to distinguish from the normal 
buffeting and airframe vibrations felt during icing encounters.  Unfortunately, tail stalls 
may be triggered by pilot actions used to recover from wing stalls; wing stall recovery 
generally entails the application of maximum power combined with a firm lowering of 
the aircraft’s nose to reduce the wing’s AoA, but these actions may precipitate or 
aggravate a tail stall (NASA, 1999; Ratvasky, Van Zante, & Riley, 1999).  When faced 
with stall warning indications or an incipient LOC during an icing encounter, the aircrew 
must determine which type of stall is imminent while under intense time pressure.  Bragg 
(2002) notes that current stall warning systems fail to present aircrew with “processed 
aircraft performance degradation information” that is vital for the resolution of the 
wing/tail stall ambiguities during icing encounters.  Such incomplete, and possibly 
misleading, stall warning system information could be expected to influence the outcome 
of icing encounters, but evaluating this premise required the development of a suitable 
theoretical framework that could generate testable hypotheses.  SDT provided exactly the 
required framework. 
Signal Detection Theory 
SDT addresses an observer’s ability to discriminate an ambiguous signal from 
background noise, using a simple binary criterion: The observer decides whether the 
perceived stimulus indicates the presence or the absence of a target.  One of the first 
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practical applications of SDT related to the challenging task of discriminating real targets 
(signals) from the ambient noise on early radar displays.  There are four permutations of 
target-state and observer decision states that SDT addresses, as shown in Table 1.   
 
Table 1   
SDT Decision Outcome Permutations 
 Observer’s Decision 
True Signal State Target Present No Target Present 
Signal present Hit Miss 
No signal present False Alarm (FA) Correct Rejection (CR) 
Note.  Adapted from “Signal Detection Theory,” by H. Abdi (2009), in B. McGaw, P. L. 
Peterson, & E. Baker (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Education (3rd ed.), pp. 1-10. 
 
 
 
In addition to the literal interpretation of physical parameters such as radar target 
returns, SDT also supports the processing of abstract or metaphorical signals (Abdi, 
2009, p. 2).  This broader interpretation applies to the ability of a stall warning system to 
correctly identify an impending stall, based on whatever engineered inputs the system 
receives.  The decisions of the stall warning to activate, in relation to the true stall-state of 
the aircraft, have the same four outcome permutations as described in Table 1 with stall 
warning system substituted for observer.  SDT can also be applied at an even higher 
level, where the system comprises both the aircrew and the stall warning system.  This 
new system has an additional set of inputs that the stall warning alone does not possess: 
These are the symptoms or indications of an imminent LOC or stall originating from the 
aircraft, as perceived by the crew.  These cues could include buffeting, control anomalies, 
13 
 
 
performance losses, etc.  The combined aircrew / stall warning system processes these 
available inputs and produces an output, which was characterized for this study as either 
a correct aircrew response to the aircraft’s true stall-state or an incorrect crew response.  
The system boundaries and relationships for the hypothesized dual-SDT model are shown 
in Figure 3.  An important aspect of the figure is that the output measure for the 
combined SDT system is a binary choice between a correct aircrew response and an 
incorrect response (see the definition of terms section for the formal definition of these 
terms for the purposes of this study).  This binary crew response property led directly to 
the selection of the BLR for the research design.   
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Figure 3.  Hypothesized dual SDT system model boundaries.  Dashed arrows indicate 
that the information flow may be incomplete or inaccurate.  
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The SDT framework includes the related concepts of system sensitivity, observer 
response bias, the ideal (unbiased) observer, and the decision criterion, which are 
discussed in detail in Chapter II.  This decision criterion sets the observer’s minimum 
threshold for categorizing a stimulus as a signal instead of noise, which directly affects 
the Hit and FA percentages.  SDT defines a hypothetical ideal observer as one who sets 
the decision criterion to minimize the probability of a Miss or an FA.  This occurs when 
the decision criterion is set so that the Miss and FA probabilities are equal (if the signal 
and noise distributions have identical distributions, as assumed here).  If a real observer’s 
decision criterion differs from the ideal observer’s, then the former is said to display a 
conservative or liberal response bias.  A conservative response bias is associated with a 
high criterion, which results in fewer FAs at the expense of fewer Hits and more Misses.  
Conversely, a liberal response bias results in increased Hits and fewer Misses but more 
FAs.  SDT performance is characterized by this unavoidable tradeoff between Hit and FA 
rates associated with the setting of the decision criterion.  The interplay between these 
two factors is often shown schematically using families of Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curves for differing decision criteria.  (The ROC result for this 
study is shown in Figure 10 in Chapter IV). 
Using the SDT framework, aircrew are assumed to evaluate aircraft cues and stall 
warning alerts that exceed the decision criterion as a stall condition.  Stimuli that fall 
below the threshold would be categorized as a no-stall condition, and any attendant stall 
warnings would be judged as FAs.  In order for such an analysis to provide useful 
predictions, the processes that aircrew use to set their decision criterion must be 
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understood.  A brief exploration of Bayes’ Theorem and its relationship to vigilance tasks 
provides an insight into the mechanisms that might be involved.   
Vigilance Tasks and Bayes’ Theorem 
Vigilance tasks may be characterized as those that require operators to monitor 
systems for long periods while trying to identify phenomena that are infrequent, 
unpredictable, and possibly insidious in their onset.  The majority of icing-related LOC 
events occur unexpectedly during cruise flight (Appiah-Kubi et al., 2013; Petty & Floyd, 
2004), which is normally a low-workload period for the aircrew.  Under normal 
circumstances, the chance of encountering a stall in cruise flight is very small, so the stall 
monitoring activity can be characterized as a vigilance task.  In these circumstances, an 
operator’s decision criterion is calibrated according to the low expected likelihood of the 
event (e.g., the wing or tail stall).  As already discussed, icing can increase the stall 
probability substantially, which has important ramifications that are quantified by Bayes’ 
Theorem.  The theorem is discussed in greater detail in Chapter II, but in its simplest 
formulation, it indicates that conditional probabilities are not commutative; instead, they 
depend on the a-priori likelihood of the event, as indicated by the following example: Is 
the probability of rain, given the occurrence of clouds, the same as the probability of 
clouds, given the occurrence of rain?  Clearly not.  Even a cursory analysis reveals that 
these probabilities could differ, possibly by orders of magnitude.  For example, clouds are 
almost always present when it is raining, so:  
P (Clouds | Rain) = 1                                                     (2) 
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Where A | B indicates the conditional probability of A, given the actual 
occurrence of B.  Conversely: 
0 ≤ P (Rain | Clouds) ≤ 1                                     (3) 
The conditional probability of rain, given the occurrence of clouds, would be near 
unity during the rainy season in the tropics and near zero for a dry desert region.  The 
conditional probability is therefore strongly determined by the a-priori probability of both 
the rain and the cloud events, as indicated by Bayes’ Theorem: 
 
𝑃𝑃 (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 | 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) = 𝑃𝑃 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎 | 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)  𝑃𝑃 (𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)
𝑃𝑃 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎)                           (4) 
 
As a result:  
P (Clouds | Rain) ≠ P (Rain | Clouds)                                (5) 
 
Bayes’ formula is equally applicable to the relationship between stalls and stall 
warnings: 
 
𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 | 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊) = 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊 | 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)
𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊)              (6) 
 
This relationship is important because of its implications for the previously 
discussed SDT decision criterion.  During vigilance tasks, aircrew would establish their 
stall-related decision criterion through years of flight experience, predominantly free of 
severe icing encounters and their associated LOC situations.  The resulting decision 
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criterion should be near the SDT ideal observer’s value for non-icing conditions, 
otherwise aircrew would experience a preponderance of Misses or FAs, and would fine-
tune their criterion to eliminate the imbalance.  The criterion would also remain relatively 
stable because its validity would be reinforced on an almost daily basis. 
Bayes’ Theorem shows that as the stall probability (Pstall) increases in icing, so 
does the corresponding conditional probability P (Stall | Stall Warning), in direct 
proportion.  This shift would invalidate the aircrew’s pre-established decision criterion 
unless the crew were to adjust the criterion for the new environment.  In SDT terms, the 
negative conditioning exhibited by a failure to shift the decision criterion would represent 
a conservative crew response bias in icing conditions.  Per SDT, the CIRB results in a 
greater susceptibility to Missed stall detections, albeit with less susceptibility to FA 
occurrences.  A conservative decision-making bias should not be confused with 
conservative behavior, as the former can actually be very risky if it results in a valid stall 
warning being ignored.  The conservative response bias shift predicted by Bayes’ 
Theorem and SDT in a vigilance task context is the last element required to produce a 
verifiable model of the aircrew / stall warning interaction in icing conditions.  The model 
is appropriately called the Conservative Icing Response Bias model.  
The Conservative Icing Response Bias (CIRB) Model 
The CIRB hypothesis combines a dual SDT framework with Bayes’ Theorem to 
create a testable model of the combined aircrew / stall warning system behavior outcomes 
during icing encounters.  The CIRB hypothesis could explain a perplexing aspect of 
several aviation icing accidents: Why did some aircrew apparently fail to appreciate the 
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severity of their icing encounter (NTSB, 1996c) while others overreacted to benign 
conditions (NTSB, 2010a)?  Still others obviously grasped the severity of the problem yet 
failed to take meaningful actions to save the aircraft (Taiwan Aviation Safety Council, 
2005, p. ii).  The literature gives few insights into the causes of these heterogeneous crew 
responses, but the CIRB provides a framework for such an analysis.  The model begins 
by coding the stall warning system behavior and aircraft stall-state in SDT terms, as 
shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2   
Comparison of Stall Warning Outcomes and SDT Constructs 
 Stall Warning System Response 
Aircraft   
Statea 
No  
Stall Warning 
Wing-stall 
Warning Alert 
Tail-stall 
Warning  
(Dummy Variable)b  
Aircraft 
not stalled 
System CR  
No action is required. 
System FA 
The wing stall warning 
must be ignored. 
 
System FA 
The tail stall warning 
must be ignored. 
Incipient or 
developed 
wing stall 
System Miss 
The wing stall must be 
identified by other 
means, and an 
appropriate recovery 
executed. 
System Hit 
The wing stall warning 
must be acted upon, 
for a correct stall 
recovery to be 
executed. 
System FA and Miss 
The tail stall warning 
must be ignored; the 
wing stall must be 
identified by other 
means.  An appropriate 
wing stall recovery 
must be executed. 
Incipient or 
developed 
tail stall 
System Miss 
The tail stall must be 
identified by other 
means, and an 
appropriate recovery 
must be executed. 
System FA and Miss 
The wing stall warning 
must be ignored; the 
tail stall must be 
identified by other 
means, and appropriate 
recovery must be 
executed. 
 
System Hit 
The tail stall warning 
must be acted upon, 
and an appropriate tail 
stall recovery must be 
executed. 
Note.  aA simultaneous wing and tail stall is unlikely because a stalled horizontal 
stabilizer is inherently unable to generate the required down-force to raise the main wing 
to a stalling AoA.  bThere are currently no 14 CFR Part 23 or 25 airworthiness 
requirements for systems to provide an artificial warning of an impending tail stall, so the 
provision of a tail stall warning alert is included as a dummy variable to support the 
ensuing analysis. 
 
 
 
As Table 2 illustrates, a stall warning system could detect (Hit) or fail to detect 
(Miss) a wing stall.  There are currently no stall warning systems that address tail stalls, 
but these cases still had to be encoded for the STD analysis using a dummy tail stall 
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warning variable.  This is because SDT does not differentiate between Misses due to an 
absent system and Misses associated with a less-than-perfect installed device; both 
outcomes would be encoded as stall warning Misses, as shown in the table.  In addition to 
Hits and Misses, stall warning systems can produce FAs by issuing an alert when no stall 
is imminent or CRs when they remain silent when no threat is present (the nominal 
situation).  Other combinations are less relevant.  For example, simultaneously occurring 
wing and tail stalls are unlikely because a stalled horizontal stabilizer is inherently unable 
to generate the required down-force to achieve the main wing’s critical AoA, unless the 
aircraft is in an inverted stall as described by Telford (1988).  Nevertheless, this 
combination is so atypical that it is not addressed in the table.  The combination of a wing 
stall warning during a tail stall is also improbable but could not be ruled out until the data 
were examined, so this combination was retained in Table 2. 
Table 2 also illustrates the complex decisions that the crew must make to 
correctly respond to the numerous permutations of aircraft stall states and stall warning 
system behaviors during icing encounters.  Under these circumstances, an imminent stall 
or LOC can occur with little or no notice, and the crew must very rapidly discriminate 
between a wing or tail stall and apply the appropriate recovery techniques in the highly 
stressful environment associated with an impending loss of control.  The crew might 
encounter severe aircraft buffeting and motions, unusual control forces and deflections, 
and a multitude of cockpit alarms, all competing for the limited processing capacity of 
the pilot’s working memory (Endsley & Jones, 2012, p. 2.5).  All of these factors increase 
the noise term in the SDT calculations, which should lead to an increase in both types of 
decision-making errors (Misses and FAs), in the absence of the CIRB hypothesis.  In 
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contrast, CIRB predicts that the negative conditioning associated with vigilance tasks and  
the resulting conservative decision criterion bias should lead to testable predictions of 
increased susceptibility to system Misses and a reduced susceptibility to FAs.   
In order for these predictions to be tested, SDT requires that the ROC curves be 
established for a range of decision criteria.  This is usually accomplished experimentally 
by plotting the Hit vs. FA data for differing controlled decision criteria, in order to 
determine the system’s sensitivity and response bias.  This information is unfortunately 
not accessible using archival data, as the decision criterion levels can neither be measured 
nor systematically varied.  This does not imply, however, that the crew response bias 
effect in icing conditions does not exist.  What is needed is a method of gauging the 
correctness of the crew / stall warning system based on the SDT Hit, Miss, FA, and CR 
factors.  The binary logistic regression provides a mechanism for achieving this 
integration, as described in the following section. 
The Binary Logistic Regression 
The BLR is a robust multivariate modeling technique for predicting and 
explaining a binary categorical (Yes / No) outcome from a combination of metric or non-
metric independent variables (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010, p. 317).  The 
mechanics of the method are discussed more fully in Chapter III, but the BLR’s 
importance to this study is that it can test the hypotheses made by the CIRB model.  The 
BLR is the final tool required for the application of SDT techniques to the problem of 
aircrew interactions with their stall warning systems in icing conditions. 
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Summary 
The literature shows that airframe icing is a longstanding and ongoing problem 
for aircraft operations.  The accident and incident records are replete with inexplicably 
divergent crew responses to similar situations ranging from apparent nonchalance to 
overreactions, with both extremes having led to the loss of aircraft.  A dual SDT model 
provides a promising framework for modeling aircrew decision-making performance 
outcomes, as well as the performance of the stall warning system in icing.  As a first step 
in the model’s application, the stall warning system and crew behavioral outcomes are 
mapped to the standard SDT categories: Hit, Miss, FA, and CR.  For the stall warning 
system, these classifications represent the permutations of the stall warning outputs in the 
presence or absence of a real stall condition.  Similarly, for the combined aircrew / stall 
warning system, the four categories relate to successful or unsuccessful initial crew 
decision-making outcomes in response to the perceived aircraft stall cues and / or stall 
warning alerts.   
SDT embodies the concept of a decision criterion that demarcates the threshold 
above which a stimulus is viewed as a signal.  An SDT ideal observer is unbiased and 
sets the decision criterion in an optimum manner to minimize undesirable Misses and 
FAs.  Any deviation from the ideal threshold represents a conservative or liberal bias.  
The final CIRB assumption is that aircrew subconsciously set and fine-tune their decision 
criterion to approximate an ideal observer during routine non-icing operations.  This low-
intensity stall-monitoring activity during non-icing cruise flight can be characterized as a 
vigilance task because the stall probabilities are very low and stall warnings are 
infrequent.  Aircrew may become negatively conditioned and therefore carry forward the 
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same decision criterion to the icing case, where the stall probabilities are much higher.  
Under these circumstances, Bayes’ Theorem predicts that the conditional probability of a 
stall, subject to a stall warning, increases markedly in icing flight, which invalidates the 
previously established decision criterion and introduces a conservative aircrew response 
bias in icing, hence the CIRB nomenclature.  CIRB predicts an increased susceptibility to 
incorrect decision-making outcomes arising from Missed stall warning detections, 
accompanied by a greater tolerance to FA occurrences during icing conditions, both in 
relation to the stall warning Hit baseline rates. 
Unfortunately, this bias shift hypothesis cannot be directly tested using archival 
sources because SDT requires a range of decision criterion values and corresponding Hit 
and FA rates to determine the system sensitivity and response bias parameters.  The 
problem can be solved by incorporating the SDT framework of Hits, Misses, FAs, and 
CRs as factors in a Binary Logistic Regression, with the crew response outcome as the 
binary dependent variable.  The SDT classifications of the stall warning system behavior 
and the aircraft wing / tail stall-state were therefore selected as the primary independent 
variables for the basic CIRB model.  The combination of the dual SDT framework, 
Bayes’ Theorem, and the predicted response bias shift constitute the CIRB hypothesis.  
The BLR allowed the model’s bias-shift predictions to be tested using NTSB accident 
and NASA ASRS archival data. 
Statement of the Problem 
The literature shows that the majority of airborne icing accidents result from 
aircraft stalls, yet there is no theoretical model that ties the success or failure of the crew 
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decision-making in icing to the performance of the stall warning system (Green et al., 
1996, p. 2).  This knowledge gap imposes reactionary and untargeted regulatory 
responses that have failed to fully resolve the icing issue, despite decades of effort.  
Significance of the Study 
The novel application of SDT methodology and Bayes’ Theorem has resulted in 
the CIRB model of the influence of stall warning system performance on crew decision-
making outcomes during icing encounters.  The CIRB model provides the missing 
theoretical framework.  CIRB builds upon Sarter & Schroeder’s (2001) simulator studies 
of decision-making during high-workload icing encounters, but the model’s theoretical 
basis provides testable predictions regarding the influence of stall warning system Misses 
and False Alarms in icing.  The CIRB hypothesis should be equally applicable to archival 
research using different databases, and it should be a useful aid for future experimental 
research designs.  If validated by such future research, the underlying theory will provide 
a new tool that will yield a better understanding of the interaction between the aircrew, 
the icing environment, and the aircraft’s stall protection and warning systems.  This 
research should also yield generalizable system guidelines to aircraft manufacturers, 
flight test personnel, and certification agencies, relating to the relative significance of 
correct, misleading, and missing stall warning information for the main wing and 
horizontal tail surfaces.  Some of the processes used in the current research design, such 
as the correct crew response decision criteria described in Chapter III, should also help 
provide a standardized methodology for evaluating crew behavior outcomes in complex 
and dynamic environments, using archival data.  If validated, the CIRB hypothesis should 
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lead to recommendations regarding required levels of stall warning system reliability, 
selectivity (SDT Hit ratio), and specificity (SDT CR ratio).  These recommendations 
should lead to concrete and verifiable measures for reducing icing-related accidents and 
for evaluating the relative benefits of installing new protection systems such as 
Aerodynamic Performance Monitors and tail-stall warning systems.  The ultimate and 
overriding objective of the research is to save lives. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of the research was to evaluate the CIRB SDT model of aircrew 
decision-making in icing conditions by means of an archival analysis of U.S. aircraft 
icing incident and accident data.  The model was used to determine the influence of stall 
warning system behavior in cueing aircrew to perform correctly during hazardous 
airborne icing encounters.  For this purpose, correct aircrew performance was defined as:  
1. Implementing appropriate wing-stall or tail-stall prevention and / or recovery 
procedures subsequent to a stall warning alarm or other indications of a developing 
stall condition, such as: controllability and performance issues, airframe buffeting, 
and abnormal control forces and reactions. 
2. Taking no stall prevention or recovery action under False Alarm conditions.    
Hypotheses 
The fundamental research question pertains to the influence of stall warning 
system performance on aircrew behavior outcomes during hazardous airborne icing 
encounters.  Using a baseline of normal stall warning system performance (i.e., SDT 
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Hits), the CIRB hypothesis predicts that aircrew would be more susceptible to making 
incorrect responses when faced with stall warning system Misses and less likely to make 
incorrect responses when faced with system False Alarms.  The following hypotheses 
were used to test these predictions.  Although the stated hypotheses used two-sided tests 
for significance, the BLR methodology allows the direction of the relationship to be 
established: 
1. H01: There is no significant difference in the crew performance outcome between a 
valid system stall warning (HIT) and a stall warning Miss. 
2. H02: There is no significant difference in the crew performance outcome between a 
valid system stall warning (HIT) and a stall warning False Alarm. 
Research Approach 
A nomothetic exploratory archival analysis (Babbie, 2013, pp. 91-93; Vogt, 
Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012, pp. 86 - 95) was conducted using NTSB accident data 
(NTSB, 2012a) and NASA ASRS reports (NASA, 2014).  Because of the relatively small 
number of icing records, the methodology resembled formalized case study research, 
which Zotov (2000) deemed the appropriate approach for determining the underlying 
causes of aircraft accidents.  A two-phase research design was employed.  The first phase 
addressed the data sampling, scrubbing, and verification activities, in preparation for the 
second phase, which entailed the execution of the BLR analysis, along with the 
associated hypothesis testing.  Although the qualitative archival review was a prerequisite 
for the subsequent quantitative analyses, the process was iterated to fine-tune the sample 
for the best BLR outcome. 
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The first phase sampling process began with an exploration of the accident and 
incident archives to select a sampling frame that contained the airborne icing cases in 
which the state of the stall warning system, aircraft icing state, aircraft wing / tail stall 
status, and crew responses could be definitively ascertained.  As part of this phase, a pre-
test was conducted using both of the target databases to establish the approximate number 
of cases that would be encountered.  The pre-test results indicated that the final number 
of cases would be between approximately 100 and 500, which was sufficiently small for 
the case processing and sample selection to be performed manually.  In order to pre-
screen the ASRS and NTSB database, while ensuring that the required information would 
be available for the analysis, the samples were constrained to turbine powered non-
amateur built aircraft.  This subset of the population is generally equipped with cockpit 
voice recorders (CVR) and / or flight data recorders (FDR), which were essential in many 
cases for retrieving the required data.  The turbine-only constraint had the added benefit 
of limiting the sample predominantly to the larger turboprop or turbojet aircraft that are 
the focus of the study.   
The case selection for the ASRS and NTSB databases relied on carefully crafted 
Boolean keyword search queries.  The literature contains several useful precedents for 
searching the NTSB and ASRS databases for icing cases (Appiah-Kubi et al., 2013; 
Aventin, Morency, & Nadeau, 2015; S. D. Green, 2006).  The pre-tests also helped in the 
refinement of the search terms to be used for the main study.  
The sampling phase concluded with the encoding of the selected cases in SDT 
terms to capture the correctness of the crew response, the stall warning system SDT 
categorization (Hit, Miss, FA, and CR), and the aircraft stall-state (wing-stall, tail-stall, 
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no stall).  The data were also encoded to allow the individual or collective treatment of 
the ASRS and NTSB archives.  The encoded NTSB and ASRS sample datasets were 
processed using Microsoft® Excel™ and Access™ software packages, which were used 
for merging the two databases, data integrity verification, missing data identification, and 
duplicate data checks.  Few data duplications were anticipated or encountered, and the 
relatively small number of records allowed these records to be identified and merged 
manually.  The scrubbed data and merged data samples were exported into IBM® SPSS™ 
and SAS® Enterprise Miner™ statistical software packages for the execution of the 
Binary Logistic Regression in Phase 2.  The data sampling and scrubbing processes are 
described in greater detail in the Treatment of the Data section in Chapter III. 
The BLR analysis (Hair et al., 2010, pp. 317-344) was conducted in Phase 2 to 
determine the influence of stall warning system behavior on aircrew responses during 
airborne icing encounters, to evaluate the CIRB coefficients, and to test the research 
hypotheses.  A single dichotomous dependent variable (DV), encoded as 
correct_response, was used to record the efficacy of the crew’s initial reaction to the 
perceived imminent stall or LOC event.  The primary binary independent variables (IV) 
for the basic CIRB model were the four SDT permutations related to the stall warning 
system operation: Hit, Miss, FA, and CR.  The wing stall and tail stall conditions were 
introduced as secondary independent variables for a comprehensive CIRB model that 
also included a new system_issue IV, the need for which was identified during the 
qualitative analysis of the databases.  Summary statistics were generated for the ASRS 
and NTSB data individually and for the combined data ASRS / NTSB dataset.  For 
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reasons that are explained in Chapter IV, the BLR was only conducted on the combined 
dataset.  
Population and Sample 
The population was comprised of the fleet of civilian U.S. (N-registered), non-
amateur built (in NTSB database terminology), turbine-powered airplanes.  The sample 
contained the subset of accidents and incidents of U.S. registered, non-amateur built, 
turbine-powered airplanes with icing-related NTSB Probable Cause entries and ASRS 
reports between January 1, 1988, and October 2, 2015, for which the aircraft stall-state, 
stall warning system performance, and crew performance could all be determined 
unambiguously by two subject matter experts (SMEs).     
The ASRS and NTSB samples were initially encoded independently by the author 
and a second SME using a structured procedure, an unambiguous codebook, and a 
formalized checklist, as described in Chapter III and shown in Appendix D.  The two 
SMEs manually selected records containing an imminent onset of an icing-induced wing 
or tail stall, loss of control situation, or receipt of a stall warning.  If the required stall 
warning, aircraft stall status, and aircrew performance parameters could be definitively 
determined, these records were encoded with these data and retained in the sample.  If 
one or more of the key data elements were missing, or if the SMEs disagreed on the 
disposition of an individual record following mutual consultation, then the entire record 
was deleted from the sample - a listwise deletion in IBM® SPSS™ terminology.  The pre-
tests results and literature review indicated that adequate samples could be obtained from 
the ASRS and NTSB data to perform the BLR analysis (S. D. Green, 2006; Petty & 
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Floyd, 2004).  Nevertheless, there were a number of challenges associated with the 
selection, categorization, and encoding of the data samples, as described in the next 
section.  
Delimitations 
The research focus was on the subset of the population of U.S. registered aircraft 
operations that have been recorded in either the NTSB accident database or NASA ASRS 
databases because of icing encounters.  This is an important limitation because the vast 
majority of icing encounters are successfully negotiated; accordingly, the findings from 
this study are only generalizable to icing events that lead to accidents or noteworthy 
incidents, as characterized by their inclusion in the two target databases.  The study 
depended on the availability of first-hand narratives from surviving crewmembers or 
usable data from installed CVR and / or FDR equipment.  In simplified terms, 14 CFR § 
91.609 requires flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders for U.S. civil registered, 
multiengine, turbine-powered airplane with 10 or more passenger seats and for those with 
six or more passenger seats for which two pilots are required (FAA, 2010c; FAA, 2010d).  
The study was therefore limited to turbine aircraft, in order to ensure a reasonable 
probability of having access to CVR or FDR data.  This was particularly important for the 
NTSB accident cases, where first-hand crew narratives were often unavailable in the 
absence of a CVR, if the crew did not survive the event.  The turbine requirement was 
applied consistently across the ASRS and NTSB databases, with one relaxation: In some 
cases, the ASRS database records were missing the explicit entry to the engine type.  
These records were encoded as turbine events when significant indicators were available 
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to support this assumption, such as: high cruise altitudes, mention of bleed air, aircraft 
slats, etc., which predisposed toward a turbine classification.  The SMEs did not 
experience any difficulty or ambiguity in making these rare classification judgment calls. 
Overall, the turbine-only limitation should not have a severe impact on the 
generalizability of the proposed research because the large number of U.S. registered 
aircraft and their varied operations should ensure sufficient randomization to produce 
meaningful results.  Furthermore, the aircraft classes and configurations that were 
included in the sampling frame are the most relevant from an icing perspective, as 
smaller Part 91 and homebuilt aircraft are generally operated in visual flight conditions 
with far less exposure to icing.   
Another delimitation of the study was its reliance on the NTSB probable cause 
summaries for the initial case selection.  The NTSB full narrative was only consulted 
when the factors of interest were ambiguous in the probable cause statement.  This could 
have led to rare misclassifications in the unlikely event that the full narrative favored a 
different crew performance outcome or stall warning system behavior than those derived 
from the probable cause summaries.  Within these constraints, the methodology, sample 
size, and composition should be more than adequate for the hypotheses tests and study 
outcomes to be reliable and generalizable. 
The author, a flight operations and certification SME, performed two important 
subjective assessments related to the processing of the archival data.  This section 
addresses these activities, as well as the author’s qualifications to make the required 
assessments as an SME.  These are important considerations because the validity and 
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reliability of the study both depend to a large degree on the correct record selection and 
variable encodings.  
The first evaluation was the determination of whether sufficient data were present 
in each individual NASA ASRS or NTSB record to allow its inclusion into the BLR 
analysis sample.  This required that the aircrew performance, stall warning system 
operation, and aircraft wing / tail icing status to be determinable unambiguously.  The 
second evaluation was an assessment of the correctness of the crew’s initial response to 
the icing encounter, which constituted the correct / incorrect binary dependent variable in 
the BLR analysis.  Of the two assessments, the first was relatively straightforward, 
because the required data were either present or not, and there was little subjectivity 
involved.  The second assessment was more challenging because it involved a subjective 
evaluation of crew performance from a limited archival record.  Green succinctly 
captured this challenge: 
Quantitative analysis was possible in certain data fields; however, with 
respect to the nature and characteristics of the event sequences, it was necessary 
to add a carefully considered set of inferences to develop models of the accident 
morphology.  This was rather like reconstructing a number of clay pots from the 
shards recovered at an archaeological dig.  To obtain a sketch of the complete pot, 
certain gaps must be inferred.  An example of such inferences is the addition of a 
“loss of control” element to a sequence that had concluded with an “uncontrolled 
descent.”  A more significant inference that was used extensively, was the 
addition of a “stall” to the event sequence when a “loss of control” had been 
identified.  The premise used in this case was that a loss of control, if in fact due 
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to ice accretion, only occurs when some degree of flow separation takes place.  A 
report, which suggested icing as a cause of an uncontrolled descent, would thus be 
described in the database as a stall, leading to a loss of control, and concluding 
with an uncontrolled descent.  Analysis of this portion of the data were (sic) 
therefore more qualitative.  (Green, 2006, p. 3) 
As an added complication, correct crew performance sometimes resulted in 
accidents, for example in cases where the icing severity overwhelmed the aircraft and its 
systems despite appropriate crew action.  In other cases, aircraft survived unscathed, 
despite less than optimal aircrew performance outcomes.  For these reasons, a simple 
successful / unsuccessful outcome categorization was an inadequate proxy for the desired 
correct crew performance measure.  A structured process, described in Chapter III, was 
developed to minimize the subjective aspects of Green’s method.  This process 
incorporated objective checklist criteria for the sample selection and data encoding to 
minimize subjectivity and bias.  The procedure was evaluated during the pre-test of the 
ASRS data and was found to properly address all the cases with no unresolved 
ambiguities. 
The validity of the proposed research strongly depends on the correct encoding of 
the crew performance outcomes and stall warning system behavior for the BLR analysis.  
Incorrect classification of these variables would compromise the internal validity of the 
BLR, which would in turn severely impact the external validity of any conclusions drawn 
from the analysis.  The required classification rigor and consistency was achieved in two 
ways: The primary safeguard was the rigorous classification schema, coupled with a 
robust codebook (Appendix D) for the “exhaustive and mutually exclusive” coding of the 
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variables of interest, which should ensure the reliability of the data encoding activity 
(Babbie, 2013, p. 417).  The use of a second SME added a level of quality assurance to 
the author’s categorization of the crew performance outcomes and stall warning system 
behavior factors, as encoded for the BLR.  These aspects are discussed in greater depth in 
Chapters II and III.    
Limitations and Assumptions 
Accident data were derived from the NTSB accident database from January 1, 
1988, to October 2, 2015, inclusive.  The former represents the first availability of full 
NTSB docket data on-line and also corresponded to the start date selected by Green for 
his (2006) comprehensive study of U.S. inflight icing accidents.  The October 2, 2015 
cutoff represents the selected end-date for the data extract used in the ASRS pre-test 
discussed in Chapter III that resulted in 115 usable cases.  For consistency, the same end-
date was used for the NTSB accident data, which also ensured that probable cause 
findings had been published for almost all of the NTSB records used in the analysis.  The 
NTSB accident database is comprehensive because of the legal obligation to report all 
accidents and certain types of incidents (NTSB, 2010b).  A pre-test of the NTSB accident 
database using these parameters (cf. chapter III) retrieved 5,110 records before data 
scrubbing.  This ensured that a viable sample could be obtained for the BLR analysis.  
The NTSB data were supplemented by the ASRS records to further populate the aircrew 
performance outcome measure.  Unlike the compulsory NTSB accident reporting, 
participation in ASRS is voluntary and subject to self-reporting (response) bias, as well as 
manual filtering by data entry personnel.  As a result of these factors, a limitation of the 
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ASRS data is that many incidents go unreported, and even the reported incidents are 
subject to filtering before being selected for inclusion into the ASRS database.  These 
limitations are clearly outlined in the reference materials published by NASA Ames that 
are included in Appendix B.   
The ASRS selection bias effects were mitigated in a number of ways.  First, the 
combined databases are very large; Green found 9,299 relevant icing events using similar 
databases and search criteria, albeit using an additional FAA Accidents / Incidents Data 
System (AIDS) (2006).  A second mitigating factor is the anonymous and altruistic nature 
of incident reporting, as well as the specific ASRS FAA Compliance and Enforcement 
Program incentive of eliminating noncriminal enforcement action for ASRS respondents 
(FAA, 2011a).  More pragmatically, there are few other sources for the required data, and 
most alternatives also depend on voluntary reporting. 
The crew response outcomes derived from both databases were subject to 
confounding from uncontrolled external factors such as aircraft type, type of operation, 
pilot experience, etc.  For example, it could be posited that professional crews would be 
more likely than private pilots to recognize anomalous indications from their stall 
warning systems during icing encounters.  Petty & Floyd (2004) used stratification by 
type of operation (Part 91, 121, or 135) to minimize these effects, but this was impractical 
for the current study because the BLR severely constrains the number of possible IVs for 
a given sample size.  Each new stratification variable requires an additional BLR model 
coefficient to be estimated, and the BLR technique is very sensitive to the minimum 
number of records in each of these bins.  Hair et al. (2010, p. 333) specify that each BLR 
group should have a minimum sample size of 10 times the number of estimated model 
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coefficients (which correspond to the number of IVs).  This would quickly become 
problematic if an excessive number of stratification variables were introduced, 
considering that the ASRS pre-test revealed just 115 total cases.  The final data samples 
were large enough to meet the minimum sample sizes required by the BLR with the 
limited number of variables proposed in Chapter III.  Stratification based on other 
variables such as pilot experience would have been challenging because of the effect on 
required group sample sizes, and because the data were not consistently available, 
particularly in the self-reported ASRS database.  Nevertheless, the proposed CVR/FDR 
requirement tended to exclude the highly heterogeneous private pilot operations and 
selected towards the more homogeneous professional crew operations, which should 
reduce the need for stratification.  
The impact of these delimitations on the study’s validity and reliability was 
addressed in a number of ways.  Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele encourage the use of 
triangulation, which entails the application of different methods to explore a single 
phenomenon in order to add depth of understanding and increase confidence in the 
outcome of the study (2012, pp. 111 and 113).  Triangulation was achieved in this study 
through the use of combined data from two completely independent databases.  Vogt et 
al. also encourage a thick understanding that arises when a phenomenon is examined in 
close conjunction with its natural context (2012, pp. 71-72).  The SME review of the 
accident narratives provided this level of detailed context-sensitive understanding that 
should further bolster the construct validity of the study.  A final mechanism for 
improving the study’s reliability and validity was the adoption of the BLR multivariate 
technique, which is robust and resistant to violations of the usual constraints that apply to 
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most forms of inferential statistical analysis, such as data normality and 
homoscedasticity.  In summary, the proposed application of a mixed-method approach to 
two large datasets should compensate for the limitations of the study and result in valid 
and generalizable outcomes of value to future researchers. 
Definitions of Terms 
Angle of Attack (AoA) The angle between the chord line (that joins the 
airfoil’s leading and trailing edges) and the relative 
airflow.   
 
Commuter Category “Multiengine airplanes that have a seating 
configuration, excluding pilot seats, of 19 or less, 
and a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 
19,000 pounds or less” (CFR Title 14 §23.3(d)). 
 
Conservative Icing 
Response Bias (CIRB) 
A model based on Signal Detection Theory and 
Bayes’ Theorem that predicts that aircrew are 
conditioned to exhibit a conservative bias response 
to stall warnings during icing encounters.  This bias 
would be expected to lead to increase errors in the 
face of stall warning Misses and reduced errors due 
to False Alarms. 
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Correct Crew Performance 
Outcome 
(1) Implementing appropriate wing-stall or tail-stall 
prevention and / or recovery procedures subsequent 
to a stall warning alarm or other indications of a 
developing stall condition, such as: controllability 
and performance issues; airframe buffeting; and 
abnormal control forces and reactions; and (2) 
taking no stall prevention or recovery action under 
false-alarm conditions.  Used interchangeably within 
the manuscript with Correct Decision-Making and 
Correct Crew Response outcome, dependent on the 
context.  Recorded as the Correct_Response 
measure in the analysis. 
 
Correct Rejection (CR) An SDT term for the situation when a subject 
correctly recognizes the absence of a signal during a 
vigilance task. 
 
Critical Angle of Attack The angle of attack corresponding to the maximum 
attainable lift coefficient (CLmax) of an airfoil. 
 
Decision Criterion (d') An SDT concept that defines an observer’s stimulus 
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threshold, above which a perceived stimulus is 
deemed to represent a target detection (i.e., a signal).  
Below the decision criterion threshold, the perceived 
stimulus is judged to be noise. 
 
Equivalent Airspeed Indicated Airspeed corrected for position and 
instrument errors and compressibility effects. 
 
False Alarm (FA) An SDT term for the situation when a subject 
incorrectly detects a signal when no signal is present 
during a vigilance task.  
 
Hit An SDT term for the situation when a subject 
correctly detects a signal that actually exists during a 
vigilance task.  Hit is capitalized throughout this 
manuscript when used in the SDT context. 
 
Miss An SDT term for a subject failing to detect a signal 
that existed during a vigilance task.  Miss is 
capitalized throughout this manuscript when used in 
the SDT context. 
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Signal Detection Theory 
(SDT) 
A human factors method for evaluating operator 
responses to sensory stimuli during vigilance tasks, 
where the signals of interest occur relatively 
infrequently and have low amplitudes in relation to 
the background noise level.  These factors result in 
Missed detections and False Alarms in addition to 
the desired target detections (Hits) and correct 
rejections (CR) of noise elements. 
 
Stall The phenomenon caused by airflow separation 
beyond an airfoil’s critical Angle-of-Attack that 
results in a loss of lift, increase in drag, and potential 
stability and control issues for the aircraft.  All 
airfoils (wing, tail, fin) on a conventional aircraft are 
susceptible to the stall phenomenon. 
 
Stall Warning System An aircraft system designed to alert the aircrew of 
an impending aerodynamic stall.  A combination of 
visual, aural, and tactile cues may be employed. 
 
Transport Category Multi-engine airplanes with more than 19 seats or a 
maximum takeoff weight greater than 19,000 lbs. 
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List of Acronyms 
14 CFR Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations  
αabs Absolute Angle of Attack 
αε Effective Angle of Attack 
αG  Geometric Angle of Attack 
αZL  Zero Lift Angle of Attack 
AC Advisory Circular 
AD Airworthiness Directive  
ADREP  (ICAO) Accident and Incident Data-Reporting Database 
AFM Airplane Flight Manual 
AIDS FAA Accidents/Incidents Data System 
AIM Aeronautical Information Manual  
AoA Angle of Attack 
APM Aerodynamic Performance Monitoring  
ASRS NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System 
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ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials 
BEA Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile  
BLR Binary Logistic Regression   
CADORS Civil Aviation Daily Occurrence Reporting System (Transport Canada) 
CCR Correct Crew Response 
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics  
CFIT Controlled Flight into Terrain 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CIRB Conservative Icing Response Bias (model) 
CL Lift Coefficient 
CLmax Maximum Lift Coefficient 
CR Correct Rejection (Signal Detection Theory construct) 
CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder  
df Degrees of Freedom 
DSS Decision Support System 
DV Dependent Variable(s) 
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ε Induced Downwash 
EAS Equivalent Airspeed 
Exp(B) Exponentiated Logistic Coefficient(s) 
FA False Alarm (Signal Detection Theory construct) 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations  
FDR Flight Data Recorder 
FOQA Flight Operational Quality Assurance  
GA General Aviation 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICTS Ice-contaminated-tailplane-stall  
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions  
IV Independent Variable(s) 
LOC Loss of Control 
NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
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NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NBAA National Business Aircraft Association 
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking  
NPV Negative Predictive Value (for Binary Logistic Regression) 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
Part 23 14 CFR Part 23 (Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, Commuter Category 
aircraft) 
Part 25 14 CFR Part 25 (Transport Category aircraft) 
Part 91 14 CFR Part 91 (General operating and flight rules) 
Part 121  14 CFR Part 121 (Domestic, flag, and supplemental operations) 
Part 125  4 CFR Part 125 (Airplanes that have a seating configuration of 20 or 
more passengers or a maximum payload capacity of 6,000 pounds or 
more when common carriage is not involved) 
Part 135  14 CFR Part 135 (Commuter and on-demand operating requirements) 
PPV Positive Predictive Value (for Binary Logistic Regression) 
Pstall Stall Probability 
ROC (SDT) Receiver Operating Characteristic 
46 
 
 
SAFO (FAA) Safety Alert for Operators  
SDT Signal Detection Theory 
SE Standard Error 
SFAR Special Federal Aviation Regulation  
SLD Supercooled Large Droplets 
SME Subject Matter Expert  
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
Vref Reference Landing Speed (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010a, 
§1.2)  
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Chapter II Review of the Relevant Literature 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The purpose of this study was to determine the influence of the stall warning 
system behavior in cueing aircrew to perform correctly during hazardous airborne icing 
encounters.  A Conservative Icing Response Bias (CIRB) model of aircrew behavior 
outcomes was proposed, based on an SDT framework and Bayes’ Theorem.  The model 
predicts that aircrew should be more error-prone when faced with stall warning Misses 
and less error-prone in the face of False Alarms (FA), as compared to the baseline 
condition of correct stall warning system behavior (Hits).  Two hypotheses were used to 
test the significance of Misses and FAs against the baseline crew performance in the face 
of stall warning Hits.   
The literature review begins with an overview of the aerodynamic effects of in-
flight icing on airfoils, aircraft, and their stall warning systems.  Tail stalls are briefly 
examined, followed by an overview of several operational factors that make commuter 
aircraft more susceptible to icing effects than larger airliners.  This introduction is 
followed by a summation of prior archival research on icing accidents and incidents and 
an examination of the evolution and current status of the applicable certification 
regulations, including recent initiatives aimed at stemming the number of accidents that 
have resulted from airborne icing encounters.  The regulatory summary is followed by an 
exploration of the relationship between airframe icing, stall warning systems, and aircrew 
performance.  The theory review concludes with an overview of the SDT framework and 
the repercussions of Bayes’ Theorem in the context of aircrew vigilance tasks, such as 
monitoring for potential stall situations. 
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Icing Effects on Airfoils and Aircraft 
Icing adversely affects an airfoil’s maximum lift coefficient and stall Angle of 
Attack (AoA), which can cause severe performance losses and seriously degrade aircraft 
stability and controllability.  The impact of airframe icing is difficult to predict because 
numerous factors influence the effect of icing contamination on airfoil performance, and 
individual airfoils differ markedly in their sensitivity to icing.  Thurber cites a Canadian 
study that noted that an icing density equivalent to a salt-grain sized ice crystal per square 
centimeter of the critical airfoil leading edge led to a 33% CLmax reduction when out of 
ground effect (2008).  Veillette noted that heavy rain alone could cause an 18% reduction 
in CLmax and a 40% drag increase, characterized by Veillette as “an exceptionally difficult 
process to understand” (2009, p. 26).  Lynch & Khodadoust (2001, p. 760) observed the 
same CLmax reduction in their comprehensive archival study of experimental aerodynamic 
research.  
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (2006) cited several studies noting 
that the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) 23000 series airfoil used 
in a very popular light utility aircraft “has been found to be very sensitive to leading edge 
ice accretions.  Compared to other general aviation airfoils, the NACA 23012 has the 
most severe performance loss” (p. 15).  Zeppetelli & Habashi (2012) observed that the 
popular NACA 23012 airfoil accounted for 25% of the events in the International Civil 
Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) accident and incident data-reporting database (ADREP), 
and cited Abbott and von Doenhoff’s findings that contamination greatly affects the lift 
capability of the 230XX series airfoils (1959, p. 705).  Broeren, Bragg, & Addy (2004) 
performed tests at the Goodrich Icing Wind Tunnel of a representative NACA 23012 
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general aviation airfoil with simulated leading-edge ice shapes that were cast from actual 
ice formations obtained during the ice-tunnel testing.  The authors were interested in 
evaluating the effects of residual intercycle ice that forms in-between the activation 
cycles of leading-edge pneumatic deicing boots.  The study revealed very severe 
aerodynamic degradations from this relatively small icing accumulation, including a 60% 
loss in maximum lift coefficient and an 8-degree drop in the airfoil’s stall AoA.   
Icing Effects on Stall Warning Systems 
It has long been recognized that AoA-based stall warning systems cannot 
inherently adapt to the changing aerodynamic characteristics caused by icing.  In 1944, 
Klemin reported on the development of three new stall warning systems, two of which 
would “function successfully under all flight conditions except when ice has accumulated 
on the wings” (1944, p. 195).  The third system described by Klemin was intended to 
operate correctly even with contaminated airfoils because its diaphragm-operated sensor 
was vented directly to the suction surface of the airfoil.  Unfortunately, Klemin failed to 
elaborate on the aerodynamic criteria for triggering such a system, and this promising 
development appears to have stalled.  Luers reviewed the airborne icing literature and 
noted “dramatic decreases in maximum lift…lead(ing) to premature stall… destroy(ing) 
the safety margin of an aircraft approaching stall” (1983, p. 54).  Garvey cautioned that 
there is no “rule of thumb” to estimate or quantify the performance impacts of airborne 
icing, even though these can far exceed the customarily applied safety margins (2010).  
The situation did not change appreciably over the next 40 years, and the provision of a 
satisfactory stall warning solution in icing remained elusive.  This situation would be 
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exacerbated when another aspect of airfoil icing rose to the forefront with the dramatic 
accidents that befell American Eagle 4184 (NTSB, 1996a) and Comair Flight 3272 
(NTSB, 1998a): icing-induced roll upsets. 
Roll Upsets 
In addition to the loss of lift and increased drag, another undesirable effect of in-
flight icing is its potential to adversely influence control forces and moments on aircraft 
with unpowered (reversible) flight controls, such as the ailerons and elevators.  Airflow 
degradation and flow separation bubbles caused by airfoil icing can drive a control 
surface to a full deflection (Bragg, 1996), as experienced by American Eagle 4184 
(NTSB, 1996a) and Comair Flight 3272 (NTSB, 1998a), which caused both aircraft to 
rapidly roll to extreme attitudes following their icing encounters.  The problem is 
exacerbated following a sudden disconnect of the autopilot, which can occur when the 
icing-induced control forces become excessive (Flight Safety Foundation, 1996; Flight 
Safety Foundation, 2008; Manningham, 1997; NTSB, 1996b; NTSB, 1998b).  This 
phenomenon can affect the pitch axis as well as the roll axis, and longitudinal stick forces 
as high as 195 lbs. have been recorded during flight test investigations into icing-induced 
tail stalls (B&CA Staff, 1997).    
Icing and Tail-Plane Stalls 
Unlike the main wing, conventional aft-mounted tail-planes operate as inverted 
airfoils.  Much of the following information on this phenomenon stems from a 4-year, 
multi-disciplinary, flight-testing, and wind-tunnel study led by NASA Lewis, with 
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participation from Ohio State University (Ratvasky et al., 1999).  The flight trials were 
performed using the Lewis de Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter turboprop.  
Horizontal stabilizers generally produce a down-force to compensate for the nose-
down pitching moment of the main wing, particularly at slow aircraft speeds.  Large main 
wing flap deflections move the center of pressure aft, which further increases the 
aircraft’s nose-down pitching tendency that must be overcome by the tail.  The main 
wing flaps also increase the downwash impinging on the horizontal tail, increasing the 
tail’s negative AoA and putting the stabilizer closer to a stall situation.  Compounding 
this effect, the horizontal stabilizer may be six times more susceptible to icing 
accumulations than the main wing because the tail airfoil’s sharper leading-edge radius 
makes it a more efficient ice collector (F. T. Lynch & Khodadoust, 2001, p. 760; 
Manningham, 1997).  All of these factors can lead to, or exacerbate, an ice-contaminated-
tail-plane-stall (ICTS).   
A tail stall recovery entails a reduction in power, pulling back on the control 
column, and raising the flaps (Detwiler, 2015; North, 1998), which are the opposite 
inputs from those required to recover from a wing stall.  The recovery must be executed 
under the extreme time pressure and stress of an imminent stall, and the choice of 
technique depends on subtle cues, such as detecting control wheel vibration in the 
absence of airframe buffet.  The wrong decision has resulted in at least 16 crashes 
(Carlisle, 2006; North, 1998) and at least 139 fatalities (B&CA Staff, 1997, p. 80).   
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Commuter Aircraft Icing Exposure 
The 1970s saw the start of the proliferation of commuter category turboprops and 
small regional jets.  These aircraft typically fly numerous short sectors at mid-altitudes 
where icing is prevalent, which increases the icing exposure frequency, severity, and 
duration for commuter types compared to larger transport category aircraft.  Conversely, 
larger airliners tend to spend most of their flight time at cruise altitudes well above the 
freezing level, climbing and descending quickly through the freezing layer, which limits 
their exposure to the icing environment.  Commuter aircraft have therefore experienced a 
disproportionate amount of icing accidents, and despite FAA efforts, the U.S. commuter 
icing accident rate did not reduce appreciably during the 1982 to 2000 period studied by 
Petty and Floyd (2004).  A number of high-profile commuter aircraft icing accidents 
prompted an intense research focus on airborne icing, as demonstrated by the emergence 
of numerous archival studies of the icing phenomenon. 
Icing Accident and Incident Archival Studies 
The following discussion summarizes a number of archival studies of icing-
related accidents and incidents to the U.S. civil aircraft population in approximately 
chronological order.  Cole & Sand reviewed NTSB accident data from 1975 to 1988, 
examining a number of variables, including type of operation, phase of flight, and 
seasonal distribution, before concluding that airborne icing encounters can be “extremely 
hazardous” and “a significant number of larger commercial aircraft…have been involved 
in icing related accidents” (1991, pp. 9 and 10).  Petty & Floyd (2004) explored NTSB 
data from 1982 to 2000 and added a useful stratification by type of operation: 14 CFR 
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Part 91 (general aviation (GA)), Part 121 (air carrier), Part 135 scheduled (commuter), 
and Part 135 non-scheduled (air taxi).  The authors noted that 39.8% of the icing-related 
accidents and 50.6% of the fatalities occurred during the cruise phase of flight.  Despite a 
gradually declining icing accident rate throughout the period, icing still accounted for 819 
deaths, and Petty & Floyd concluded their review by stating that airframe icing remained 
a “serious aviation hazard.”   
Green (2006) broadened the investigation by merging the FAA Accidents / 
Incidents Data System (AIDS) with the NASA ASRS and NTSB accident data in a 
comprehensive study of 5,604 reports covering the 1978 to 2002 period.  Green reduced 
the data to 693 “aerodynamically significant” events and noted that the prevalent 
outcome from an icing encounter was a stall followed by a LOC event.  Hard landings 
caused by unexpected stalls were another leading contributor to the recorded accidents 
and incidents.  Green also highlighted instances of icing overwhelming pitot-static system 
heaters, particularly on smaller GA aircraft, leading to a loss of cockpit airspeed 
indications.  This phenomenon would prove to be equally dangerous for much larger 
aircraft, with the catastrophic loss of an Airbus 330 on June 1, 2009, just three years after 
Green’s study (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile 
(BEA), 2012).  Air France 447 experienced pitot-tube blockage due to icing that led to 
the temporary failure of the aircraft’s air data systems.  This led to a degradation of the 
flight control laws that resulted in the loss of the sophisticated flight envelope and stall 
protections normally provided to the crew.  The aircraft was then unintentionally held 
into a stall for several minutes, despite the aircraft’s aural stall warning sounding 75 
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times during the fully stalled descent into the Atlantic Ocean, with the loss of all 228 
aboard (BEA, 2012). 
Veillette’s analysis of NTSB, FAA, and ASRS data between 1991 and 2010 
revealed that LOC was the leading cause of fatalities in the large commercial jet and 
business jet sectors (2012).  Veillette reported that LOC accounted for 4,717 lives lost, 
and 44% of all U.S. business aircraft accidents during the period.  Of particular note, 
Veillette’s data showed that icing caused 29% of these fatal LOC events.  A worldwide 
Boeing study of large (> 60,000 lbs.) jet aircraft accidents between 2005 and 2014 
corroborated Veillette’s findings: LOC was the leading cause of fatal accidents, 
accounting for 1,706 deaths – more than double the 804 fatalities resulting from CFIT, 
the next leading cause (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2015).  Although not specifically 
broken out, the proportion of icing-induced LOC accidents in the Boeing data should 
mirror the 29% observed by Veillette (2012), based on the very similar aircraft 
classifications used in the two studies.  In recognition of these trends, the NTSB added 
LOC to its Most Wanted List (NTSB, 2016a), effectively absorbing and embracing the 
icing issue that was removed as a stand-alone item in 2012.   
Small aircraft have also been well represented in the icing accident statistics.  
Aarons (1995) cites an internal NTSB study covering the period between 1986 and 1995, 
which records 154 icing-related accidents experienced by 14 CFR Part 23 aircraft 
operating under 14 CFR Parts 91 (private) and 135 (air taxi) operations.  In a follow-on 
study for the period 1989 to 1997, the NTSB noted that icing was a factor in 11% of 
weather-related GA accidents, 6% of air taxi and commuter mishaps, and 2% of air 
carrier accidents (National Aviation Weather Program Council, 1999, p. 7-1).  FAA 
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Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing analysts reviewed the NTSB accident 
and incident databases for the period 2003 – 2007; of the 1,740 weather related accidents, 
64 (3.7%) were related to icing encounters.  Of the icing total, 57 pertained to 14 CFR 
Part 91 (private) operations and the remainder to Part 135 (air taxi) operators (FAA, 
2010f).  No Part 121 carriers experienced any icing-related losses during the period, 
although this respite would end in February 2009 with the high-profile loss of Colgan Air 
Flight 3407 over Buffalo, NY (NTSB, 2010a).   
Appiah-Kubi, Martos, Atuahene, & William (2013) examined NTSB and ASRS 
data from 2006 to 2010 in a study that yielded 228 accidents and 30 incidents related to 
aerodynamic events arising from airborne icing encounters.  Similar to Petty and Floyd’s 
(2004) study, Appiah et al. (2013) noted that the majority of the accidents (40%) occurred 
following the first detection of icing during the cruise phase of flight.  The majority of the 
accidents (53%) also resulted from a stall and subsequent loss of control after such 
encounters, with only two aircraft out of 40 successfully recovering from the resulting 
stall.  This finding was borne out by the previously cited National Business Aircraft 
Association (NBAA) study of business aviation LOC accidents between 1991 and 2010 
that found “no cause was nearly as prevalent as aerodynamic stalls” (NBAA, 2015, p. 1).  
The NBAA noted that 9 of the 31 stall events (29%) were related to airspeed 
management in icing conditions. 
Aventin, Morency, & Nadeau (2015) examined data from the Transport Canada 
Civil Aviation Daily Occurrence Reporting System (CADORS) to evaluate the influence 
of on-ground de-icing / anti-icing on icing accidents.  The small size of the final sample 
(19 events) limited the causal inferences that could be drawn, but the pattern was 
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consistent with the earlier research: Small GA proved more vulnerable to icing than 
larger aircraft, with turboprop aircraft accounting for 58% of the accidents in the study.   
Zeppetelli & Habashi (2012) researched the ICAO ADREP database that 
comprises mandatory reports of aviation accidents to aircraft over 2,250 kg in accordance 
with Annex 13, Chapter 7 of the Chicago Convention.  The authors identified 323 
airborne icing occurrences since the database’s inception in 1970.  Once again, the cruise 
phase of flight accounted for the largest percentage of these accidents (approximately 
33%), closely followed by the approach phase (32%).  A worldwide Boeing study of 
commercial jet aircraft accidents between 1959 and 2014 noted that LOC accounted for 
17 of 72 total accidents and 1,656 of the 3,946 total on-board fatalities, although icing 
accidents were not broken out specifically (2015).   
Lynch & Khodadoust (2001) performed a comprehensive review of public-
domain flight test and wind tunnel data pertaining to icing effects on airfoil surfaces of 
fixed-wing aircraft.  The authors considered four principal icing formations: (1) small 
initial leading-edge ice accumulations; (2) runback icing, which is characteristic of 
Supercooled Large Droplet (SLD) conditions; (3) large, irregular ice formations resulting 
from extended exposures with inadequate or failed ice-protection capability; and (4) 
ground frost on the upper wing surfaces, typically caused by chilled fuel in the wings 
during a quick-turnaround following a cold-soak at altitude.  Lynch & Khodadoust’s 
findings corroborated many of the icing hazards already discussed, but the authors 
grouped their conclusions into four insightful icing threat categories: 
1. “Dangerous because of (the) possibility of being under-estimated and / or 
misunderstood;” 
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2. “Dangerous because of (the) potential for catastrophic reductions in aerodynamic 
effectiveness;” 
3. “Dangerous because (the) upper limits of potential aerodynamic consequences are not 
really defined;” and 
4. “Dangerous because of (the) portion of flight operation envelope involved” (F. T. 
Lynch & Khodadoust, 2001, pp. 759, 760). 
These four hazards of severe inflight icing were tragically and simultaneously 
demonstrated by a LOC accident recounted by Telford (1988).  Ironically, the crash 
occurred to his organization’s B-26 atmospheric research aircraft in the course of an 
investigation into SLD icing.  The SLD phenomenon has been the subject of many 
regulatory changes in recent years and remains a difficult challenge for the certification 
and safe operation of contemporary aircraft.  For example, the FAA issued 
“Airworthiness Directive (AD) 96-09-25 requiring crews of de Havilland Model DHC-7 
and DHC-8 Series Airplanes to avoid or exit SLD conditions as a matter of urgency” 
(FAA, 1996a).  In contrast, the Telford accident aircraft had deliberately been exposed to 
SLD and accumulated substantial airframe ice.  The accident sequence began during a 
descent in clear air as the ice started to melt and run back on the wings and tail surfaces.  
The resulting residual ice ridges apparently caused the inboard wing sections to stall, 
which led to a loss of pitch and roll stability.  The aircraft executed a series of unstable 
pitch and roll excursions before entering into an inverted stall and diving into the ground 
at a 60-degree angle.  Telford conjectured that the tail was also fully stalled during the 
final negative-g maneuver, precluding any possibility of recovery.  This single accident, 
to a fully-instrumented icing research aircraft, exhibited almost every characteristic of 
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severe icing that has already been discussed, including: performance degradation; 
premature stalling with a lack of stall warning indications; loss of pitch stability; violent 
roll divergence; and, finally, an unrecoverable tail stall (Telford, 1988).  Lynch & 
Khodadoust observe that this type of accident could have been avoided if decades of 
lessons learned had not been ignored or forgotten (2001, p. 761).   
Aarons (1999) critiqued the historical certification approach to stall warnings in 
icing conditions, which allowed approval based on a mixture of artificial and natural stall 
cues (such as airframe buffeting).  Veillette (2006) noted the flaws in this approach, as 
exemplified by six premature stall events on a single commuter aircraft type that occurred 
with little or no warning from the aircraft’s stall protection systems, and which failed to 
alert the crews by other means.  Zeppetelli & Habashi (2012) also noted a number of 
shortcomings in the icing certification regulations, ranging from problems with the icing 
terminology to unrepresentativeness of the simulated ice shapes used for certification 
flight-testing.  These certification issues are central to the current investigation, so they 
merit a dedicated discussion.   
Operational Approvals for Known Icing Flight 
Sections of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), popularly known 
as the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), govern the approval for flight in known icing 
conditions for all U.S. registered civilian aircraft.  Known icing authorization has two 
elements: airworthiness certification of the aircraft and its systems and operational 
approval for flight in known icing, which is the subject of this section.  The type of 
operation dictates the applicable standards: 14 CFR Part 91 (General operating and flight 
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rules); Part 135 (Commuter and on-demand operating requirements); Part 125 (airplanes 
that have a seating configuration of 20 or more passengers or a maximum payload 
capacity of 6,000 pounds or more when common carriage is not involved); and Part 121 
(Domestic, flag, and supplemental operations).  The broadest requirements are contained 
in 14 CFR 91.527(c) operating in icing conditions that states:   
Except for an airplane that has ice protection provisions that meet the 
requirements in section 34 of Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 23, or 
those for transport category airplane type certification, no pilot may fly an 
airplane into known or forecast severe icing conditions.  (FAA, 2009d) 
This apparently clear-cut regulation has proved difficult to interpret and 
implement.  Jeck (2001) captured the evolution of the FARs related to operations in icing 
conditions and notes the conflicts that have arisen because of the continued use of stale 
terminology that has not kept pace with the changing regulations.  The problem partially 
stems from the definition of severe icing contained in the FAA Aeronautical Information 
Manual (AIM), which defines the phraseology to be used for pilot reporting purposes: 
“The rate of accumulation is such that deicing / anti-icing equipment fails to reduce or 
control the hazard.  Immediate flight diversion is necessary” (FAA, 2014a, p. 7-1-45).  
Under the AIM definition, flight in severe icing should never be countenanced, regardless 
of the installed aircraft equipment.  This conflicts with the wording in 14 CFR 91.527(c) 
that implies that a certain level of equipage should allow such operations.  Zeppetelli & 
Habashi (2012, p. 612) also clearly highlight this contradiction between theory and 
practice.  
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Airworthiness Approvals for Known Icing Flight 
In addition to the operational approval for flight in known icing, 14 CFR also 
contains standards for the airworthiness approvals of aircraft and equipment required for 
flight in known icing conditions.  14 CFR Part 23 lists the airworthiness standards 
applicable to normal, utility, aerobatic, and commuter category airplanes.  These 
standards generally apply to small aircraft with a maximum weight of 12,500 lbs., with 
the exception of the commuter category that is limited to 19,000 lbs. and 19 passenger 
seats.  Large aircraft are governed by 14 CFR Part 25, which encompasses the Transport 
Category airworthiness standards; these are generally more stringent than their Part 23 
equivalents.  Collectively, 14 CFR Parts 23 and 25 contain the regulations applicable to 
aircraft stall behavior, stall warning systems, and anti-icing / de-icing equipment.  
Appendix C to Part 25 also embodies a Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) that 
defines the precipitation and icing envelopes for known icing certifications (FAA, 
2009a).  Pending the enactment of 2014 amendments to this SFAR discussed in a later 
section, certain weather phenomena, such as SLD precipitation, were outside the 
Appendix C envelope.  As a result, SLD encounters have occasionally overwhelmed the 
anti-icing or deicing capabilities of known-icing certified aircraft, leading to a number of 
accidents (NTSB, 1996b; NTSB, 1996c; Taiwan Aviation Safety Council, 2005).   
In addition to the SLD problem, the stall warning provisions of 14 CFR 25.207(e) 
raise additional issues (the following paragraph numbering mirrors the regulation): 
(e) In icing conditions, the stall warning margin in straight and turning flight must be 
sufficient to allow the pilot to prevent stalling (as defined in §25.201(d)) when the 
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pilot starts a recovery maneuver not less than three seconds after the onset of stall 
warning.  When demonstrating compliance with this paragraph, the pilot must 
perform the recovery maneuver in the same way as for the airplane in non-icing 
conditions.  Compliance with this requirement must be demonstrated in flight with 
the speed reduced at rates not exceeding one knot per second, with - 
(1) The most critical of the takeoff ice and final takeoff ice accretions defined in 
Appendices C and O of this part, as applicable, in accordance with §25.21(g), for 
each configuration used in the takeoff phase of flight; 
(2) The most critical of the en route ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of 
this part, as applicable, in accordance with §25.21(g), for the en route configuration; 
(3) The most critical of the holding ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of 
this part, as applicable, in accordance with §25.21(g), for the holding 
configuration(s); 
(4) The most critical of the approach ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of 
this part, as applicable, in accordance with §25.21(g), for the approach 
configuration(s); and 
(5) The most critical of the landing ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of 
this part, as applicable, in accordance with §25.21(g), for the landing and go-around 
configuration(s). 
(f) The stall warning margin must be sufficient in both non-icing and icing conditions to 
allow the pilot to prevent stalling when the pilot starts a recovery maneuver not less 
than one second after the onset of stall warning in slow-down turns with at least 1.5 
g load factor normal to the flight path and airspeed deceleration rates of at least 2 
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knots per second. When demonstrating compliance with this paragraph for icing 
conditions, the pilot must perform the recovery maneuver in the same way as for the 
airplane in non-icing conditions.  (FAA, 2014e) 
The problem with these apparently stringent requirements is that no existing stall 
warning system can determine the correct stall speed under the multitude of icing 
conditions that could be encountered.  Bragg et al. (1998) proposed a sophisticated ice 
management system that would use advanced sensors to predict the performance and 
controllability effects of airborne icing, but such a system has yet to be certified.  
Considerable research has been conducted into stall warning methods based on direct 
airflow measurements (Catlin, 1992; Lerner, 1985; Maris, 1991; Maris, 1996; Pederson, 
2003), but Bragg et al. note “no processed aircraft performance degradation information 
is available to the pilot” (2002, p. 1).  Instead, a common solution is to apply a fixed 
safety increment to the stall warning margin when ice is detected via an on-board sensor 
or via a pilot-selectable speed reference switch that changes the airspeed thresholds for 
the activation of the stall warning and protection systems.  The latter approach was 
implemented in the Dash-8 aircraft that was involved in the Colgan Air icing accident 
(NTSB, 2010a, p. 18).  Neither solution can guarantee an adequate warning margin under 
all flight conditions, and there may also be circumstances when the system provides too 
much warning, particularly if the aircrew misinterpret or forget the position of the icing 
reference switch, as was the case in the Colgan Air accident (NTSB, 2010a, p. 151).  As a 
result, the use of fixed or even dual stall warning sensitivity thresholds inevitably results 
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in some Missed stall warnings or False Alarms in icing conditions that have important 
ramifications for this study.  
The Evolution of Icing Legislation 
The push for icing legislation reform goes back many years, but a watershed event 
occurred in January 1997 when a commuter twin-turboprop experienced an un-
commanded icing-induced roll excursion on approach to the Detroit Metropolitan / 
Wayne County Airport (DTW).  The aircraft dove steeply into the ground, partially 
inverted, with no survivors (NTSB, 1998b).  Reehorst, Chung, Potapczuk, & Choo (2000) 
analyzed the accident scenario using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) techniques 
and determined that as little as five minutes of ice accretion were sufficient to produce 
the aerodynamic degradations that led to the complete loss of control.  As a result of the 
Detroit accident, the NTSB made 21 sweeping recommendations to the FAA, including a 
reiteration of two of its previously issued safety recommendations to the Agency: 
Revise the icing criteria published in 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 23 and 
25, in light of both recent research into aircraft ice accretion under varying 
conditions of liquid water content, drop size distribution and temperature, and 
recent development in both the design and use of aircraft.  Also, expand the 
Part 25 Appendix C icing certification envelope to include freezing drizzle / 
freezing rain and mixed water / ice crystal conditions as necessary (A-96-54). 
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Revise the icing certification testing regulation to ensure that airplanes are 
properly tested for all conditions in which they are authorized to operate, or are 
otherwise shown to be capable of safe flight into such conditions.  If safe 
operations cannot be demonstrated by the manufacturer, operational limitations 
should be imposed to prohibit flight in such conditions and flightcrews should be 
provided with the means to positively determine when they are in icing conditions 
that exceed the limits for aircraft certification (A-96-56).  (NTSB, 1998b, p. 185) 
The FAA had already begun to act in 1997 by publishing its Inflight Icing Plan, 
overseen by the FAA Icing Steering Committee, which detailed the FAA’s intended 
activities and milestones for improving flight safety in icing conditions.  The plan 
incorporated sweeping changes to the certification regulations, including an overhaul of 
the Appendix C icing envelopes to address the SLD and ice crystal phenomena (FAA, 
1997).  In parallel, the FAA began publishing a long run of ADs targeting the vulnerable 
commuter turboprop category, and imposing operational restrictions in certain types of 
icing.  In addition, the AD instructed aircrew on procedures for recognizing and escaping 
from dangerous SLD ice (Flightglobal, 1996).  Also in 1997, the NTSB decided to 
incorporate the airframe icing issue into its Most Wanted List of Safety Improvements for 
the first time.  Airframe icing would remain on the list until 2011 (Weener, 2011).  The 
FAA responded in 1999 by proposing a sweeping series of ADs affecting the operation in 
icing conditions of the “Beechjet 400-series, Cessna T303 Crusader, de Havilland Dash 6 
Twin Otter, Embraer EMB-110 Bandeirante, Jetstream 31-series, and Nihon Aeroplane 
YS11” (B&CA, 1997).   
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Throughout this period, the FAA continued to update the ice protection 
regulations applicable to Part 23 aircraft.  Prior to 1993, the regulations required no flight 
evaluations in real icing conditions for GA known-ice approvals.  This changed when 
Amendment 23-43 was issued in 1993, required these aircraft to meet the same 
performance and flying quality criteria in icing as outside it, which was beyond the 
capability of most applicants.  The evolving regulations also required tail contamination 
effects to be evaluated in flight for all GA known-icing approvals.  Newton (2006) 
observed that 13 years after the new rules came into effect, only one aircraft type, the 
Extra 400, had been certified to Amendment 23-43.  With this one exception, known 
icing certification was not even being attempted for the most vulnerable segment of the 
GA fleet. 
The FAA also tried to address the icing issue for transport aircraft via a string of 
regulatory amendments to the ice protection standard (14 CFR § 25.1419) in 1970, 1990, 
2007, and 2009 (FAA, 2009b).  Of note, the 2007 “Activation of Ice Protection” Notice 
of Proposed Rule-making (NPRM), and the subsequent regulatory amendment, 
introduced the concept of a “primary ice detection system that automatically activates or 
alerts the flightcrew to activate the airframe ice protection system” (FAA, 2007).  These 
changes, along with the ever-growing list of ADs, were well intended but reactive 
measures that did not constitute a long-term strategic solution to the icing problem.  This 
shortcoming was exemplified by the crash of a small business jet short of the runway at 
Pueblo, CO, in 2005, where Fiorino noted “the (NTSB) board found the FAA’s failure to 
establish adequate certification requirements for flight into icing conditions was a 
contributing factor in the crash.  It resulted in the failure of the aircraft’s stall warning 
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system to provide an adequate warning margin” (2007, p. 47).  Fiorino also cited the 
NTSB’s recommendation to “modify the Cessna 560 stall warning system to require a 
warning margin that takes into account the size, type, and distribution of ice” (2007, p. 
47).  The FAA had already published an Advisory Circular (AC) on Aircraft Ice 
Protection (AC 20-73A) that addressed this issue and stated the need to “provide 
acceptable stall warning margins and to prevent a stall during flight in icing conditions” 
(FAA, 2006, p. 27).  Unfortunately, like all ACs, AC 20-73A is not a regulation; it simply 
describes “an acceptable means, but not the only means of showing compliance with the 
…Regulations” (FAA, 2006, p. i).   
On February 24, 2010, NTSB Chair Deborah Hersman, testifying to the House 
Aviation Subcommittee of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, elected to 
keep the icing issue on its Most Wanted List, due in part to more than 50 accidents and 
200 associated deaths resulting from ice encounters (NTSB, 2010c).  The same day, the 
FAA issued a press release “Fact sheet – flying in icing conditions” that listed the 
Agency’s historical and planned efforts at addressing the problem (FAA, 2010e).   
Table 3 summarizes this fact sheet and includes updates to the FAA activities that 
occurred after the press release was issued. 
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Table 3   
FAA Icing Activities 1996 - 2014 
Date FAA Action Descriptiona 
1996 AD 96-09-25 Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) 
revision to limit or prohibit the use 
of various flight control devices 
and provide flight crews with 
recognition queues and procedures 
for exiting from severe icing 
conditions. 
 
1999 AD 99-19-18 Mandated revisions to AFM to 
advise flight crews to activate 
airframe pneumatic de-icing boots 
at the first sign of ice 
accumulation.  Applicable to 
aircraft with history of icing issues. 
 
Mar 29, 2006 Safety Alert for Operators 
(SAFO) 06002 
Ground deicing practices for 
turbine airplanes in nonscheduled 
Part 135 and Part 91 service. 
 
Oct 6, 2006 SAFO 06014 Hazards posed by polished frost. 
Nov 11, 2006 SAFO 06016 Aimed to increase awareness of in-
flight icing dangers for pilots flying 
turbo-propeller powered airplanes. 
 
Aug 8, 2007 Final rule: icing certification 
standards. 
New airworthiness standards for 
the performance and handling 
characteristics of transport 
airplanes in icing conditions…  
Harmonize(s) the U.S. and 
European airworthiness standards 
for flight in icing conditions.  
Comprehensive set of 
airworthiness requirements that 
manufacturers must meet to receive 
approval for flight in icing 
conditions, including specific 
performance and handling 
qualities requirements, and the ice 
accretion (size, shape, location, 
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Date FAA Action Descriptiona 
and texture of ice) that must be 
considered for each phase of flight.  
These revisions will ensure that 
minimum operating speeds 
determined during the certification 
of all future transport airplanes 
will provide adequate maneuvering 
capability in icing conditions for 
all phases of flight.   
 
Nov 30, 2007 SAFO 07009 Inform(s) owners, operators, and 
FAA entities of training 
requirements for pilots of CE-208 
(Cessna Caravan 1) and CE-208B 
(Cessna Grand Caravan) airplanes 
for flight into icing conditions. 
 
Dec 2007 AC 91-74A Affect (sic) of ice crystals on 
turbine engines. 
 
May 8, 2008 NPRM: Polished frost Remove(d) language from its 
regulations that allowed some 
operators – not commercial 
airplanes – to operate with 
polished frost.  Unlike commercial 
airplanes which must have a clean 
wing, corporate aircraft were 
permitted to fly with smooth or 
“polished frost.”  That practice 
has been deemed unsafe.  
 
May 20, 2008 SAFO 0812 Aircraft taxi operations during 
snow and ice conditions. 
 
Feb 11, 2009 SAFO 09004 
SAFO 0812 elaborated  
Emphasize preflight and in-flight 
planning for winter airport 
operations for taxi, takeoff, and 
landing.  
 
Aug 3, 2009 Final Rule: icing certification 
standards for transport category 
airplanes. 
Rule requires either the automatic 
activation of ice protection systems 
or a method to tell pilots when they 
should be activated.  The rule 
applies to new transport aircraft 
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Date FAA Action Descriptiona 
designs and significant changes to 
current designs that affect the 
safety of flight in icing conditions… 
 
The standards further require that 
after initial activation, the ice 
protection system must operate 
continuously, automatically turn on 
and off, or alert the pilots when the 
system should be cycled. 
 
Nov 29, 2009 NPRM: ice detectors for air 
carrier airplanes 
Proposed rule would require either 
the installation of ice detection 
equipment or changes to the 
procedures for activating the ice-
protection system to ensure timely 
activation of the ice-protection 
system.  This proposed rule would 
apply to all current and future 
airplanes in service with air 
carriers whose maximum takeoff 
weight is less than 60,000 pounds.  
  
Mar 16, 2010 SAFO 10006 In-Flight Icing Operations and 
Training Recommendations… 
encouraging directors of safety and 
directors of operations (part 121 
and 135); and training managers 
for all operators…to review and 
amend, if required, flight 
crewmember and dispatcher 
training programs. 
 
June 29, 2010 NPRM: SLD The proposed rule would improve 
safety by taking into account 
supercooled large droplet (SLD) 
icing conditions for transport 
category airplanes most affected by 
these icing conditions, mixed-phase 
and ice-crystal conditions for all 
transport category airplanes, and 
supercooled large droplet, mixed 
phase, and ice-crystal icing 
conditions for all turbine engines. 
70 
 
 
Date FAA Action Descriptiona 
  
Nov 4, 2014 Final Rule: Part 25 and 33 icing 
certification standards. 
Appendix C icing envelope 
expanded to accommodate SLD 
and ice crystal icing.  Added 
performance and handling 
requirements for transport aircraft 
in SLD.  New Part 25 icing 
certification requirements for 
airspeed and AoA indicating 
systems.   
Note.  Adapted from FAA Fact Sheet “Flying in Icing Conditions” FAA (2010e), 
retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsid=10398 
aItalicized text is quoted verbatim from the source document. 
 
 
 
In June 2010, the FAA took the important step of codifying the mass of advisory 
material into a broad NPRM that would add significant legislative weight to tackle the 
SLD and aircraft systems problems in icing (FAA, 2010b).  The NPRM was finally 
enacted on November 4, 2014, and came into effect on January 5, 2015, as the “Airplane 
and engine certification requirements in supercooled large drop, mixed phase, and ice 
crystal icing conditions” (FAR, 2014d).  The updated regulation addressed a number of 
previous problem areas, notably including an update to the Appendix C icing envelope to 
accommodate SLD and ice crystal icing, as well as adding performance and handling 
requirements for transport aircraft operations in SLD.  The new regulation also 
introduced updated system requirements, including the need for AoA sensors and 
airspeed indicators, “to perform in freezing rain, freezing drizzle, mixed phase, and ice 
crystal conditions” (FAA, 2014g, p. 1).  Two advisory circulars supported the revised 
airworthiness standards.  The first, AC 25-25A, addressed compliance demonstration 
with the performance and handling requirements for the new Appendix C SLD regulation 
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(FAA, 2014f).  The second circular, AC 25-28, addressed the broad new certification 
requirements for transport category aircraft operations in icing conditions (FAA, 2014c).  
Unfortunately, it proved impractical to make the updated certification requirements 
retroactive, so the more stringent standards only apply to certifications commencing after 
January 5, 2015, when the new regulations came into force (FAA, 2014g).  
In parallel with its legislative activities, the FAA and other groups were heavily 
engaged with industry.  The FAA hosted an international conference on aircraft icing in 
1996 (FAA, 1996b), while SAE International addressed the icing issue with a pair of 
working groups: the AC–9 Aircraft Icing Technology sub-committee and the G-12 
committee, which was given the mission “to improve worldwide safety in matters related 
to aircraft ground deicing” (SAE International, 2014, p. 1).  In 1997, the University of 
Illinois constituted an interdisciplinary research center for aircraft icing, which embarked 
on the Smart Icing Systems Project in conjunction with the NASA Lewis Research 
Center.  The project team implemented a multidisciplinary combination of basic and 
applied research to address the issue of icing safety (Bragg et al., 1998).  As a result of 
these ongoing efforts and an increasing awareness of the serious and unpredictable 
consequences of airfoil ice contamination, certification authorities such as the FAA and 
Transport Canada adopted the Clean Aircraft Concept that precludes attempted takeoffs 
with any ice or frost adhering to the critical surfaces of the aircraft, including its wings, 
propellers, and stabilizers (Transport Canada, 2004).    
Icing was finally removed from the NTSB’s Most Wanted List in 2012, but the 
problem was far from conquered.  In March 2014, the FAA published a new AD (its 
112th related to icing) that barred known icing operations by approximately 4,200 small 
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GA aircraft, based on 52 mishaps and 36 fatalities attributed to in-flight icing within this 
group in the past 30 years (FAA, 2014g; Lynch, 2014).  Two years after the NTSB 
removed icing from the Most Wanted List, an Embraer Phenom crashed following an 
icing encounter because the pilot failed to activate the aircraft’s ice-protection systems.  
As a result of this accident, the NTSB issued a recommendation to the FAA and the 
General Aviation Manufacturer’s Association that a system be developed to 
automatically alert pilots of certain aircraft when the ice protection systems should be 
activated (NTSB, 2016b).   
In parallel with the FAA and NTSB efforts, the American Society for Testing and 
Materials (ASTM) convened Technical Committee F44 on general aviation aircraft, with 
a primary mandate to streamline the Part 23 regulations for the certification of light 
aircraft.  As a result of the committee’s work, the FAA issued an NPRM “Revision of 
Airworthiness Standards for Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter Category 
Airplanes” that included a major emphasis on LOC and icing, including SLD (FAA, 
2016).  In the interim, the FAA issued a revised policy to substantially ease the 
certification burden of installing AoA systems in Part 23 aircraft “to provide precise 
information to the pilot (that) could help avoid needless accidents” (FAA, 2014b).  
Despite these efforts, the NTSB’s recommendation for improvements in cockpit 
stall warning systems still remain unmet by the new regulations for icing scenarios, and 
in the absence of such a capability, aircrew continue to experience FAs and Missed stall 
warnings during severe airborne icing encounters.  The following discussion examines 
the issue of crew decision-making and the interaction between the aircrew and the 
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aircraft’s stall warning system under sub-optimal conditions such as severe icing 
encounters. 
Aircrew Performance During Icing Encounters 
Advani wryly observed “Aerodynamic Stall Can Prompt ‘Brain Stall.’” (2014, p. 
58), and icing-induced stalls are no exception.  According to Sarter and Schroeder (2001), 
surprisingly few studies have been performed on the effectiveness of Decision Support 
Systems (DSS), under a combination of time pressure and incorrect cueing from the DSS.  
Sarter and Schroeder’s study used a scripted simulator exercise to examine the impact of 
different levels of DSS cueing and reliability on pilot response times and error rates in a 
multiple-task, highly dynamic (icing) environment (2001).  The researchers observed a 
positive correlation between the aircrew’s successful handling of the encounter and the 
level of cueing provided to the pilots.  They also noted that incorrect DSS command 
information led to more stall recovery errors than systems that provided simple status 
information, even when the latter were in error.  Inaccurate command display information 
was especially problematic in unfamiliar icing conditions (the authors’ term for tailplane 
icing), and DSS errors compromised the operator’s ability to evaluate and respond to 
other valid cues that were presented (Sarter & Schroeder, 2001, p. 8).  As the literature 
shows, contemporary stall warning systems, which can be characterized as DSS tools in 
icing, sometimes experience Misses and FAs in icing conditions.  This violates one of 
Billings’ key principles for human-centered automated systems: machine processes must 
be predictable if the automation is to help, rather than hinder, the human operator’s 
situational awareness (1997).  
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Green et al. observe that the majority of icing encounters are successfully 
negotiated, but they also caution that “remarkably, (there is) little pragmatic 
understanding of what made those few unsuccessful and how they might be avoided” 
(1996, p. 2).  The authors contrasted the state of icing management with thunderstorm 
avoidance.  They noted that thunderstorms are well understood meteorologically, and that 
useful tools, such as airborne and ground weather radar, are available to manage 
interactions with thunderstorms.  In contrast, icing encounters tend to be very spatially 
and temporally localized, which makes accurate forecasting difficult, even though the 
potential value of such forecasts has been demonstrated experimentally by Vigeant-
Langlois, & Hansman (2000).  Green et al. also added their voices to the body of 
critiques concerning the highly subjective and inconsistent nature of current icing 
reporting terminology and recommended the adoption of an objective, quantitative, 
graduated parametric (icing) severity index.  In the absence of such a forecasting tool, the 
authors observed that wing-mounted aerodynamic performance monitoring (APM) 
technologies could give aircrew an “objective indication of the wing’s performance… 
that would allow the pilot to make tactical decisions in a timely and informed matter” 
(1996, p. 4).  As the literature shows, contemporary AoA-based stall warning systems do 
not monitor airfoil performance and therefore occasionally manifest stall-detection errors 
in icing conditions.  Under these literal Hit and Miss circumstances, Signal Detection 
Theory provides a useful framework for evaluating the crew / stall warning interactions 
during airborne icing encounters.   
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Signal Detection Theory 
Signal Detection Theory is widely used in the human factors field.  The theory 
was initially formulated by Peterson, Birdsall, and Fox (1954) and extended in important 
works by Tanner and Swets (1954) and Green and Swets (1966).  SDT provides a formal 
framework for modeling the outcome of a binary (Yes / No) decision task when an 
observer attempts to discriminate a signal from the background noise (Figure 4).   
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Signal Detection Theory concepts. 
 
 
The horizontal axis represents the value of the stimulus parameter or decision 
variable (x), such as the target’s brightness on the radar display.  The two curves 
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represent the probability distributions of the noise and the combined (signal + noise) 
stimuli.  The noise is assumed to be random and normally distributed.  For mathematical 
convenience, this Gaussian distribution is usually re-expressed in non-dimensional terms, 
with a mean of zero and a variance of one.  The signal adds to the noise, so the combined 
(signal + noise) stimulus is also assumed to have a Gaussian shape but shifted to the right 
by a distance d' (‘d-prime’), which represents the mean value for the signal distribution 
(recalling that the mean of the noise distribution is zero).  The quantity d' is a measure of 
the sensitivity of the system.  In the commonest SDT models, the variances of the two 
Gaussian distributions are assumed equal (Lee, 2008, p. 450), as shown by the two 
identically shaped curves in Figure 4.   
The observer must determine which curve a stimulus belongs to, based on its 
perceived strength.  The task is simple if the signal is strong relative to the noise, making 
the curves widely separated (i.e., d' is large).  The required discrimination is much more 
difficult when the curves have a significant overlap, as shown in Figure 4.  SDT 
addresses the four possible outcome permutations under these circumstances: the 
presence or absence of a signal, and the response or absence of response from the 
operator.  In SDT terms, these permutations are self-evidently labeled Hit, Miss, FA and 
Correct Rejection (CR).  The FA region is equivalent to a Type I error and alpha level in 
statistical hypothesis testing, while a Miss corresponds to a Type II error and beta level. 
SDT assumes that the operator discriminates between the signal and noise by 
setting an internal decision criterion, above which the stimulus would be categorized as a 
target (signal + noise), and below which the stimulus would be classified as noise.  In 
Figure 4, the selected decision criterion is x = 2, and the area of the shaded regions 
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indicate the Hit and FA probabilities corresponding to this decision criterion.  If the 
threshold is increased, there is a reduction in FAs at the cost of increased Misses; 
conversely, a reduced threshold would result in more Hits, at the cost of more FAs.  By 
convention, SDT defines an ideal observer as one who chooses a zero-bias decision 
criterion threshold that exactly balances the probabilities of the undesirable Misses and 
FAs.  This occurs where the two curves intersect for the equal variance model shown in 
Figure 4. 
Non-ideal observers exhibit response bias that is deemed liberal when their 
selected decision criterion is below the ideal observer’s and conservative when it is above 
the ideal observer’s.  The selected decision criterion and the corresponding response bias 
are affected by the costs of making the wrong decision (Miss, FA) and the benefits (or 
payoffs) of achieving a correct outcome (Hit, CR).  For example, a radar operator trying 
to avoid two aircraft colliding would set a relatively low (liberal) decision criterion, 
resulting in high Hits and high FAs.  This is because the consequences of an undetected 
target and subsequent collision could be a major loss of life.  Conversely, a radar operator 
operating an anti-aircraft battery in peacetime would set a very high decision criterion in 
order to avoid the risk of shooting down a non-threatening target.  The reduction in FAs 
would come at the risk of an elevated Miss probability against a real threat, but this 
would be an acceptable compromise in peacetime.  As these examples show, the ideal 
observer is a theoretical construct for evaluating bias, not an individual person. 
The preceding discussion applies SDT to model an observer’s reactions, based on 
known signal and noise distribution parameters.  SDT is more commonly applied in the 
converse sense: to estimate the SDT parameters, such as system sensitivity and response 
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bias, based on observed Hit and FA rates.  The resulting data are often plotted on 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves, which allow predictions of one 
parameter (e.g., response bias) if the other two are known (e.g., Hit and FA rates).  
Sheriden & Parasuraman (2000) investigated the use of SDT Miss and False Alarm rates 
in this manner to determine the optimum balance between human operators and 
automation.  This research extends Sheriden & Parasuraman’s work by treating the crew 
and stall warning as interacting SDT systems, in order to investigate the influence of the 
degraded stall warning system operation under icing conditions on the eventual crew 
performance outcomes.   
For this study, archival icing accident and incident data were analyzed using the 
SDT framework introduced in Table 2.  Accidents and incidents were classified based on 
the stall warning system performance and the resulting influence on the crew 
performance outcomes.  For example, in the case of the American Eagle 4184 accident 
(NTSB, 1996b), the aircraft departed controlled flight with no prior stall warning - an 
SDT Miss by the stall warning system, and an incorrect crew response because the 
precipitating event was not avoided.  Conversely, in the Colgan Air 3407 crash (NTSB, 
2010a), a premature stall warning led to an incorrect crew response resembling a tail-stall 
recovery, which led to a main-wing stall.  The initial stall warning in the Colgan case 
would therefore be characterized as an SDT False Alarm.  An SDT Hit is exemplified by 
the crash of Air Florida Flight 90, where the stick-shaker stall warning actuated 
immediately after the aircraft became airborne and continued until impact into the 
Potomac river 30 seconds later (NTSB, 1982).  CRs represent the null case of no-
pending-stall or LOC and no stall warning.   
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The classification of aircrew responses and the associated stall warning SDT 
categories form the foundation of the CIRB model of the stall warning system’s impact 
on aircrew performance during icing encounters.  Unfortunately, the aircrew’s SDT 
decision criterion cannot be directly measured or manipulated using archival data.  The 
analysis requires a new construct related to the available Hit and FA data.  Bayes’ 
Theorem provides this missing link and yields two testable predictions.  
Bayes’ Theorem 
Bayes’ Theorem addresses the conditional probability of an event happening 
subject to the occurrence of another event, as described in the rain and clouds example in 
Chapter I.  Lee (2008) cites numerous advantages of using Bayesian methods with SDT, 
including their complete representation of uncertainty, but Bayes’ Theorem is also useful 
for the evaluation of the crew / stall warning interactions because of its possible influence 
on the SDT decision criterion, which is the observer’s threshold for identifying a stimulus 
as a signal rather than noise.    
Stalls and stall warnings are both rare occurrences during normal flight 
operations.  In the absence of any overriding factors, the likelihood of a stall increases 
during icing encounters due to the reduced critical angle of attack with leading edge ice 
contamination, as discussed in Chapter I.  Bayes’ Theorem predicts the probability of a 
stall, given that a stall warning event has occurred, as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 | 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊) = 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊 | 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)
𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊)            (7) 
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As equation 7 shows, the probability of a stall, given that a stall warning has 
occurred, is directly proportional to the a priori probability of a stall occurring (PStall), 
which increases with icing.  The stall probability is also inversely related to the 
probability of a stall warning occurring (PStall Warning).  The latter is influenced by the 
sensitivity and FA rates of the stall warning system that may or may not be influenced by 
the icing.  Bayes’ Theorem therefore predicts that the FA rate should increase as the a 
priori probability of the precipitating event (an actual stall) decreases.  In the extreme, the 
FA rate could become unacceptable when the precipitating event is extremely unlikely 
(Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2000).  This phenomenon may condition aircrew to treat stall 
warnings in cruise flight as nuisance FAs, even though their perception should change 
drastically in icing conditions, where PStall can increase markedly.  Aircrew are unlikely 
to be aware of these Bayesian consequences and are likely to use the decision criterion 
that they established over many years of uneventful flying when assessing the risk of a 
stall occurring in icing.  During an icing encounter, when the Bayesian probability of a 
stall increases, aircrew should lower their decision criterion because a given stimulus is 
more likely to represent a true stall event and less likely to be a FA.  This is easily 
understood if taken to the extreme: There is some level of ice accretion that would 
produce a 100% probability of a stall, so the crew should treat any signal under these 
circumstances as a stall.  Conversely, a clean aircraft in un-accelerated high-speed flight 
is unlikely to stall, so a high decision criterion should be set to avoid excessive FAs under 
these circumstances.   
If aircrew fail to adjust their decision criterion and therefore treat all stall 
warnings equally, then SDT predicts that incorrect crew responses arising from stall 
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warning Misses would increase during icing encounters while FAs would lead to fewer 
errors than the baseline non-icing condition (Figure 4).  This phenomenon should be 
more noticeable for vigilance tasks that are characterized by long periods of inactivity, 
such as flight operations in the cruise segment, because the decision criterion would 
likely be set at a higher threshold for such tasks.  Operators perceive vigilance tasks as 
fatiguing and stressful (Warm, Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008) and often fail to respond 
appropriately when the stimulus appears.  In the icing environment, these difficulties 
could be compounded by the crew’s conservative decision criterion, which arises from 
the conditioning that takes place during routine (non-icing) cruise operations.  The 
situation is exacerbated because stalls do not always present with consistent symptoms in 
a well-defined sequence, particularly with contaminated airfoils, which makes stall 
identification and warning interpretation even more difficult (NTSB, 2010a).  Flottau 
(2012) quotes the Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile 
(BEA) report into the loss of Air France 447 following a temporary failure of the 
aircraft’s stall protection features and primary air data indications: “the occurrence of the 
failure in the context of flight in cruise completely surprised the crew of flight AF447....  
The startle effect played a major role in the destabilization of the flight path and in the 
two pilots’ understanding of the situation” (BEA, 2012, p. 209).   
The failure of the crew to adjust their decision criterion in icing corresponds to a 
conservative SDT response bias.  The CIRB theory predicts an increase in incorrect crew 
performances when exposed to stall warning Misses but reduced errors in the face of FAs 
when compared to the stall warning Hit baseline.  Unlike the theoretical SDT analysis 
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discussed previously, Bayes’ Theorem allows this prediction to be tested using archival 
data. 
Summary 
The literature shows that airborne icing has a clearly demonstrated potential to 
cause serious and sometimes catastrophic degradations in aircraft performance, stability, 
handling qualities, and system performance.  Current aircraft stall warning systems are 
unable to provide consistent and reliable warnings during icing encounters.  This is 
because no existing stall warning directly samples the airflow over the wing where the 
flow separation occurs, so the stall warning margin provided to the crew is, at best, an 
informed estimate.  The NTSB accident reports and ASRS pre-test data contain numerous 
instances of aircraft stalling before the receipt of any warning by the crew.  In some 
cases, this has happened during the flare, and the result has been a hard landing; in many 
others, such as the loss of American Eagle Flight 4184 and Comair Flight 3272, the result 
has been the tragic loss of the aircraft and all on board (NTSB, 1996b; NTSB, 1998a).  
Furthermore, no certified system monitors or warns against tail stalls, which significantly 
increases the challenges faced by the crew when trying to differentiate between a wing or 
tail stall.  This is a critical shortcoming, as the recoveries for the two types of stall are 
almost diametrically opposed.  The application of an inappropriate recovery technique 
undoubtedly exacerbates the situation and may be unrecoverable, as demonstrated by the 
loss of Colgan Air Flight 3407 (NTSB, 2010a).   
Airframe icing remained on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of transportation 
safety improvements for small and large aircraft from 1997 to 2011 (NTSB 2012b).  
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Airframe icing is a continuing problem, despite the FAA’s publication of more than 200 
Airworthiness Directives (2010e) and multiple regulatory amendments affecting almost 
every class of aircraft and type of operation.  Aside from a small number of simulation 
studies (Sarter & Schroeder, 2001), there has been very limited research into the 
interaction between the aircraft’s wing-stall or tail-stall status, the operation of the stall 
warning system, and the outcome of the aircrew’s decision-making process.  As a result, 
current efforts at addressing the loss of control problem in icing are reactive rather than 
proactive, and the expensive, complex measures that have been adopted have not 
prevented a number of major icing-related accidents.   
The current research is based on a modification of the Signal Detection Theory 
framework (Abdi, 2009) that treats the crew and the stall warning as two interacting SDT 
systems that can be analyzed using classical SDT methods: The aircraft is either about to 
experience a wing stall, a tail stall, or no stall at all.  The aircraft’s stall warning attempts 
to determine whether a warning should be issued, based on incomplete and possibly 
erroneous sensor information.  These factors result in four permutations of stall warning 
behavior, self-evidently labeled Hits, Misses, False Alarms, and Correct Rejections in 
SDT terms, which form the IVs for the CIRB model.  In turn, the crew uses basic cues 
from the aircraft (such as buffeting, vibration, and altered control responses) and its stall 
warning system to determine the stall state of the vehicle.  The crew response is either 
correct or incorrect, and this simple binary measure is the dependent variable for the 
analysis.  The CIRB model suggests that aircrew establish a decision criterion for 
reacting to a stall warning indication.  The crew would treat the combined stimuli from 
the aircraft’s behavior and stall warning system as an actual stall when total stimulus 
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exceeds the decision criterion, and ignore stimuli below this threshold.  Aircrew would 
establish their individual stall warning decision criterion from extensive exposure to 
event-free flight, characterized in SDT terms as a vigilance task, which would lead to a 
very conservative setting in order to avoid overreactions to the relatively high number of 
False Alarms that are characteristic of such low probability events (Sheridan & 
Parasuraman, 2000). 
Bayes’ Theorem indicates that conditional probabilities are directly affected by 
the a priori event in question, and these conditional probabilities are not commutative 
(Lee, 2008).  This was demonstrated in Chapter I with the rain vs. cloud example.  
Unfortunately, aircrew probably instinctively treat stall and stall warning probabilities as 
commutative, so they may fail to adjust their decision criterion sufficiently when 
encountering serious icing conditions.  This results in a strong conservative SDT 
decision-making bias, which should lead to increased incorrect aircrew responses in the 
face of stall warning Misses, but reduced errors in the face of stall warning False Alarms.  
For convenience, this model has been titled the Conservative Icing Decision Bias model.  
The CIRB predications are testable under experimental conditions if the Hit and False 
Alarm data could be generated for a range of decision criteria.  Under these 
circumstances, the system’s sensitivity and bias could also be determined.  Alternatively, 
if the SDT model parameters are known, any one of the SDT properties (Hit rate, False 
Alarm rate, and operator sensitivity and bias) could be inferred from the others. 
Two comprehensive archival databases were selected to test the conservative bias 
decision criterion theory: NASA’s self-reported Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS) incident repository (NASA, 2014) and the NTSB online accident report database 
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(NTSB, 2012a).  Unfortunately, the decision criterion cannot be manipulated 
experimentally using archival data, so an additional step was required in order to test the 
hypotheses stemming from the CIRB theory.  The solution lay in the application of the 
Binary Logistic Regression to the archival data.  The BLR is a powerful non-linear 
multivariate method that is used to predict and explain binary categorical (Yes / No) 
outcomes from a combination of metric or non-metric independent variables (Hair et al., 
2010, p. 317).  The BLR is extremely resilient to violations of normality and to 
heteroscedasticity, and its robustness is well suited to the proposed exploratory analysis.  
The aircraft (wing-stall / tail-stall / no-stall) state and the stall warning SDT 
classifications were the factors (IVs) evaluated with the BLR analysis.  The single 
dichotomous dependent variable was the Correct_Response measure of the crew’s initial 
response to the stall warning (or lack of one).  The BLR tied together the factors and 
measures required to evaluate the two CIRB hypotheses derived from SDT and Bayes’ 
Theorem: CIRB predicts that icing encounters should lead to a significant reduction in 
aircrew correct responses for the stall warning Miss cases compared to the stall warning 
Hits.  Conversely, the theory predicts that stall warning False Alarms should not result in 
a significant increase in incorrect aircrew responses compared to the baseline Hit 
condition.  These predictions differ from an equilibrium situation where either error 
would be expected to have the same influence on crew behavior outcomes.  The next 
chapter details the application of these concepts for analyzing the NASA ASRS and 
NTSB database archives. 
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Chapter III Methodology  
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Approach 
This chapter describes the research approach, population and sampling methods, 
data sources, and data treatment that were applied to test the predictions stemming from 
the Conservative Icing Response Bias (CIRB) model.  A nomothetic exploratory archival 
analysis (Babbie, 2013, pp. 91-93; Vogt et al., 2012, pp. 86-95) was used to determine the 
influence of stall warning system behavior on aircrew performance outcomes during 
airborne icing encounters.  Two research hypotheses were evaluated using a Binary 
Logistic Regression (BLR) analysis of archival NTSB accident data (NTSB, 2012) and 
NASA ASRS incident data (FAA, 2011a).  Records from these two databases were 
examined and encoded by two subject matter experts (SMEs) on flight operations and 
certification processes, as discussed in the Delimitation section of Chapter I.  The 
following sections detail the population and sampling methods that were applied to the 
ASRS and NTSB databases. 
Population and Sample Overview 
The population was comprised of the fleet of civilian U.S. (N-registered), non-
amateur built, turbine-powered airplanes.  The sample contained two subsets from the 
population: (1) U.S. registered, non-amateur built, turbine-powered airplanes with icing-
related probable cause entries in the NTSB accident database, and (2) icing-related Loss 
of Control (LOC) ASRS events obtained using the query syntax shown in Appendix A, 
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which was developed in close cooperation with the ASRS database specialists.  The 
sample date range used for both the ASRS and NTSB queries was January 1, 1988, to 
October 2, 2015, inclusive.  Sub-samples were generated from the ASRS and NTSB 
samples for which the aircraft stall-state, stall warning system performance, and crew 
performance outcome could all be determined unambiguously, as described in the 
following sections.  To aid subsequent researchers, the NASA ASRS and NTSB records 
included in the final sub-samples are tabulated at Appendix C2 and C3, respectively. 
Data Encoding 
A large amount of archival NTSB and NASA ASRS narrative data was processed 
for the quantitative BLR evaluation.  Two SMEs were employed for this activity.  The 
author drew upon substantial experience with icing stall research in making the 
judgments necessary for the proposed research (FAA, 1996b; Lerner, 1985; Maris, 1996; 
Maris, 2009).  The literature identifies the benefit of using a second SME to provide 
independence and quality assurance of the work of the Principal Investigator: Bazeley 
advocates the use of an independent observer to validate researchers’ encoding decisions 
and stresses the importance of a robust audit trail for achieving the sought-after reliability 
(2013, p. 151).  Babbie also advocates for “some verification” of the researcher’s 
encoding decisions, but notes the overriding importance of “exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive” code categories (2013, pp. 416, 417).  This study adopted both of these 
recommended safeguards.  A highly structured encoding process was employed, using a 
second SME to provide a quality assurance check on the author’s sample selection and 
data encoding of the ASRS and NTSB databases.  The appointed SME is a highly 
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experienced pilot with 7,500 hours total flight time, and is a certified multi-engine and 
instrument flight instructor with an FAA Airline Transport Pilot certificate and type 
ratings for the ATR42/72.  In order to familiarize the SME with the protocols involved in 
this study, the SME was briefed using the checklists and procedures included in 
Appendix D, which also includes the data collection worksheet.  The following sequence 
was followed for the data sampling and encoding processes: 
1. Both SMEs queried the on-line NTSB accident archive using the criteria shown in 
Table 7.  The NASA-provided custom ASRS extract already conformed to the 
specifications shown in the table, without additional processing. 
2. The SMEs compared their recorded ASRS and NTSB sample sizes and addressed any 
discrepancies in order to achieve identical sample sets. 
3. The SMEs examined the ASRS and NTSB samples and rejected records for which the 
aircraft stall state, stall warning system performance, and crew performance outcomes 
could not be unequivocally determined.  Any discrepancies were addressed to ensure 
that the resulting sub-sample sets from the two SMEs were identical. 
4. The SMEs independently encoded the sub-samples regarding stall warning system 
performance and aircrew performance outcomes using the criteria discussed in the 
next section and summarized in Table 4.  Discrepancies were discussed openly, and 
each SME presented the reasoning behind their encoding to the other SME.  Any 
unresolved disagreement in these assessments resulted in the rejection of the entire 
record, based on its failing to meet the overwhelming evidence threshold listed in the 
table. 
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5. The selected sub-samples were recorded in the Appendix D worksheet and 
subsequently encoded into the software used for the BLR analysis and hypothesis 
tests.   
The preceding steps are described in more detail in the following paragraphs.  The 
stall warning status and aircraft stall state were both relatively unambiguous parameters: 
They were either present in the record, leading to the record’s inclusion in the sample, or 
they were absent, and the entire record was eliminated from the sample.  An ASRS pre-
test (described below) comprising 18,214 records, resulted in a 115-case sample with no 
ambiguities encountered that required a subjective assessment of the stall warning 
operation and stall warning status.  This lack of ambiguity does not imply that the 
required information was present in all the records; it only indicates the availability of the 
required data and that resultant treatment of the individual record was easy to determine 
without guesswork. 
The evaluation of the crew responses was a more subjective exercise because it 
involved an assessment of the interplay between human behavior; a complex 
environment; and a framework of rules, procedures, and industry norms.  For these 
reasons, a structured methodology was employed to add rigor to the process and to 
minimize any subjective biases.  The author and the independent SME each classified the 
crew performance outcomes as correct or incorrect based on the sequential application of 
the criteria shown in Table 4, as evinced by the crew’s initial reactions during the onset 
of the stall, stall warning, or LOC event. 
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Table 4   
Crew Performance Outcome Evaluation Criteria 
 Incorrect Crew Performance Correct Crew Performance 
1. The NTSB probable cause or 
contributing factor in a factual or final 
report indicates that the crew’s initial 
response was inappropriate (e.g. BEA, 
2012; NTSB, 1996b; NTSB, 2010a). 
The NTSB probable cause or 
contributing factor in a factual or final 
report indicates that the crew’s initial 
response was appropriate (e.g. BEA, 
2012; NTSB, 1996b; NTSB, 2010a). 
2. The ASRS submitter indicated that the 
crew response was inappropriate. 
The ASRS submitter indicated that the 
crew response was appropriate. 
3. The crew first became aware of the 
impending stall or loss of control after 
their onset (i.e., the crew allowed the 
situation to degrade to the point where 
control was lost before recognizing this 
fact). 
The crew first became aware of the 
impending stall or loss of control before 
their onset and made positive efforts to 
avoid the event, regardless of the 
success of the outcome. 
4. An appropriate stall warning was not 
acted upon in time to avoid a true 
aerodynamic stall or loss of control. 
An appropriate stall warning was acted 
upon in a timely fashion, regardless of 
the success of the outcome. 
5. The crew response was markedly 
different from an accepted norm (i.e., 
adding power and firmly lowering the 
nose to prevent a wing stall) (e.g. 
NTSB, 2010a). 
The crew response conformed to the 
accepted norm, regardless of the 
success of the outcome. 
 
6. The crew appeared to be unaware of the 
stall-state of the aircraft or 
misdiagnosed its state (e.g. BEA, 2012).   
The crew appeared to be aware of the 
stall-state of the aircraft. 
7. There is overwhelming evidence from a 
subjective review of the record that the 
crew’s initial response was 
inappropriate. 
There is overwhelming evidence from a 
subjective review of the record that the 
crew’s initial response was appropriate. 
 
 
91 
 
 
Only the sixth criterion listed in Table 4 was subjective, and this was the reason 
for the strict imposition of the overwhelming evidence threshold (criterion 7).  If the crew 
performance could not be determined using these criteria, or if the two SMEs differed on 
the coding of a particular record, then the de-facto overwhelming evidence criterion was 
not met, and the entire record was rejected, listwise.  The heuristics in Table 4 were 
evaluated and found usable in the NASA ASRS pre-test, which gave considerable 
confidence for their application to the NTSB data.  Nevertheless, the ASRS and NTSB 
database sampling methods differed because ASRS data are always de-identified and do 
not contain CVR or FDR data, but usually contain first-person narratives.  Conversely, 
the NTSB cases often contained CVR and FDR information that made the assessments 
easier for these cases.  The following sections address the individual sampling 
approaches used for the ASRS and NTSB databases, after a short discussion regarding 
inter-rater reliability between the two SMEs. 
Inter-Rater Reliability 
There are several precedents for the use of two raters in peer reviewed works and 
dissertations.  Joslin (2013) employed two SME raters in a comparative study of Runway 
Incursion Models and cited numerous other works where two raters were used, including 
two aerospace studies (Hendriksen & Holewijn, 1999; Zuschlag, 2005).  Bazeley 
mentioned the use of “a second person” to check coding reliability but notably did not 
extrapolate the concept to greater numbers of coders (2013, p. 150).  Instead, Bazeley 
placed her main emphasis for improving reliability on “the strength of your argument and 
clarity and comprehensiveness of your evidence” (2013, p. 151).  For these reasons, and 
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as a result of the procedural precautions taken for the data encoding process, two raters 
were deemed appropriate for this study, one of whom was the author acting in the 
capacity of an SME, while the second provided a quality assurance function.  The two 
raters interacted regularly to converge on a common outcome, so the second SME should 
not be considered as an independent rater for statistical purposes.  
Inter-rater reliability between the author and the second SME was not quantified 
because the methodology required complete consensus on all retained records, yielding a 
de-facto inter-rater reliability of 100%.  More sophisticated measures, such as Cohen’s 
kappa (k), could have been employed to contrast the observed agreements between raters 
with chance outcomes (Cohen, 1960), but the kappa statistic can seriously underestimate 
the inter-rater reliability when the contingency table is skewed by a prevalent response 
(Feinstein & Cicchetti, 1990).  Based on the ASRS and NTSB pilot studies, such skewing 
was anticipated, so the use of the kappa statistic would have added little insight to the 
inter-rater reliability, negating its usefulness.  
ASRS Database, Sample, and Pre-test 
The NASA ASRS sample was obtained via a customized data extract in XLSX 
format for subsequent processing using a combination of MS® Excel™, MS® Access™, 
IBM® SPSS™ Statistics and SAS® Enterprise Miner™ software applications.  The search 
query was developed via personal communications between the author and the ASRS 
data specialist with the objective of being sufficiently broad to avoid the accidental 
elimination of relevant cases.  This conservative approach resulted in the inclusion of 
superfluous records that had to be scrubbed before the BLR analysis.  The final query 
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syntax is listed in Appendix A.  Important ASRS limitations are included in Appendix B, 
and the ASRS imported data structure is shown in Appendix C1.  
The ASRS data complemented the picture of the icing phenomenon provided by 
the NTSB database because the accident data, unsurprisingly, yielded very few correct 
crew responses to the stall warning cues.  The ASRS cases of interest were expected to 
contain a higher proportion of crews responding correctly to the icing exigencies, thereby 
avoiding an appearance in the NTSB’s database.   
 
ASRS pre-test.  A pre-test was performed to validate this assumption and to 
determine if the quality and quantity of available ASRS icing encounter data would 
support the proposed BLR analysis.  The sample was comprised of 115 ASRS records 
from the inception of ASRS in January 1988 to October 2, 2015.  ASRS data were 
obtained via a customized extract in XLSX format from the publicly available database 
of 182,214 records.  The pre-test query string included in Appendix A was developed and 
refined in the course of a number of personal communications between the author and the 
ASRS database Project Manager.  Only five CRs were observed in the resulting sample, 
which is unsurprising as these represent the null case of no-pending-stall or LOC and no 
stall warning.  These cases were excluded from the analysis because an accepted 
minimum bin size for a BLR is 10 observations per estimated parameter (Hair et al., 
2010, p. 322).  Table 5 details the steps in the refinement of the sample used for the 
ASRS pre-test. 
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Table 5   
ASRS Pre-test Population and Sample Summary 
Group Size  
ASRS sample date range January 1, 1988 - October 2, 2015 
Full ASRS dataset, since inception 182,214 records at October 2, 2015  
Initial sample, per tailored request #7212b 381 cases 
Scrubbed sample for further analysis 200 cases 
Final sample size for further analysis 115 casesa 
Note.  aAll five “Correct Rejection” (CR) cases were eliminated because of Logistic 
Regression sample-size restrictions.  bThe search string used to generate the 381 sample 
cases from the complete 182,214 ASRS data record is included in Appendix A. 
  
 
 
ASRS pre-test findings.  Aircrew responded correctly to the icing encounter in 
45% of the pre-test cases.  The logistic regression model was statistically significant, 
χ2(2) = 24.615, p < .0005.  The Hosmer and Lemeshow test was not statistically 
significant (p = 1.0), indicating that the model was a satisfactory fit despite the small 
sample size, and no multivariate outliers were noted using a two-standard deviation 
cutoff.  The model explained 33.6% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in crew performance 
outcomes and correctly classified 75.7% of the cases.  Sensitivity was 54.0%, specificity 
was 92.3 percent, positive predictive value was 15.6%, and negative predictive value was 
72.3%.  Of the three predictor SDT-state variables, two were statistically significant: 
STD_MISS and STD_FALSE_ALARM.  Compared to a missing stall warning, aircrew 
had 16.54 times greater odds of performing correctly when faced with a stall warning 
False Alarm.  The BLR pre-test indicated that a significant proportion of successful crew 
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performance outcomes could be predicted using the SDT model, paving the way for the 
full study and its associated hypothesis tests.  An unexpected finding from the pre-test 
was the need for the inclusion of a new System_Issue variable to address incidents caused 
by systems failures directly related to the icing conditions that were not initially related to 
stalls or LOC.  The loss of Air France 447 (BEA, 2012) due to a stall resulting from the 
aircrew’s response to pitot icing exemplifies the need for this new variable. 
NTSB Accident Database, Sample, and Pre-test 
NTSB accident data were downloaded for the period January 1, 1988, to 
October 2, 2015, inclusive, from the public on-line query page: http://www.ntsb.gov/_ 
layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx.  The start date represents the first availability of full 
NTSB docket data on-line and also corresponds to the start date of Green’s (2006) study 
of U.S. inflight icing accidents that is discussed below.  The October 2, 2015, cutoff 
corresponded with the end-date of the NASA ASRS data extract used in the pre-test; it 
also ensured the majority of the NTSB probable causes had been established in time for 
the data reduction, based on a six-month buffer between the record retrieval date and the 
time of the data processing. 
 
NTSB accident archive processing.  The NTSB archive was imported in 
delimited text format directly into Excel™ and IBM® SPSS™, using the “ | ” (vertical 
bar) symbol as the delimiter.  Figure 5 shows the pre-test results of importing the NTSB 
accident database into SPSS™; identical results were achieved with the Excel™ import. 
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Figure 5.  SPSS import of NTSB accident database variables. 
 
 
NTSB accident archive sample.  The sampling method was patterned after 
Green’s (2006) comprehensive archival study of U.S. inflight icing accidents and 
incidents between 1978 and 2002 using NTSB, FAA, and ASRS data.  Green’s initial 
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NTSB sample contained 11,174 cases, which was reduced by shortening the review 
period and by careful selection of the Boolean search terms.  Green also eliminated a 
number of the retrieved reports relating to engine icing or icing system anomalies by 
adjusting the search terms and by manual inspection.  The final search string employed 
by Green (“icing | freezing | rime | glaze | sleet | frost”) yielded a more manageable 2,212 
cases, which were then manually reduced to a working sample of 693 accidents for 
Green’s detailed analysis.  Based on the similarity between the scope of the present study 
and Green’s work, Green’s strategy and search string were reused for the current 
research.  This will facilitate meaningful comparisons with Green’s earlier findings.  As 
indicated in the delimitations section (Chapter I), the analysis required a level of 
inference regarding icing-induced loss of control and stall events, which sometimes 
presented solely as “uncontrolled descents” in the accident data (Green, 2006, p. 3).  A 
similar approach to Green’s was adopted to address this issue, although additional 
formalized structure was imposed, as previously discussed. 
The NTSB accident database is comprehensive because of the legal obligation to 
report all accidents (NTSB, 2010b), so a large number of icing-related records were 
anticipated, in line with Green’s findings.  Unlike the ASRS database, many of the NTSB 
cases related to accidents without survivors, making it impossible to determine the stall 
warning performance and crew outcomes without access to a CVR or FDR.  The NTSB 
archive was therefore screened for aircraft that were likely to be equipped with CVR and 
/ or FDR equipment in order to facilitate the extraction of the factors and measures 
required for the BLR analysis.  As the FDR and CVR requirements have evolved with 
time and contain grandfather clauses, it was not possible to specify which records would 
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meet the selection requirement before a detailed examination of the data.  Based on the 
current FARs at the time of publication, the following aircraft classes were expected to 
have FDR and / or CVR equipment installed: U.S. civil registered, multiengine, turbine-
powered airplane with 10 or more passenger seats (FAA, 2010d) and “U.S. civil 
registered, multiengine, turbine-powered airplanes… (with) six passengers or more and 
for which two pilots are required by type certification or operating rule” (FAA, 2010d).  
In order to capture these classes of aircraft as simply as possible using the NTSB 
database search criteria, the NTSB sampling frame was limited to non-amateur built 
turbine (turbojet, turbofan, or turboprop) airplanes.  The turbine limitation was not 
strictly necessary for the ASRS data because the ASRS pre-test indicated that the sample 
size would remain manageable, even without this filtering, and also because crew 
narratives are almost always available in the ASRS records, which obviates the need for 
CVR or FDR equipage.  Nevertheless, the NTSB turbine-only limitation was also applied 
to the ASRS data in order to maximize the similarities between the sample sets.   
The filtered NTSB turbine aircraft accident Probable Cause synopses were 
manually examined to select cases where an aerodynamic stall or loss of control were 
encountered, with the remaining records discarded.  The crew performance outcomes and 
stall warning system behavior were then encoded for the retained records.  For those 
records where the crew and stall parameters could not be determined from the NTSB on-
line synopses, the NTSB full narratives were consulted, where available, to determine the 
missing parameters.  If the NTSB full narratives were unavailable or failed to include the 
required parameters, then the affected records were discarded.  The full narratives for the 
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remaining records were used to encode the stall warning and crew outcomes for the 
subsequent BLR investigation. 
 
NTSB pre-test.  A pre-test was performed to evaluate the potential sample size of 
the icing-related occurrences contained in the NTSB database.  NTSB accident data for 
the period January 1, 1978, to October 2, 2015, were downloaded in text format directly 
from the publicly available archive via the on-line query page: http://www.ntsb. 
gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx.  The pre-test sample was obtained using Green’s 
(2006) search string with the following syntax: "icing" or "freezing" or "rime" or "glaze" 
or "sleet" or "frost."  The sample was constrained to non-amateur built airplanes with 
turbine engines (i.e., turboprop, turbofan, and turbojet classifications in the NTSB 
database).  An additional extract was performed with piston-powered aircraft in order to 
gauge the size of this sub-group, in case it was required in order to achieve an adequate 
overall sample size, but this subset was not used in the final analysis.  For reference, 
before the application of the keywords and engine-type delimiters, 5,110 records were 
retrieved for the sample period, of which 855 met the search string criteria.  The resulting 
sampling frames were not examined further to determine the actual usable sample size, 
but approximately 30% of the sample frame was expected to result in usable sample data, 
based on the ASRS pre-test results (Table 5).  The NTSB pre-test results and initial 
estimates of the sample sizes for the BLR analysis are shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6   
NTSB Pre-test Sample Size Findings 
Engine Type 
Pre-test Sample Size 
(records) 
Estimated Final 
Sample Size (records)a 
Turboprop 106 32 
Turbofan 42 14 
Turbojet 13 4 
Total Turbine Airplane Sample Size 161 50 
Piston  694 208 
Maximum Sample Size 855 258 
Note.  Retrieved from http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx based on 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations between January 1, 1978, and October 2, 2015, 
with the following query syntax: "icing" or "freezing" or "rime" or "glaze" or "sleet" or 
"frost."  aEstimated sample size is 30% of sampling frame size, based on ASRS pre-test 
findings. 
 
 
 
Hair et al. (2010, p. 333) indicate that each BLR group should have a minimum 
bin size of 10 times the number of estimated model coefficients.  Based on the IV factors 
under consideration (stall warning system state and aircraft stall state), a minimum 
sample size of 20 was desired.  The findings from the NTSB database pre-test indicated 
that the BLR analysis should be viable using turbine-engine aircraft records alone, 
although the option of including the piston-engine airplanes was retained, if needed to 
achieve an acceptable sample size.  
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Database Summary 
The key characteristics of the ASRS and NTSB databases are summarized in 
Table 7.  
Table 7   
Key Database Characteristics 
Characteristic ASRS Data NTSB Data 
Database source Custom extract provided by 
ASRS data specialist 
Downloaded from NTSB 
accident database websitea 
Data format MS XLSX file Delimited TXT File 
Extract start date January 1, 1988  January 1, 1988 
Extract end date October 2, 2015 October 2, 2015 
Primary Filter Customized Boolean search 
query (Appendix A) 
Turbine Engine Type 
AircraftCategory Filter Airplane Airplane 
AmateurBuilt Filter N/A No 
EngineType Filter N/A Turbine aircraft (turbojet, 
turboprop, turbofan) 
WeatherConditions Filter N/A All 
Suitable Informationb Filter SME evaluation SME evaluation 
Note.  a Retrieved from http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx.   bSuitable 
information is defined as adequate to determine aircraft stall state, stall warning system 
state, and crew response. 
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Data Reliability 
Field defines reliability as “the ability of a measure to produce consistent results 
when the same entities are measured under different conditions” (2009, p. 792).  Three 
techniques were used to enhance the reliability of the analysis.  The first entailed the 
application of the Hosmer and Lemeshow test, which has specific application to the BLR 
method.  A model is deemed not to have a poor fit when the Hosmer and Lemeshow test 
value does not achieve statistical significance at the desired level.  The second method 
attempted to take advantage of the two completely independent datasets used for the 
analysis.  The BLR was run independently on each of the ASRS and NTSB data samples, 
with the objective of validating the results across the two analyses.  Unfortunately, 
sample size limitations precluded this approach, as discussed in Chapter IV, which 
required the use of a merged database for the BLR.  The reliability of the merged 
database was therefore established by partitioning the sample into training and holdout 
(validation) samples.  This required the BLR to be run a number of times while varying 
the relative training / holdout proportion in order to attain the best balance between the 
model specification (which required a large training sample) while reducing variance in 
the validation dataset (which required a large holdout sample).  A satisfactory 
compromise was achieved with a 50 – 50 split between the two partitions, as discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
A second important reliability consideration stemmed from the self-reporting 
nature of the ASRS source data, which introduced the potential for significant bias.  
Although there are definite benefits of filing an ASRS report, such as indemnification 
from FAA prosecution for non-criminal violations (FAA, 2011a), this enticement could 
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not completely overcome the self-selection bias inherent in the program.  Appendix B 
contains an excellent summary of the limitations of the ASRS data provided by the 
program office.  Another source of ASRS bias arises because a noteworthy event has 
already occurred for a record to appear in the ASRS database, so every ASRS record 
likely corresponds to a large number of uneventful icing encounters that would never 
appear in the database.  This is undoubtedly the reason for the relatively poor (45%) 
aircrew correct response outcome rate observed in the ASRS pre-test.  For many of these 
records, the first indication reported by the crew in the ASRS data was often an LOC, 
which automatically constituted an incorrect aircrew response based on the criteria in 
Table 4.  These incorrect crew response classifications were not intended to impute 
blame, because there were several instances where no warning was given to the crew 
before the LOC.  The terminology should be understood simply as a category for the 
dependent variable, with no blame attribution.  Conversely, an event would be 
categorized as an incorrect crew response if the crew’s initial responses were 
inappropriate, even if the event did not result in an accident.  Despite these shortcomings, 
the ASRS data provided an important perspective that would have been missing had the 
NTSB accident data been analyzed in isolation.  In summary, the ASRS and NTSB 
databases should offset each other’s weaknesses to some degree, thereby increasing the 
reliability of the study. 
Data Validity 
Field defines validity as “evidence that a study allows correct inferences about the 
question it was aimed to answer” (2009, p. 795).  A number of validities were considered 
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for this exploratory design, including ecological validity, content validity, face validity, 
and external validity.  Ecological validity relates to the absence of bias that could be 
caused by the researcher’s presence (Field, 2009, p. 12).  As there was no researcher 
observing the targeted archived events as they unfolded, the ecological validity of the 
research should be sound.  Babbie defines content validity as the degree to which a 
measure covers the range of meanings included within a concept (2013, p.152).  The 
factors and measures used in this study were robust and fully encompassing, either due to 
their binary nature (for the IV and several of the DVs) or because their definition 
comprehensively covered all the available outcomes (i.e., the SDT Hit, Miss, FA, and CR 
permutations).  For these reasons, the content validity should also be high.  Babbie 
describes face validity as the quality of an indicator that makes it seem to be a reasonable 
measure of some variable (2013, p. 151).  Once again, the characterization of the stall 
warning system’s performance in SDT terms (Hit, Miss, FA, and C.) had high face 
validity and very little subjectivity.  The face validity of the Correct_Response measure is 
much harder to establish because it can be very difficult to divine the crew’s thoughts as 
they responded to icing challenges.  As previously noted, anti-ice and deice systems have 
occasionally been overwhelmed by severe icing resulting in the loss of the aircraft, 
despite textbook crew responses.  Conversely, some crews have survived unscathed, 
despite their executing a series of ill-advised actions.  The structured approach employed 
for evaluating crew responses (Table 4) should mitigate bias from these characteristics, 
thereby improving the external validity of the research.  
Shadish, Cook, & Campbell define external validity as “…whether the cause-
effect relationship holds over variation in persons, settings, treatment variables, and 
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measurement variable” (2003, p. 38).  External validity is strongly influenced by the 
quality of the research design and by the robustness of the statistical tools used in the 
analysis.  Although it is difficult to control the validity of the archives used in any 
exploratory research, a number of techniques were used to increase the validity of results 
derived from them.  These included triangulation (Vogt et al., 2012, p. 113), whereby 
conclusions were drawn using independent paths and the development of a thick 
understanding of the situation by examining the phenomena in the most representative 
possible real environment (Vogt et al., 2012, pp. 71, 72).  This study attempted to 
implement both of these techniques by sampling from independent pools of highly 
pertinent data.  The large number of U.S. registered aircraft and their varied operations 
should ensure sufficient randomization to produce meaningful results.  The NTSB 
accident data were comprehensive due to the mandatory nature of aircraft accident 
reporting.  In contrast, the ASRS reports were voluntary and subject to self-reporting and 
response biases, but the NTSB accident data should mitigate these effects, as should the 
anonymous and altruistic nature of ASRS reporting, with its associated incentive of 
eliminating noncriminal event enforcement action.  The robustness of the statistical tools 
employed in the study is another major factor in the achievement of good external 
validity: The BLR was selected primarily because of its inherent resilience to 
heteroscedasticity and to violations of normality (Hair et al., 2010, pp. 317, 321).  In 
combination, these considerations should help achieve good external validity and the 
consequent generalizability of the conclusions to be drawn from the research. 
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Treatment of the Data 
Data processing was accomplished using a phased approach with the application 
of four software packages: Microsoft® Excel™, MS Access™, IBM® SPSS™ Statistics, 
and SAS® Enterprise Miner™.  These applications were used collectively to perform the 
four data treatment activities: importation, scrubbing, variable encoding, and BLR 
execution.  The ASRS and NTSB data samples were initially imported into Excel™ and 
SPSS™, where the two datasets were merged while retaining the identification of the 
source database for stratification purposes.  The combined record was manually scrubbed 
for duplicates based on event dates, and records with missing values for any of the key 
variables were rejected on a listwise basis.  The scrubbed data were then manually 
encoded for the selected BLR variables and imported into Access™ to facilitate review 
and comparison between the two SMEs.  These processes are described in the following 
sections. 
 
Data importation and scrubbing.  The ASRS and NTSB pre-test findings 
indicated that the proposed Boolean keyword searches would return a considerable 
number of unwanted records that were unrelated to airframe icing, such as engine 
compressor stalls and carburetor icing events.  These confounding records were 
eliminated by inspection of the imported data files using the Microsoft® Excel™ and MS 
Access™ applications.  Bazeley’s “describe, compare, and relate” (2013) strategy was 
used for the selection, scrubbing, and encoding of candidate cases, and to facilitate the 
manual filtering of these extraneous records.  The scrubbed data were encoded for the 
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factors and measures to be used in the subsequent BLR evaluation of the CIRB 
hypothesis.   
 
Variable encoding.  The ASRS and NTSB databases did not contain several of 
the factors and measures required for the BLR analysis, so these variables were manually 
encoded into the data files.  The data operationalization was accomplished by adding an 
additional column into the Excel™ spreadsheet for each desired variable shown in Table 
8.  The SME hand-encoded the appropriate values for each new variable based on 
scrutiny of the NTSB and ASRS narratives using the heuristics shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 8   
Primary BLR Variables 
Variable Name Function Attribute 
Correct_Response DV Binary Y/N 
SDT_Class IV Categorical: Hit, Miss, FA, CR 
Pending_Wing_Stall IV Binary Y/N 
Tail_Stall IV Binary Y/N 
Stall_Warning IV Binary Y/N 
System_Issue IV Binary Y/N 
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Missing data.  The CIRB model postulates that the correct aircrew performance 
outcome construct can be modeled through the application of Bayes’ Theorem to an SDT 
theoretical structure.  This relationship is pivotal, because the Conservative Icing 
Response Bias at the heart of the CIRB model represents a cognitive shift that eludes 
direct measurement, so the BLR analysis of the aircrew responses was a vital construct 
for quantifying the intangible CIRB effect.  For this reason, it was essential to avoid 
extraneous assumptions about the data in order to avoid skewing the outcome.  
Accordingly, the BLR required an unambiguous response to three questions in order for a 
record to be included in the analysis.  The first consideration was whether the crew’s 
initial response to the incipient stall, loss of control, or FA could be determined, 
regardless of a successful or failed outcome.  A correct response entailed implementing 
appropriate wing-stall or tail-stall prevention and / or recovery procedures subsequent to 
a stall warning alarm or other indications of an incipient stall condition.  A correct 
response also required that no stall prevention or recovery action be undertaken under FA 
conditions.  The second consideration related to the SME’s ability to characterize the stall 
warning system’s performance in SDT terms (Hit, Miss, FA, or CR).  The final 
consideration required the unambiguous determination of the aircraft’s actual stall status 
(wing stall, tail stall, or no imminent stall).  If any of these characteristics could not be 
unambiguously determined, no imputation was attempted, and the entire record was 
deleted from subsequent analysis (listwise, in SPSS™ terminology).  This approach was 
essential to avoid skewing the BLR analysis with erroneously categorized records, which 
was an important consideration given the relatively small samples under consideration. 
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Duplicate data.  The ASRS and NTSB data records each carried unique 
identifiers, so few, if any, duplicate records were anticipated within either dataset.  It was, 
however, anticipated that some ASRS reports could be filed for events that led to 
accidents, in which case some duplication was to be expected.  As ASRS data are fully 
de-identified, automated methods could not be used that depend on unique identifiers, 
such as the aircraft registration, for de-duplication.  Accordingly, duplicate records were 
manually screened, identified, and merged using a combination of unique field data, such 
as occurrence date, aircraft class, etc.  The BLR was executed once the data had been 
properly scrubbed with suitable attention to duplicate records and missing values.   
Binary Logistic Regression Overview 
This section describes the mechanics of the BLR as outlined by Hair et al. (2010, 
p. 317-344) and also addresses the specific application of the method for the testing of the 
CIRB hypothesis.  The BLR was the appropriate multivariate technique for the proposed 
investigation based on decision-tree classification methodology developed by Hair et al. 
(2010, pp. 12-13).  Table 9 outlines the process and decision nodes used to arrive at the 
BLR methodology. 
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Table 9   
Multivariate Method Selection Decision Tree 
Decision Node ASRS Attribute  
What type of relationship is being 
examined? 
Dependence  
How many variables are being predicted? One dependent variable in a single 
relationship (i.e., Correct_Response) 
What is the measurement scale of the 
dependent variable? 
Nonmetric (i.e., binary) 
Appropriate Multivariate Method Linear Probability Model: 
Binary Logistic Regression 
Note.  Adapted from “Multivariate data analysis” (7th ed.), by Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., 
Babin, B. J., & Anderson, R. E., (2010), Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 12 
and 13. 
 
 
The BLR is a subset of logistic regression methods “formulated to predict and 
explain a binary (two-group) categorical variable” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 317).  For the 
present study, the binary dependent variable (DV) was the Correct_Response measure, 
which categorizes initial aircrew responses to icing-induced stall, stall warning, or loss of 
control events, as either correct or incorrect.  Candidate independent variables for a BLR 
can be any combination of nonmetric or metric independent variables (IV).  The primary 
IVs for this investigation were the four Signal Detection Theory (SDT) classifications of 
the stall warning system response to wing or tail icing: Hit, Miss, FA, or CR.  Indicator 
Coding was used to convert the four levels of SDT IVs into dichotomous values through 
the use of dummy variables.  The SDT Hit IV was used as the reference variable for the 
indicator coding, and was therefore excluded from the regression analysis.  The BLR 
111 
 
 
processed these IVs in a manner that maximized the discrimination between the two DV 
states by using a logistic or logit curve shown in Figure 6 (Hair et al., 2010, pp. 321-323).  
As the figure illustrates, the logit curve is a continuous sigmoid function that 
asymptotically approaches the values zero and one, while represent the two possible 
states of the binomial dependent variable.  The figure highlights examples of correctly 
classified and misclassified data, based on the logit model. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Sample binary logistic regression logit function.  The figure shows the source 
data and a sample logit model with correctly classified and misclassified data identified.  
Derived from Hair (2010, p. 322). 
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Hair et al. showed that the coefficients (bi) for the variables (Xi) that define the 
logistic curve can be calculated using the mathematically equivalent logit (Equation 8) 
and exponentiated / Odds Ratio (Equation 9) formulae (2010, p. 326): 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 = ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆1 −  𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆� =  𝑝𝑝0 +  𝑝𝑝1𝑋𝑋1 + ⋯+ 𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑋𝑋𝑅𝑅                         (8) 
 
𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆1 −  𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆� =  𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1𝑋𝑋1 +⋯+ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛                                    (9) 
 
These equations highlight the inherently non-linear relationship between the IVs 
and DV in a BLR, unlike the standard multiple regression techniques, which require a 
linear relationship.  Further, the error terms of the discrete BLR dependent variable are 
binomially (i.e., not normally) distributed and the error variances are not constant across 
the IV values (heteroscedasticity).  Although these properties violate the statistical 
requirements of linear regression methods, the BLR technique is not affected by such 
violations.  
 
BLR model fit.  The distinctive nature of the logistic curve and its underlying 
assumptions require a different approach to model fit from traditional regression 
methods.  BLR fit is evaluated using statistical measures that are unique to the BLR 
technique.  These tests evaluate overall model fit, differences between models, and the 
significance of the parameters within a model.  Overall fit is evaluated using maximum 
likelihood estimation to derive the -2 log likelihood (- 2LL) value for the model, which is 
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analogous to the sum of square errors obtained in regression analysis (Hair, et al., 2010, 
p. 327).  Lower likelihood values indicate a better model fit, and a perfect fit is indicated 
by a zero -2LL value.   
A second statistical measure of the overall BLR model fit is provided by the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test that evaluates the significance of differences between the 
actual DV values and the expected values derived from the model.  Smaller differences 
are desired, and an acceptable model fit is indicated by a non-significant Hosmer and 
Lemeshow result.  Good model fit is not necessarily a measure of practical significance, 
so the -2LL and Hosmer and Lemeshow tests are supplemented by the Pseudo R2 statistic 
that is equivalent to the multiple regression coefficient of determination.  Pseudo R2 is a 
measure of the statistical difference between two models, evaluated using a chi-square 
significance test of the difference between their respective –2LL values.  Pseudo R2 is 
interpreted in a similar manner to coefficients of determination and has a range of zero to 
one, with one representing a perfect fit.  The Cox and Snell R2 and Nagelkerke R2 are 
refinements to the pseudo R2 test and are assessed identically (Hair et al., 2010, p. 339).  
The results of this study are presented in terms of the Nagelkerke R2.  The basic pseudo 
R2 statistic is calculated as follows (Equation 10):  
 
𝑅𝑅2𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =  − 2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 −  (−2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶)− 2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶                                         (10) 
where: 
R2 = pseudo R2 
LL = Log Likelihood  
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BLR classification accuracy.  Once the BLR model overall fit and practical 
significance are established using the preceding tests, the model’s practicality as a 
predictive tool is assessed by means of a classification matrix, as shown in Table 11.  The 
classification matrix captures a number of key statistics from the BLR model, including 
the Hit Ratio, which is the percentage of combined Hit and CR outcomes successfully 
predicated by the model, as well as the model’s sensitivity and specificity that correspond 
to the model’s individual SDT Hit and CR ratios, respectively. 
 
BLR coefficient weights.  BLR coefficients are equivalent to those for a multiple 
regression, but the former are logarithmic when the DV is expressed using the logit 
function.  BLR logit coefficients represent the “change in the ratio of the probabilities 
(the odds)” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 329) that reflect the relative weights of each IV.  Logit 
coefficients are real numbers, and a zero coefficient indicates an odds ratio of 1.0 and a 
corresponding probability of 0.5.  Negative logit coefficients indicate lower odds ratios 
and corresponding probabilities less than 0.5.  Positive logit coefficients indicate the 
converse.  The logit coefficients are useful in determining the strength of the coefficient 
relationships with the DV.   
Coefficient weights can be expressed using an alternative but equivalent format to 
facilitate the interpretation of the direction of the relationship between the DV and IVs:  
Exponentiated logistic coefficients are the antilogs of their equivalent logit coefficients.  
These exponentiated coefficients are positive real numbers, where 1.0 corresponds to a 
relationship with no direction, and values above and below zero reflect positive and 
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negative directional relationships between the DV and the selected IV, respectively.  The 
exponentiated format is also useful for determining the relative weights of the 
coefficients, as shown in Equation 11 (Hair et al., 2010, p. 331):  
 
Percentage change in odds = (Exponentiated Coefficienti – 1.0) x 100             (11) 
. 
Categorical IVs, such as the SDT classifications used in this study, entailed the 
use of dummy (indicator) variables.  In such cases, the calculated percentage change in 
odds is in relation to the reference category chosen for the analysis: SDT Hits for this 
study.  The odds ratios quantify the relative weights of Misses, FAs, and CRs on the crew 
performance outcomes, in relation to the Hit baseline crew performance. 
 
The Wald statistic.  The Wald statistic is used to test the significance of the 
coefficients derived in a BLR analysis.  The statistic is applied and interpreted in the 
identical manner to the t value significance test of multiple regression coefficients.  The 
preceding concepts are summarized in Table 10, which contrasts the BLR parameters 
with their more familiar multiple regression equivalents. 
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Table 10  
Comparison of BLR and Multiple Regression Parameters 
Multiple Regression 
Property 
Equivalent 
BLR Property 
BLR Parameter Range and 
Interpretation 
Total sum of squares, 
Error sum of squares 
– 2LL of base model  Smaller is better:  
0 = perfect model fit. 
Regression sum of 
squares 
Difference of – 2LL for 
between models  
The model with the smaller -2LL 
value is the better fit. 
F test of model fit Chi-square test of  
– 2LL difference 
Standard Chi-square significance 
test for each evaluated model. 
F test of model fit Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Chi-square test fit test 
Non-significant outcomes indicate 
an acceptable model fit. 
Coefficient of 
determination (R2) 
Pseudo R2  
Nagelkerke R2 
0 ≤ R2 ≤ 1.0 
Coefficient significance 
(t-value) 
Wald statistic Interpreted similarly to the F and t 
values used in significance testing 
of regression coefficients. 
Coefficient weight Logit coefficients Real numbers.  A zero coefficient 
indicates an odds ratio of 1.0 and a 
corresponding probability of 0.5.  
Negative coefficients indicate 
lower odds ratios and 
corresponding probabilities less 
than 0.5.  Positive coefficients 
indicate the converse. 
Coefficient weight 
(alternative formulation) 
Exponentiated logistic 
coefficient 
Positive real numbers.  An 
exponentiated coefficient of 1.0 
corresponds to a relationship with 
no direction.  Values < 1.0 indicate 
a negative relationship direction, 
while values > 1.0 indicate a 
positive relationship direction. 
Note.  Adapted from Hair et al. (2010, p. 328).  
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BLR Execution  
The BLR was initially performed on the sample data using IBM® SPSS™ and 
SAS® Enterprise Miner™ statistical software, as detailed in the BLR and data treatment 
sections.  Each package has differing strengths and weaknesses, and the use of both in 
parallel provided a useful cross-check of the outcomes.  Enterprise Miner™ is a modular 
application that provides a unified and expandable interface for conducting advanced 
statistical analyses including linear and non-linear modeling.  The program has flexible 
import and export capabilities, including the import and export to the Excel™ XLSX 
format that was used for the data scrubbing.  The BLR was executed using the GLM 
function in Enterprise Miner™ and the Analyze > Regression > Binary Logistic in 
SPSS™, acting on the data exported and encoded from Excel™ during the data selection 
and scrubbing phase.  Both packages offered several alternative BLR methodologies that 
are discussed in the next section. 
BLR Models  
Three CIRB BLR models, each with four variations, were constructed to perform 
data mining, hypothesis testing, and validity and reliability evaluations.  The models are 
referenced as the basic, comprehensive, and validation CIRB models.  In order to 
compare the CIRB outcomes with raw stall warning data, the three CIRB models were 
contrasted with a BLR baseline analysis based solely on the activation of the stall 
warning system, as shown in Equation 12: 
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Correct Crew Response (Y/N) = f (Stall Warning (Y/N) + error)                 (12) 
 
With the exception of the validity and reliability evaluations, each BLR model 
was evaluated using the entire sample dataset in order to achieve the best fit.  The CIRB 
BLR models were evaluated using five alternative BLR methodologies: the baseline all-
in technique, with all variables retained as the model iterates, as well as forward, 
backward, and stepwise methods, in which the variables were either added or eliminated 
sequentially, based on defined criteria such as the Wald statistic.  The ASRS pre-test 
evinced very little difference among these alternate methods, but all four methods were 
applied and contrasted using the Enterprise Miner™ to evaluate the BLR sensitivity to 
the specific methodology.  Figure 7 illustrates the structure developed in the Enterprise 
Miner™ software for the evaluation of each of the BLR models described below. 
 
Basic CIRB model.  The basic CIRB model was comprised of a constant term 
and the SDT stall warning performance outcome as the sole independent variables and 
the aircrew performance outcome as the sole binomial dependent variable.  When the 
BLR incorporates nonmetric (dummy) variables, the resulting Odds Ratios are referenced 
to a selected baseline category, which is subsequently excluded from the logistic 
equation.  For this study, SDT Hits were selected as the baseline category because Hits 
reflect the intended functioning of the stall warning system.  The remaining SDT 
parameters (Miss, FA, and CR) were coded as dummy categorical variables, resulting in a 
BLR relationship of the form shown in Equation 13: 
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𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑊𝑊 = ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑊𝑊1 −  𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑊𝑊� =  𝑝𝑝0 +  𝑝𝑝1𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 + 𝑝𝑝2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑝𝑝3𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊        (13) 
 
where:  
CCR = Correct Crew Response outcome 
 
Comprehensive CIRB model.  The comprehensive model included the same 
independent variables used in the basic model, with the addition of Wing Stall, Tail Stall, 
and System Issue IVs (Equation 14): 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑊𝑊=  𝑝𝑝0 +  𝑝𝑝1𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 + 𝑝𝑝2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑝𝑝3𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑝𝑝4𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑝𝑝5𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑝𝑝6𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 +  𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊  (14) 
 
where: 
CCR = Correct Crew Response outcome 
 
CIRB validation model.  The CIRB validation model was identical to the 
comprehensive model, except the sample was split into training and holdout (validation) 
sub-samples to evaluate the BLR reliability. 
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Figure 7.  Enterprise Miner™ BLR model structure.  
  
 
BLR Descriptive Statistics 
The computed BLR outcomes were computed and presented using a 
Classification Matrix (Table 11) and a BLR Outcome Matrix (Table 12).  The 
terminology used in these matrices is explained in Table 13.   
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Table 11  
Sample Binary Logistic Regression Classification Matrix 
 
Incorrect Crew 
Response 
Predicteda 
Correct Crew 
Response 
Predicteda 
Percentage of 
Correct 
Predictions 
Incorrect response observed  AAb  BB Specificityc 
Correct response observed  CC  DDb Sensitivityd 
Figures of Merit NPV PPV Correctly Classifiede 
Note.  aCut value: .50.  bLead-diagonal elements of matrix represent correct model 
predictions.  cSpecificity = (AA / (AA + BB))%    dSensitivity = (DD / (CC + DD))%  
Positive predictive value (PPV) = (DD / (BB + DD))% ; Negative predictive value (NPV) 
= (AA / (AA + CC))% . 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12  
Sample Binary Logistic Regression Outcome Format 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I. for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
SDT_MISS 
(Reference) 
  24.615 2 .000    
SDT HIT .667 .563 1.406 1 .236 1.949 .647 5.872 
SDT FA 2.806 .566 24.603 1 .000 16.537 5.458 50.112 
Constant -1.119 .288 15.109 1 .000 .327   
 
122 
 
 
Table 13  
Binary Logistic Regression Calculated Parameters 
Statistic Symbol Meaninga 
Degrees of Freedom df Degrees of Freedom 
 
Exponentiated Logistic 
Coefficient 
Exp(B) An alternative expression of the Logistic 
Coefficient.  Always positive.  Values > 1 
indicate positive relationships; values < 1 
indicate negative relationships between the 
IVs and DV. 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow 
significance 
N/A A test for BLR model fit.  A good fit is 
indicated when the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
test is not statistically significant. 
 
Logistic Coefficient (logit) and 
95% confidence interval 
B Weighting factor for each IV in relation to 
its discriminatory power.  A zero indicates 
50 / 50 odds.  Negative numbers indicate 
probabilities < 50%, positive numbers 
indicate probabilities > 50%. 
 
Nagelkerke R2 R2 A Pseudo R2 measure applicable to the BLR 
technique that is analogous to the 
coefficient of determination (R2) in a 
multiple linear regression. 
 
Negative Predictive Value N/A Percentage of incorrect crew performance 
outcomes correctly predicted by the model 
related to the total number of incorrect crew 
performance outcomes predicated by the 
model.  100% is ideal. 
 
Percentage of Correct Aircrew 
Responses 
N/A The number of correct crew performance 
outcomes divided by the total number of 
records, after scrubbing. 
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Statistic Symbol Meaninga 
Percentage Correctly Classified 
(Hit Ratio)  
N/A The percentage of crew performance 
outcomes correctly classified by the BLR 
model. 
 
Positive Predictive Value N/A Percentage of correct crew performance 
outcomes correctly predicted by the model 
related to the total number of correct crew 
performances predicated by the model.  
100% is ideal. 
 
Sensitivity N/A Percentage of correct crew performance 
outcomes correctly predicted by the model 
related to the total number of correct crew 
performance outcomes (i.e., true positives).  
100% is ideal. 
 
Specificity N/A Percentage of incorrect crew performance 
outcomes correctly predicted by the model 
related to the total number of incorrect crew 
performance outcomes (i.e., true negatives).  
100% is ideal. 
 
Standard Error SE Standard Error of the BLR coefficient. 
 
Statistical Significance  
(χ2  p value) 
Sig. Significance level corresponding to the 
Wald statistic.  Analogous to the t-test 
significance level in a multiple regression. 
 
Wald Statistic Wald Statistical significance of each BLR 
coefficient.  Analogous to the t value in a 
multiple regression. 
 
Note.  aDefinitions from Hair et al. (2010, pp. 318, 319, 331).  Quotation marks omitted 
from embedded verbatim text for clarity. 
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Reliability testing.  BLR reliability was established by partitioning the combined 
ASRS and NTSB database into training and holdout (validation) samples (Hair et al., 
2010, p. 341).  The BLR was computed using the training partition, and the reliability 
was established using the validation partition.  The two samples were compared on the 
basis of their misclassification rates and average squared error.  The BLR was repeated 
with differing training / holdout proportions in order to optimize the model definition in 
the training sample while reducing the variance in the holdout sample.  The selected 
partition ratio is presented in Chapter IV.  
 
Hypothesis testing.  The purpose of the study was to determine the influence of 
the stall warning system behavior in cueing aircrew to perform correctly during 
hazardous airborne icing encounters, as evaluated by the following hypotheses: 
1. H01: There is no significant difference in the crew performance outcome between a 
valid system stall warning (HIT) and a stall warning Miss. 
2. H02: There is no significant difference in the crew performance outcome between a 
valid system stall warning (HIT) and a stall warning False Alarm. 
Although these hypotheses used 2-sided tests for significance, the BLR 
methodology allows the direction of the relationship to be established.  In each case, the 
significance threshold for rejecting the null hypothesis was established as a Wald statistic 
below .05 (p < .05).  
 
Qualitative data.  The qualitative analysis resulted from the manual examination 
of the databases while classifying the action of the stall warning system in SDT terms 
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(Hit, Miss, FA, or CR) and the Correct_Response outcomes, as defined in Chapter 1.  
The purpose of the qualitative evaluation was primarily to perform these classification 
functions and to note pertinent data for the BLR.  No inferential statistical analyses were 
performed on the qualitative data.  
Summary 
Two hypotheses derived from the Conservative Icing Response Bias theory were 
evaluated using an archival study of NASA ASRS icing incident data and NTSB accident 
data pertaining to non-amateur built turbine-powered aircraft.  A Binary Logistic 
Regression non-linear multivariate technique was used to test the CIRB predictions 
concerning the stall warning system’s impact on the crew performance outcomes.  In 
particular, the combination of Bayes’ Theorem and SDT applied to the crew stall 
monitoring vigilance task suggested that stall warning Misses would have a greater 
impact in icing conditions, while the impact of False Alarms would be reduced, both 
when evaluated against the baseline Hit condition.  These predictions formed the basis of 
the two hypotheses that were tested using the BLR. 
Two SMEs, including the author, scrubbed, merged, and encoded the ASRS and 
NTSB archives with the following information: aircraft icing state; wing or tail stall state; 
the action of the stall warning system, icing related system issues, and the reaction of the 
crew to the potential stall or loss of control situation.  Aircrew responses were 
categorized as either correct or incorrect, using a structured process, and this 
classification was used as the dependent variable for the basic, comprehensive, and 
validation BLR models.  The independent variables for the basic CIRB model were the 
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Signal Detection Theory classifications (Hit, Miss, False Alarm, and Correct Rejection) 
of the stall warning system performance, as manually derived from each data record.  The 
comprehensive model included additional IVs including the wing and tail stall state and 
the system issue variable.  Key elements of the investigation are illustrated in Figure 8.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Research activity flowchart.  
Pre-test
•INITIAL ARCHIVE EXPLORATION
•Evaluate the NASA ASRS and NTSB databases for parameter content and adequate sample 
sizes
•Establish sampling frames
Phase I
•QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT PHASE - TWO INDEPENDENT SMEs
•Conduct manual archival review to refine sampling frame
•Select records for which the aircraft icing state, stall state, stall warning state, and aircrew 
performance can be unambiguously determined
Phase 2
•DATA ENCODING - TWO INDEPENDENT SMEs 
•Encode aircraft stall status as: wing stall, tail stall, no incipient stall
•Encode stall warning system status in SDT terms: Hit, Miss, False Alarm, Correct Rejection
•Encode crew response measure: correct/incorrect response?
•Encode selected stratification variables if required (e.g. type of operation, aircraft 
category)
Phase 2
•BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION (BLR)
•Determine logistic and exponentiated regression coefficients
•Determine coefficient significance (Wald statistic)
•Determine model fit (pseudo R-square, Hosmer and Lemeshow)
•Develop classification matrix and determine model’s predictive accuracy (Hit Ratio)
•Test hypotheses
Phase 2
•EVALUATE BLR RELIABILITY
•Repeat best-fit BLR for ASRS only, NTSB only, and merged data
•Repeat BLR for Wing Stall, Tail Stall and Combined Wing and Tail Stall data if sample sizes 
prove adequate
•Evaluate differences between validation run outcomes for significance
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Chapter IV Results  
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The results of the analysis are presented incrementally, beginning with 
generalized descriptive statistics and concluding with the hypothesis test results.  The 
first section summarizes the descriptive statistics for the ASRS, NTSB, and the combined 
samples.  This is followed by summary statistics for key parameters, such as: correct 
crew response ratios; wing stall vs. tail stall vs. system issues; and the Signal Detection 
Theory (SDT) stall warning classifications.  The next section addresses the Binary 
Logistic Regression (BLR) test outcomes and BLR model validity tests.  The chapter 
concludes with the outcomes of the two hypothesis tests that were postulated in 
Chapter I. 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 14 summarizes the ASRS and NTSB sampling outcomes based on the 
criteria expounded in Chapter III.  The table reflects the 2-phase scrubbing that was used 
to identify candidate icing events.  Records that lacked the required parameters for the 
BLR were excluded listwise, with no imputation for missing values.  Six duplicate NTSB 
cases were identified and merged.  In addition, three ambiguous cases were rejected in 
the final down-sampling because of differing interpretations between the author and the 
external Subject Matter Expert (SME) relating to the crew performance outcome or 
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) classifications. 
 
128 
 
 
 
Table 14  
ASRS and NTSB Database Sample Summary 
Sample 
Group 
ASRS  
Database 
NTSB  
Database 
Combined 
Databases 
Unfiltered database size at 
October 2, 2015 cutoff 
 18,214  77,544 95,758 records 
First-scrub sample size, per 
tailored icing-event extractsa 
 381  3,039b 3,420 records 
Second-scrub sample sizec  126  108d 234 records 
Final sample for BLR (without 
imputation)d 
 79  53 132 records 
Note.  aThe first-scrub sample sets contained all eligible icing-related incidents or 
accidents; the numbers are approximate because of the iterative nature of the down-
sampling process.  bFiltered for non-amateur built airplanes.  cThe second-scrub samples 
excluded records with unknown crew performance outcomes; the numbers are 
approximate because of the iterative nature of the down-sampling process. dNet of six 
duplicate Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) / Instrument Meteorological 
Conditions (IMC) cases.  dThe final sample excluded cases with indeterminate crew or 
SDT outcomes.  
 
 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of the final subset of ASRS and NTSB icing 
events by year, based on the event date.  The figure approximates the relative incidence 
of such events, but it should not be used to evaluate the absolute occurrence rates because 
the table excludes legitimate records that were rejected from the study due to incomplete 
data.  In addition, the figure has not been normalized to account for annual flight hour 
exposure, cyclical weather variations, or other confounding factors. 
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Figure 9.  Annual incidence of icing events in study, by event year. 
 
 
Icing Event Summary Statistics 
Table 15 summarizes key icing event statistics for each of the databases 
independently and for the final combined ASRS / NTSB data sample of 132 records.  As 
expected, wing stalls accounted for most of the events, but tail stalls and system issues 
collectively accounted for more than 37% of the sample, which required the inclusion of 
these categories in the subsequent BLR analysis.  Each of the event categories (wing stall, 
tail stall, and system issue) exceeded the minimum desired count of 10 observations for 
the combined dataset, but the NTSB data failed to achieve the minimum in three of the 
four categories, and the ASRS dataset had only 14 tail stall records.  As will be shown, 
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these small sample counts for the identified IV categories had consequences on the BLR 
execution.  Note that the totals in Table 15 exceed 100% because of some overlap 
between the icing event categories, such as a simultaneous occurrence of a stall warning 
with a system issue.   
 
 
Table 15  
Icing Event Classification Frequencies 
Icing Event Class ASRS NTSB Combined 
Wing Stall 41 (51.9%) 47 (88.7%) 88 (66.7%) 
Tail Stall 14 (17.7%) 5   (9.4%) 19 (14.4%) 
Stall Warning 30 (38.0%) 6 (11.3%) 36 (27.3%) 
System Issue 23 (29.1%) 7 (13.2%) 30 (22.7%) 
Total 108a 65a 173a 
Note.  aColumn totals exceed 100% because some of the icing event categories, such as 
stall warning and system issues, can occur simultaneously and therefore overlap in the 
statistics. 
 
 
 
Tail Stall Identification 
The SMEs identified tail stall events conservatively during the data-encoding 
process.  Tail stall events were never inferred; records were only encoded as tail stalls 
when the NTSB or ASRS narratives specifically alluded to a tail stall event, as in the 
following example. The abbreviations and text contractions are as they appear in the 
source record (emphasis added): 
We were noticing very light rime ice, but it was not accumulating on the 
wings... Upon initiating the clb, the acft pitched down, buffeting.  The PIC 
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attempted to regain pitch ctl and the stall horn went off.  At this point, the PIC 
pushed up the pwr, and I contacted ctr to ask for the nearest arpt and advise that 
we had a ‘vibration’ and were experiencing difficulty… Looking back, I believe 
that, although the wings were relatively free from ice, there may have been an 
accumulation on the tail.  The acft was equipped with pneumatic boots, but there 
was never enough ice present (that I observed, and I was watching) to cycle the 
boots effectively.  Somehow, the flow around the empennage was disturbed, and 
the pitch up to initiate the clb to 13000 ft from 11000 ft must have stalled the 
horiz stabilizer.  There was no perceptible trim change to alert us to this 
condition, and the subsequent events were very rapid. (NASA 2014, extract ACN 
#265218) 
Stall Warning System SDT Performance 
As discussed in Chapter III, the CIRB model is comprised of two interacting SDT 
systems that each produce a binary output based on incomplete input data.  The first 
system contains the aircraft’s stall warning system, which performs its function subject to 
limited data available from the aircraft’s sensors and air data systems.  Table 16 
summarizes the SDT outcome measures of the stall warning system’s performance, as 
determined from the final database sample.  Correct stall warning behavior, represented 
by the Hit and Correct Rejection entries in the table, totaled 21.2% of the sample.  The 
remaining 78.8% represent the undesirable SDT Miss and FA outcomes.  These stall 
warning system SDT outcomes were hypothesized to be critical inputs to the second 
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CIRB SDT system: the crew decision-making element, which is discussed in the next 
section.  
Table 16  
Stall Warning SDT Classification Frequencies 
SDT Classification ASRS NTSB Combined 
Hit 12 (15.2%) 5   (9.4%) 17 (12.9%) 
Correct Rejection 8 (10.1%) 3   (5.7%) 11  ( 8.3%) 
False Alarm 17 (21.5%) 1   (1.9%) 18 (13.6%) 
Miss 42 (53.2%) 44 (83.0%) 86 (65.2%) 
Total 79  (100%) 53  (100%) 132  (100%) 
 
 
 
Aircrew Performance Outcomes 
As described in Chapter III, aircrew must process imperfect stall warning, 
environmental, and aircraft cues to produce an aircrew performance outcome.  The stall 
warning SDT outputs shown in Table 16 were hypothesized to have a significant effect 
on these aircrew performance outcomes.  For the combined sample, correct crew 
responses were observed in 35 of the 132 cases (26.5%), and incorrect responses were 
recorded in the remaining 97 cases (73.5%), so the aircrew performance outcomes clearly 
exhibited some of the Hit and Miss traits that characterize SDT systems, as discussed in 
Chapter II.  The BLR was used to evaluate two hypotheses that linked the crew decision-
making outcomes to the SDT performance of the stall warning system.   
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Binary Logistic Regression 
As presented in Chapter III, the BLR technique was used to evaluate three CIRB 
models: a basic CIRB model, a comprehensive model, and a validation model.   These 
models were compared to a baseline stall warning model that contained the stall warning 
actuation as the sole IV.  The binary aircrew response outcome was adopted as the sole 
dependent variable for the three CIRB models and the baseline stall warning model.  The 
results are presented in order of increasing model complexity, beginning with the 
baseline stall warning model and proceeding through the basic CIRB model to the 
comprehensive CIRB model.   
 
Baseline stall warning BLR.  The stall warning BLR was used as the baseline 
for evaluating the three subsequent CIRB models.  Aside from the model constant, the 
sole IV was the stall warning actuation (Y / N).  Results from the baseline stall warning 
model are shown in Table 17, which forms the basis for the subsequent comparison with 
the CIRB models. 
 
 
Table 17  
Stall Warning Baseline Logistic Regression Outcomes
 
Incorrect Crew 
Response 
Predicted 
Correct Crew 
Response 
Predicted 
Model 
Classification 
Accuracy 
Incorrect Crew Response Observed  82 15 84.5% Specificity 
Correct Crew Response Observed  14  21 60.0% Sensitivity 
Model Predictive Values  85.4% 58.3% 78.0%    Overall 
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CIRB models.  The basic and comprehensive CIRB models were run 
independently for each of the ASRS and NTSB sample sets, with the objective of 
comparing the results across the two databases as described in Chapter III.  
Unfortunately, the individual databases did not meet the minimum BLR sample size 
requirements of 10 observations per category, as indicated by the single-digit frequencies 
in Tables 15 and 16, particularly for the NTSB data.  This precluded the BLR from 
converging to a solution for either database in isolation, even after 20 iterations using the 
standard .50 cutoff value.  In contrast, the BLR converged in only six iterations with the 
combined dataset, with a parameter change of less than .001 at the last cycle.  The 
remainder of the analysis was therefore confined to the combined ASRS / NTSB dataset 
of 132 samples, using the conventional test and holdout methodology to establish the 
reliability and validity of the merged data. 
 
Basic CIRB model.  The basic CIRB model was of the form shown in 
equation 15: 
 
 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑊𝑊 = ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1− 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐� =  𝑝𝑝0 +  𝑝𝑝1𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 + 𝑝𝑝2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑝𝑝3𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊        (15) 
 
where:  
CCR = Correct Crew Response outcome 
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Four variants of the BLR were examined to achieve the best model fit: the default 
method, in which all BLR variables were retained as the model iterated, and three 
alternatives (stepwise, forward, and backward), which used different criteria for 
selectively excluding IVs as the model iterated.  All four methods produced identical 
results for the basic CIRB model.  The BLR was statistically significant in every case: 
(χ2(3) = 85.328 p < .0005).  The model explained 69.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance 
in crew performance outcomes and correctly classified 90.9% of the cases.  Only 12 of 
the 132 cases were misclassified by the model (three false positives and nine false 
negatives).  The Hosmer and Lemeshow test was not statistically significant for the basic 
CIRB model (χ2(2) = 0.000 p = 1.000), indicating that the model was a satisfactory fit.  
Other parameters for the basic CIRB model are shown in the crew response classification 
matrix (Table 18), and the corresponding BLR outcomes are shown in Table 19. 
 
 
Table 18  
Basic CIRB Model Crew Response Classification Matrix 
 
Incorrect Crew 
Response 
Predicted 
Correct Crew 
Response 
Predicted 
Model 
Classification 
Accuracy 
Incorrect Crew Response Observed  94b   3 96.9% Specificity 
Correct Crew Response Observed   9  26b 74.3% Sensitivity 
Model Predictive Values  91.3%c 89.7%d 90.9%b    Overall 
Note.  an = 132, cut value = .50.  bLead-diagonal elements of matrix represent correct 
model predictions.  cNegative Predictive Value.  dPositive Predictive Value. 
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Table 19  
Basic CIRB Model Outcomes
       95% C.I. for Exp(B) 
SDT Class B S.E. Wald df   Sig.    Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Hit (Reference)   41.821 3 .000    
Correct Rejection 2.909 1.165 6.232 1 .013 18.333 1.868 179.895 
False Alarm 2.686 .906 8.795 1 .003 14.667 2.486 86.529 
Miss -2.714 .777 12.217 1 .000 .066 .014 .304 
Constant -.606 .508 1.426 1 .232 .545   
 
 
Comprehensive model.  The comprehensive CIRB model was of the form shown 
in Equation 16: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑊𝑊=  𝑝𝑝0 + 𝑝𝑝1𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 + 𝑝𝑝2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑝𝑝3𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑝𝑝4𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑝𝑝5𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑝𝑝6𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 +  𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊     (16) 
 
where: 
CCR = Correct Crew Response outcome 
For the comprehensive CIRB model, the four BLR iteration alternatives produced 
slightly different results, with the all-variables-included method producing a slightly 
better fit, as shown in Table 20.  Accordingly, the comprehensive BLR model analyses, 
and the results that follow, are based on the all-in regression technique. 
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Table 20  
Comprehensive Model: BLR Method Comparison 
Model 
Misclassification 
Rate 
Squared 
Error 
BLR_All_Inputs (Default)a 0.083333 0.067738 
BLR_Forward 0.083333 0.068831 
BLR_Stepwise 0.090909 0.071701 
BLR_Backward  0.090909 0.071701 
Note.  aThe selected model for the BLR, based on lowest misclassification rate and least 
squared error criteria. 
 
 
 
Comprehensive Model Outliers.  Six multivariate outliers were noted using a 
two-standard deviation cutoff.  These outliers are listed in Table 21.   As the table shows, 
the outliers reflected diverse and random permutations of the independent and dependent 
variables, so they were deemed unlikely to skew the analysis.  Further, their elimination 
reduced some of the sample counts, such as the tail stall category, below the minimum 
group sizes required for the BLR execution.  Accordingly, the outliers were retained in 
the analysis.   
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Table 21  
Comprehensive CIRB Model Outliers 
Case Source Source ID 
Wing  
Stall? 
Tail 
Stall? 
Stall 
Warn? 
Correct 
Responsea 
System 
Issue? 
SDT 
Class ZResid.b 
24 NTSB CHI97FA047 Y N N Y N M 6.464 
48 NTSB NYC05MA083 N N N N Y C -4.533 
50 NTSB NYC97FA045 N N Y N Y F -2.791 
82 ASRS 389483 N Y N Y N M 3.098 
96 ASRS 456868 N Y N Y N M 3.098 
101 ASRS 495957 N N Y N Y F -2.791 
Note. aAll of the cases in the correct response column were misclassified by the 
comprehensive BLR model.  bOutlier threshold: 2 standard deviations. 
 
 
 
Comprehensive model statistics.  The comprehensive model was statistically 
significant (χ2(6) = 88.911 p < .0005).  The model explained 71.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of 
the variance in crew performance outcomes and correctly classified 91.7% of the cases.  
The Hosmer and Lemeshow test was not statistically significant  
(χ2(5) = 1.279  p = .937), indicating that the model was a satisfactory fit.  Other 
parameters for the comprehensive CIRB model are shown in the crew response 
classification matrix (Table 22), the outcome matrix (Table 23) and the correlation matrix 
(Table 24).  Table 23 highlights an important outcome: The SDT Hit and Miss 
parameters were the only significant IVs in the comprehensive SDT model.  No other 
parameter (i.e., Wing Stall, Tail Stall, and System Issues) approached statistical 
significance.  Also of note, the incidence of any of these three issues resulted in a 
decreased chance of a correct crew performance outcome, as shown by the negative sign 
of the B coefficients in Table 23. 
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Table 22  
Comprehensive CIRB Model Crew Response Classification Matrix 
 
Incorrect Crew 
Response 
Predicted 
Correct Crew 
Response 
Predicted 
Model 
Classification 
Accuracy 
Incorrect Crew Response Observed  93b   4 95.9% Specificity 
Correct Crew Response Observed  7  28b 80.0% Sensitivity 
Model Predictive Values  93.0%c 87.5%d 91.7%b    Overall 
Note.  an = 132, cut value = .50. bLead-diagonal elements of matrix represent correct 
model predictions.  cNegative Predictive Value.  dPositive Predictive Value. 
 
 
 
Table 23  
Comprehensive CIRB Model Outcomes
       95% C.I. for Exp(B) 
SDT Class B S.E. Wald df   Sig.    Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Hit (Reference)   15.938 3 .001    
Correct Rejection 2.339 1.275 3.364 1 .067 10.375 .852 126.367 
False Alarm 1.449 1.505 .927 1 .336 4.258 .223 81.330 
Miss -2.887 .911 10.040 1 .002 .056 .009 .332 
Wing Stall -1.802 1.351 1.778 1 .182 .165 .012 2.332 
Tail Stall -.357 1.649 .047 1 .828 .699 .028 17.717 
System Issue -.358 1.057 .114 1 .735 .699 .088 5.555 
Constant .953 1.380 .478 1 .490 2.594   
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Table 24  
Comprehensive CIRB Model Correlation Matrix 
 Constant 
SDT 
CR 
SDT 
FA 
SDT 
Miss 
Wing 
Stall 
Tail 
Stall 
System 
Issue 
Constant 1.000 -.288 -.643 -.144 -.906 -.749 -.426 
SDT_CR -.288 1.000 .391 .174 .186 .136 -.197 
SDT_FA -.643 .391 1.000 .038 .639 .504 -.252 
SDT_Miss -.144 .174 .038 1.000 -.102 -.337 .147 
Wing_Stall -.906 .186 .639 -.102 1.000 .784 .298 
Tail_Stall -.749 .136 .504 -.337 .784 1.000 .285 
System_Issue -.426 -.197 -.252 .147 .298 .285 1.000 
 
 
 
CIRB Model Comparison   
Table 25 contrasts the basic and comprehensive CIRB models with the ASRS pre-
test outcomes and the baseline stall warning model.  Both CIRB models were superior to 
the pre-test model that was developed using a sub-sample of NASA ASRS data.  This is 
attributed to the larger overall sample size of the combined ASRS and NTSB databases 
that reduced the model variance. 
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Table 25  
CIRB Model and Pre-Test Comparisons 
 
Nagelkerke 
R2 
Correctly 
Classified 
Sensitivity 
% 
Specificity 
% 
PPVa 
% 
NPVb 
% 
ASRS pre-test results .336 75.7 54.0 92.3 15.6 72.3 
Stall warning baseline 
model  
.243 78.0 60.0 84.5 58.3 85.4 
CIRB basic model  .695 90.9 74.3 96.9 89.7 91.3 
CIRB comprehensive 
model 
.715 91.7 80.0 95.9 87.5 93.0 
Note.  aPositive Predictive Value.  bNegative Predictive Value. 
 
 
 
The sensitivities of the basic and comprehensive CIRB models (74.3% and 
80.0%, respectively) were also markedly better than the baseline stall warning model 
(60.0% sensitivity).  Overall, the CIRB basic and comprehensive models correctly 
classified 90.9% and 91.7% of the sample cases, respectively, compared to 78% for the 
baseline stall warning model.  Although the comprehensive model was somewhat more 
sensitive than the basic model, the latter performed almost as well in almost every 
evaluated parameter, including model fit, Nagelkerke R2, cases correctly classified, and 
specificity.  This is an important finding because the basic CIRB model outcomes 
indicate that a simple SDT analysis of stall warning system performance explains 69.5% 
of the variance in aircrew decision-making outcomes, while correctly classifying 90.9% 
of the cases in the final data sample.  These findings must now be examined in the 
context of the BLR reliability assessments. 
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BLR Reliability   
The reliability and validity of the BLR analysis were evaluated with several tests.  
As a pre-requisite, the combined NTSB and ASRS database sample sizes were deemed 
adequate for the successful application of the BLR method, as evinced by the rapid 
convergence to a unique solution.  The Hosmer and Lemeshow test was not statistically 
significant for the basic CIRB model (χ2(2) = 0.000; p = 1.000) and for the 
comprehensive model (χ2(5) = 1.279; p = .937), indicating that the fit of both models was 
satisfactory.  The close results achieved using the four differing BLR approaches with 
both models also attested to their robustness and reliability.   
The final test of model reliability entailed the partitioning of the combined data 
sample into training and holdout (validation) sub-samples.  The BLR was run several 
times while varying the relative proportion of these two partitions.  The objective was to 
attain the best balance between the model specification (which required a large training 
sample), while minimizing the variance in the validation dataset (which required a large 
holdout sample).  An even split (n = 66/66) between the two categories was eventually 
selected that yielded a good balance between these competing influences.  Table 26 
compares the training and holdout (validation) misclassification rates and average square 
errors.   
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Table 26  
Training Vs. Holdout Samples
 
Training 
Partitiona 
Validation 
Partitiona 
Difference 
(Percent) 
Misclassification Rate 0.075758 0.075758 0 
Average Squared Error 0.059682 0.072321 21.2 
Note.  aBasis: n = 66 for both the training and holdout samples. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 contrasts the SDT Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves 
obtained for the training and holdout samples. The similar ROC curves confirm the 
training / holdout reliability depicted in Table 26.  The ROC curves also approached the 
ideal forms for maximum sensitivity and specificity, which requires them to be 
asymptotic to both axes, and convex towards the upper left quadrant.   Collectively, these 
outcomes indicate that the results of the BLR methodology should be reliable and valid 
when applied to the target U.S. registered, turbine, non-amateur-built aircraft population 
addressed in this study.  
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Figure 10.  Baseline BLR model crew response receiver operating characteristics. 
Training and validation sample comparison. 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Tests  
Table 27 contains key statistics for the Hit, CR, Miss, and FA SDT predictor 
variables for the basic and comprehensive CIRB models.  The SDT Hit and Miss 
variables and coefficients were significant and similar for both models, but the 
significance of the FA predictor was notably different between them.  This is due to the 
strong negative correlation between FA and wing stalls (-.639) and between FA and tail 
stalls (-.504), as shown in Table 24. 
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Table 27  
CIRB Model Comparison 
SDT Class B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Basic CIRB Model       
Hit (Reference)   41.821 3 .000  
Correct Rejection 2.909 1.165 6.232 1 .013 18.333 
False Alarm 2.686 .906 8.795 1 .003 14.667 
Miss -2.714 .777 12.217 1 .000 .066 
       
Comprehensive Model       
Hit (Reference)   15.938 3 .001  
Correct Rejection 2.339 1.275 3.364 1 .067 10.375 
False Alarm 1.449 1.505 .927 1 .336 4.258 
Miss -2.887 .911 10.040 1 .002 .056 
 
 
 
Based on the comprehensive CIRB model exponential coefficients in Table 27, 
aircrew had approximately 4.3 times greater odds of performing correctly when faced 
with a stall warning FA than with a stall warning Hit in icing conditions. The difference 
in crew performance outcomes between stall warning Misses and Hits was statistically 
significant (p < .0002).  Conversely, a stall warning Miss was 17.9 times (1 / 0.056) more 
likely to result in an incorrect response than a Hit.  Although the Miss IV was not 
significant in the comprehensive model (p < .336), the statistic was significant (p < .003) 
in the basic model, which was based solely on the stall warning SDT categories.  
Combining the Hit, Miss, and FA ratios, a Miss was 76.0 times more likely to lead to an 
incorrect outcome than an FA with the comprehensive CIRB model.  The Miss: FA ratio 
146 
 
 
for the basic CIRB model was even greater (222.2:1).  In the absence of the CIRB model, 
these probabilities would be expected to be approximately equal.  Accordingly: 
H01: There is no significant difference in the crew performance outcome between 
a valid system stall warning (HIT) and a stall warning Miss, therefore the hypothesis is 
rejected. 
H02: There is no significant difference in the crew performance outcome between 
a valid system stall warning (HIT) and a stall warning False Alarm, therefore the 
hypothesis is rejected.    
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Chapter V Discussion, Conclusions, & Recommendations 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS 
Discussion 
This research was predicated on the assumption that a previously unrecognized 
link exists between the action of an aircraft’s stall warning system and the successful or 
unsuccessful negotiation of an airborne icing encounter by the aircrew.  Signal Detection 
Theory (SDT) concepts were used to define two interacting SDT decision-making 
systems under these circumstances: the aircraft’s stall warning system, operating with 
incomplete sensor information, and the aircrew, also operating with incomplete and 
conflicting stall cues, including those from the stall warning system.  It was postulated 
that the stall warning system performance, in terms of Hits (i.e., valid warnings), Misses 
(required warnings that the system didn’t issue), False Alarms (FA), and Correctly 
Rejected (CR) warnings could influence the aircrew SDT system in a unidirectional 
relationship.  The application of Bayes’ Theorem to these interacting SDT models led to 
a predicted shift of the aircrew’s stall detection decision criterion in icing conditions that 
has been termed the Conservative Icing Response Bias (CIRB) model in this study.  The 
CIRB led to testable relationships between stall warning Misses, FAs, and crew 
performance outcomes.  This relationship was evaluated by the application of a Binary 
Logistic Regression (BLR) technique to an archival analysis of NASA Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) incident data and National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) accident data.  The discussion begins with an assessment of the summary 
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statistics obtained from the archival analysis and concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of the CIRB hypothesis test outcomes.  
Wing Stalls, Tail Stalls, and System Issues 
Descriptive statistics were used to assess the proportion of different icing impacts 
(wing / tail / system), the relative incidence of correct and incorrect crew response 
outcomes, and the performance of the stall warning system in SDT terms (Hit, Miss, FA, 
or CR).  A total of 132 cases met the criteria for the application of the BLR technique.  
Of these, the majority (66.7%) related to wing stalls, with tails stalls accounting for 
14.4% of the cases.  System issues, pertaining to the loss of air data capability due to the 
freezing of the pitot-static systems or AoA probes, figured relatively prominently 
(22.7%) in the final sample of 132 cases.  The inclusion of the System Issue category was 
not initially envisaged, but it was added as a new independent variable (IV) for the 
comprehensive BLR analysis based on its prominence in the pilot study, coupled with the 
severe consequences observed for this type of failure in the archives. 
The relative incidence of tail stalls and system issues may have important 
repercussions for flight operations, system design, and airworthiness certification 
requirements.  For example, despite an observed 14.4% incidence, none of the aircraft 
appearing in the archives were equipped with any form of tail stall detection or 
prevention system because current airworthiness certification requirements do not require 
such a system.  The qualitative review of the NTSB and Archives indicated that tail stalls 
generally caught aircrew completely by surprise, with the expected undesirable outcomes. 
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Similarly, icing-induced system failures such as frozen pitot-static ports and 
angle-of-attack vanes represented 22.7% of the sampled events.  These failures 
sometimes severely degraded the primary flight instrument systems and compromised 
important flight envelope protections and stall warning functionality.  The archival 
narratives even contained some instances of system issues giving rise to simultaneous 
stall and over-speed warnings, and this combination of overwhelming and erroneous cues 
clearly exacerbated the potential CIRB effect.  Unfortunately, contemporary stall warning 
systems are often rendered inoperable when these types of failures arise, disabling the 
stall protections when they are most needed.  Similarly, the literature has shown that 
Angle-of-Attack (AoA)-based stall warning systems are incapable of differentiating 
between wing stalls, tail stalls, and system issues, leaving the crew with an extremely 
challenging analysis task under very difficult conditions.  A simple, direct, indication of 
the aircraft’s wing and tail stall margins would go a long way to mitigating the limitations 
of AoA-based stall warning systems.  An ideal system would also operate independently 
from the aircraft’s highly integrated air data and AoA systems that have proven 
vulnerable to failure during severe icing encounters.  These stall warning system 
shortcomings were clearly revealed in the SDT outcomes derived during the study, as 
discussed next. 
Stall Warning System Effectiveness  
One of the two basic assumptions of the CIRB model was that aircraft stall 
warning systems operate with incomplete sensor information, particularly in an airborne 
icing context, and therefore perform imperfectly.  In SDT terms, such systems can fail to 
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function when they should operate (a Miss), or they can activate when they should not (a 
False Alarm).  The statistics confirmed this effect in a very significant manner for Missed 
stall warnings.  As noted in Table 23, the only IVs that achieved statistical significance in 
the comprehensive CIRB model were the SDT Hit or Miss stall warning parameters.  No 
other parameter (Wing Stall, Tail Stall, or System Issues) approached statistical 
significance.  Counterintuitively, the actual wing-stall or tail-stall state did not approach 
significance in relation to aircrew performance outcomes.  These findings strongly 
support the interacting crew / stall warning SDT system basis of the CIRB model, which 
explains 70% of the observed variability in crew response outcomes to airborne icing 
encounters.  As predicted by CIRB, these outcomes were strongly and negatively biased 
by poor stall warning system performance (Misses and FAs), whether the aircraft was in 
a stalled condition or not. 
In terms of overall stall warning system performance, correct operation (i.e., Hits 
and CRs during non-stall conditions) accounted for only 21.2% of the final 132 cases.  
False Alarms accounted for 13.6% of the cases, and Misses accounted for the majority 
(65.2%) of the stall warning system SDT outcomes.  These statistics reinforce the 
shortcomings of conventional stall warning systems that cannot directly respond to the 
aerodynamic degradations caused by icing or monitor for tail stalls, as discussed at length 
in Chapter II.  The repercussions of these findings are two-fold.  First, the basic 
assumptions of the CIRB model are validated.  Second, stall warning systems need to be 
developed with better Miss: FA ratios for both wing and tail stalls.  The literature shows 
that aerodynamic performance monitors, which direct measure the boundary-layer 
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separation that is always associated with a stalled condition, could help achieve these 
objectives.   
It could be argued that the apparent failures of current stall warning systems are 
simply the result of self-selection bias, such that the research sample was necessarily 
derived from those cases that had already resulted in icing incidents and accidents.  
Arguably, this process selected those very rare occurrences of poor stall warning system 
behavior that led to poor outcomes, and which did not otherwise occur in the general 
population.  There are two counterarguments to this line of reasoning: First, and most 
importantly, efforts to reduce accidents must focus on the unsuccessful outcomes and 
their causes, so the selection bias is a strength, not a weakness of the study.  For all safety 
endeavors, it is the successful outcomes that form the baseline to which incremental 
safety improvements must be added by addressing the failures.   
The second counterargument is that the literature is replete with aerodynamic 
explanations for poor stall warning performance, particularly Misses, in icing conditions.  
It is therefore no more valid to assume that stall warnings perform properly in the 
absence of an accident than it is to assume the inverse.  In other words, it would be 
equally valid to argue that several successfully negotiated icing encounters (that did not 
result in entries into the NTSB or ASRS archives) resulted despite the erroneous 
performance of the stall warning systems, not because of their excellent performance.   
For these reasons, the conclusion stands that tangible safety benefits would be 
achieved in icing operations if stall warning system design and certification addressed the 
CIRB effect.  This would be achieved by deploying warning systems that reduce the 
incidence of stall warning Misses – that led to the poorest outcomes –  even at the cost of 
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some increase in FAs, to which crews proved to be relatively resilient.  The data revealed 
three principal causes of stall warning Misses during icing encounters: incorrect stall 
warning trigger thresholds, tail stalls, and system issues.  Incorrect stall warning trigger 
thresholds resulted from the reduced critical angle of attack (AoAcrit) caused by icing-
induced aerodynamic degradation.  Contemporary stall warning systems cannot adjust for 
the highly variable effects of ace accumulations in real-time, despite the stall-margin 
allowances that are made to accommodate the ice shapes used for certification 
demonstrations.  In consequence, there will continue to be occasional icing encounters 
that result in airfoil stalls before the activation of the aircraft’s stall warning system.  Tail 
stalls also led to Missed stall warnings, because no system currently monitors the 
empennage to provide tail stall warning or alerting.  Tails stalls therefore constitute stall 
warning Misses, almost by definition, unless a simultaneous wing stall resulted in the 
activation of the stall warning system when the tail stalled.  The final category of stall 
warning Misses related to icing-induced system failures that were observed to 
compromise both the aircraft’s stall warning and envelope-protection functions.  These 
complex failures represented some of the most challenging stall warning scenarios, as 
they sometimes resulted in near-simultaneous presentation of stall warning Hits, Misses, 
and False Alarms to the crew.   
Aerodynamic performance measurement (APM) systems address the three causes 
of stall warning Misses identified above.  APM systems directly sample and respond to 
the degraded aerodynamics associated with airfoil icing, in contrast to current Angle-of-
Attack based systems which tend to underestimate the stall threat in icing conditions, as 
amply supported by the literature review and the findings from this study.  APM systems 
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can be used to monitor the empennage to provide appropriate warnings in the event of 
impending tail stalls.  Finally, APM systems operate completely independently from the 
air data and AoA systems, which currently provide the stall protection functions.  For 
these reasons, APM-based stall warning systems would be less susceptible to the icing-
induced sensor degradations that were observed in this study. 
Crew Performance 
The descriptive statistics obtained from the analysis of the NASA ASRS and 
NTSB accident archives confirmed the findings from the literature review concerning the 
previously unexplained variability of crew responses during icing encounters.  For the 
combined NASA ASRS and NTSB database archive, correct crew responses were 
observed in only 35 of the 132 cases (26.5%), and incorrect responses were recorded in 
the remaining 97 cases (73.5%).  These statistics could be attributed to self-selection bias 
causing the final sample to capture only those crews that performed incorrectly, while the 
majority successfully negotiated their icing encounters.   
The counterargument is the same as was raised for the stall warning discussion: 
Even if the results stemmed from self-selection, these same cases would still need to be 
addressed to improve the safety record.  Further, it could be argued that many cases were 
excluded from the final sample despite an incorrect performance outcome from the crew 
because an accident was avoided (and hence went unreported).  Several records that 
might have further supported the CIRB hypothesis were also excluded because one or 
more parameters of interest could not be explicitly determined using the overwhelming 
evidence threshold set for this study.  These considerations support the conclusion that 
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aircrew performed imperfectly during icing encounters largely due to the influence of the 
stall warning system, which is addressed in the following section. 
Stall Warning System Influence on Crew Performance Outcomes 
As predicted by the CIRB model, the BLR analysis indicated that Missed stall 
warnings had a significant and adverse influence on the outcome of airborne icing 
encounters for both the basic and comprehensive CIRB models.  More surprisingly, the 
actual stall state of the wing or tail did not prove statistically significant as a predictor of 
crew performance outcomes.  This implies that crews did react appropriately to stalls 
when they were correctly identified by the stall warning system.  Otherwise, statistically 
significant degradations in correct crew response outcomes should have been observed in 
the presence of actual stall conditions.  Nevertheless, stalls and loss of control (LOC) 
events were often accompanied by system issues and adverse environmental influences, 
such as airframe vibration and buffeting, which undoubtedly added an increased noise 
component to the aircrew’s stall-detection task, in SDT terms.  If the aircrew did not 
adjust their decision-making criterion appropriately, the increased SDT noise would 
further complicate the task of detecting a stall.  This SDT noise effect would compound 
the overly-conservative SDT decision-making criterion bias predicted by the CIRB 
model, which explains 70% of the variability in the crew performance outcomes.  This 
finding also supports Advani’s assertion, first noted in Chapter II, that “Aerodynamic 
Stall Can Prompt ‘Brain Stall’” (2014, p. 58).   
An incorrect assertion could be made that False Alarms caused fewer poor 
outcomes because of their scarcity, but this view is not supported by the data.  FAs 
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accounted for 13.6% of the final data sample, second in prevalence only to Misses.  More 
importantly, the CIRB model predicts that the increased aircrew vulnerability to stall 
warning Misses is a direct result of the Bayesian and SDT origins of the model.  This 
counterargument is further validated by the almost identical outcomes obtained with the 
basic and comprehensive CIRB models.  The basic model, which incorporated the stall 
warning system SDT performance as the only IV, correctly classified 90.9% of cases, 
with only 12 of 132 cases being misclassified by this relatively simple model.  The 
comprehensive SDT model, which added the wing stall, tail stall, and system issue IVs, 
correctly classified only one additional case.  The stall warning SDT was therefore the 
dominant factor in determining the aircrew performance outcomes in this study. 
Research Design Lessons Learned 
The BLR technique was applied successfully to achieve the objectives of this 
study, but several lessons-learned arose from the application of the method.  As 
anticipated, the BLR proved resilient to violations of traditional statistical requirements 
related to normality and heteroscedasticity, but the tradeoff for these benefits was the 
BLR’s requirement for a larger sample size than other multivariate techniques, such as 
multiple linear regression.  Successful BLR execution was highly dependent on minimum 
sample size constraints being met for the overall sample, as well as for the number of 
observations within each variable category grouping.  As indicated in Chapter III, the 
desired sample size for this analysis was 10 cases per estimated parameter or category, 
but the NTSB data had less than 10 samples each for the Tail_Stall, Stall_Warning, and 
System_Issue variables.  The decision made at the outset of the research design to use a 
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combination of ASRS data and NTSB archival data proved fortuitous.  The BLR would 
not run successfully with either archive in isolation due to one or more violations of the 
minimum sample-size requirements. 
Although the BLR executed properly using the combined ASRS / NTSB database, 
the final sample of 132 cases was still near the lower acceptable group sample size 
bounds for the successful execution of the BLR.  This was evinced when the BLR 
analysis was attempted with six identified outliers removed from the data sample: The 
BLR failed to converge to a solution because the lower sample size limits had been 
violated.  This sensitivity of the BLR to the overall sample size and the sample sizes 
within each independent variable group should be considered carefully if the technique is 
to be reattempted because it is unlikely that the BLR would run successfully with a 
sample any smaller than was used for this study.  Similarly, the addition of more 
independent variables would significantly raise the minimum sample size that would also 
likely preclude the successful execution of the BLR.  Future researchers contemplating 
the application of this method should therefore carefully consider the tradeoff between 
minimum required sample size and the number of variables during the early stages of 
their experimental design because other analytical methods might prove more suitable 
than the BLR if these constraints cannot be met.  
A second research-design lesson-learned relates to the importance of making a 
very clear distinction between crew performance outcomes and adverse or satisfactory 
event outcomes.  Extensive efforts were made to isolate the crew responses from the 
event outcomes when viewed in an icing / stall context.  This is because False Alarms are 
inherently associated with nonthreatening (no stall) situations, while Misses correspond 
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to threatening stall or LOC conditions.  An incorrect response to an FA would therefore 
likely correspond to a benign outcome, despite a crew error, whereas a correct crew 
response to a Miss might still result in an accident.  If proper account were not taken of 
this phenomenon, the data would simply correlate with the potential seriousness of a stall 
in icing, rather than the intended SDT independent variables.  Efforts to replicate this 
study should therefore take similar precautions to properly isolate the SDT phenomenon 
of interest to avoid seriously confounding the analysis. 
A third lesson-learned related to the relative usefulness of the ASRS and NTSB 
databases.  It was anticipated that the NTSB accident archives would yield a higher 
percentage of usable records than the ASRS incident data because of the presumed 
availability of flight data recorders (FDR) and cockpit voice recorders (CVR) in the 
tailored sample of turbine aircraft that normally carry this equipment.  This did not turn 
out to be the case.  It proved difficult to determine the exact crew responses and stall 
warning system status from the NTSB accident data because most of the aircraft in the 
sample frame lacked an FDR.  Conversely, many of the ASRS records contained detailed 
and useful pilot narratives, often with explicit declarations concerning the items of 
interest.  This unexpected windfall proved the value, once again, of using two different 
archival sources, as planned from the inception of the research design. 
The final lesson-learned related to the benefits of building on prior research, 
particularly with the regard to the generation of appropriate search strings.  For example, 
the use of Green’s (2006) search string, and some of Green’s associated methodology, 
significantly streamlined the processing and down-sampling of the massive ASRS data 
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archive.  As an added benefit, this standardization should facilitate future research 
synthesis and meta-analyses related to the topic. 
Conclusions 
This study applied the Binary Logistic Regression technique to a hypothesized 
Conservative Icing Response Bias model of aircrew performance outcomes during 
airborne icing encounters.  The evaluation of the CIRB hypothesis resulted in a 
convergent BLR solution with adequate combined sample sizes and positive analytical 
measures of reliability and validity.  Accordingly, the following conclusions should be 
generalizable to the target population of U.S. registered, non-amateur-built, turbine 
aircraft, as intended.   
The research demonstrated a significant adverse effect of Missed stall warnings 
(that accounted for 65.2% of the events studied) on aircrew performance outcomes during 
airborne icing encounters.  Conversely, aircrew proved far less susceptible to FAs, as 
predicted by the CIRB hypothesis.  The fundamental CIRB assumptions concerning two 
interacting Signal Detection Theory Systems were therefore validated.   
CIRB provides a much-needed theoretical model that explains the apparently 
heterogeneous aircrew reactions to icing encounters.  The model uses only four SDT 
parameters (Hit, Miss, FA, and CR) related to the aircraft’s stall warning system’s 
performance to predict the aircrew performance outcomes during airborne icing 
encounters.  CIRB produces quantitative predictions, so it can be formally applied and 
tested with any dataset that meets the sample size requirements for a BLR analysis.  By 
extension, these results highlight the potential application of SDT to a much broader 
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context than airborne icing encounters.  Although the current study was predicated on the 
SDT modelling of crew response outcomes, these binary outcomes are manifestations of 
a higher-level Situational Awareness construct, which could be termed stall awareness.  
This extension of SDT methodology beyond simple perceptual tasks associated with 
physical stimuli into higher-level abstract or metaphorical signals was mentioned in the 
introduction (Abdi, 2009, p. 2).  This potential was realized in the findings from the 
current study, where the crew decision-making outcomes were the result of complex 
interactions between physical stimuli, the environment, training, workload, 
aerodynamics, and numerous other factors.  The application of the combined SDT / BLR 
method reduced these numerous and sometimes unknown or unquantifiable factors to the 
four basic binary elements of SDT: Hits, Misses, FAs, and CRs.  Despite this significant 
simplification, the resulting model yielded impressive sensitivity, specificity, and correct 
classification statistics.  If the methods of this study can be successfully replicated, then 
the reductionism achieved by combining the SDT method and the BLR technique has 
important ramifications for the modelling of other complex human-in-the loop processes.  
Previously intractable problems can be reframed in SDT terms, with the dependent 
variable representing the output of a high-level construct such as stall awareness.   The 
resulting models could then be quantitatively evaluated for statistical and practical 
significance using the SDT / BLR technique, as applied in this study.  Once successfully 
modeled, the same methods would allow the quantitative evaluation of the effects of 
changed parameters on the model output.  In the case of the current study, the CIRB 
SDT / BLR model could be applied to the development and evaluation of aircraft stall 
warning systems and their associated certification regulations.  Ongoing data mining 
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methods could then be applied to determine if the anticipated benefits of APM systems or 
revised aircrew training are being realized as expected.  
Recommendations 
This section addresses three broad topic areas: stall warning system design and 
certification, aircrew training, and future research directions.  The following 
recommendations are intended to explicitly address the problem statement developed in 
Chapter I, and repeated below:   
The literature shows that the majority of airborne icing accidents result 
from aircraft stalls, yet there is no theoretical model that ties the success or failure 
of the crew decision-making in icing to the performance of the stall warning 
system.  This knowledge gap imposes reactionary and untargeted regulatory 
responses that have failed to fully resolve the icing issue, despite decades of 
effort.  
 
Stall warning system design.  The CIRB phenomenon has shown that it would 
be advantageous to modify stall warning system certification regulations (e.g., 14 CFR 
§23.207 and §25.207 Stall Warning) to achieve systems with improved Miss: FA ratios.  
This could be accomplished in several ways: Stall warning systems should be developed 
that maintain the correct warning margins in the face of airfoil icing.  Warning systems 
should also monitor for tail stalls, which accounted for 14.4% of the sampled events and 
which often led to stall warning Misses with unfavorable consequences.  Finally, stall 
warning systems should be developed and certified that continue to function 
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independently and correctly in the face of icing-induced system issues, such as frozen 
pitot-static ports and angle-of-attack vanes, which represented 22.7% of the sampled 
events.  The literature has shown that aerodynamic performance monitors have promise 
in fulfilling all three of these requirements.  
 
Aircrew training.  Aircrew training programs for airborne icing operations 
should explicitly address the response-bias phenomenon and its attendant dangers.  The 
CIRB phenomenon stems from the failure of aircrew to adjust their SDT decision 
criterion appropriately to the more conservative value required during airborne icing 
encounters.  This response bias is a direct consequence of Bayes’ Theorem, which 
predisposes aircrew to underestimate the possibility of a stall or loss of control during 
icing encounters, based on stall expectations derived during extensive exposure to non-
icing flight.  The incorporation of specific training objectives to familiarize aircrew with 
the CIRB effect would strongly complement the current emphasis on the meteorological 
and technical aspects of airframe icing.  For example, crews should be conditioned to 
respond to all performance and flying quality degradations in icing as aerodynamic stalls, 
unless proven otherwise by overwhelming evidence.  Although this recommendation 
seems self-evident, there were numerous cases in the archives and literature where the 
crew failed to make the connection between their control difficulties and impending 
icing-induced aerodynamic stalls.  In some cases, the crew forced the aircraft into a stall, 
and then maintained inappropriate control inputs, sometimes for several minutes, which 
precluded any chance of recovery.  Conflicting cues, an unfamiliar environment, and high 
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stress levels undoubtedly contributed to these unfortunate outcomes, and better training to 
recognize and address such situations would be a very important mitigation.   
In addition to the preceding training recommendations, the CIRB / BLR 
methodology could be applied to Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) data 
obtained during routine operations and from simulator training data.  The application of 
comprehensive data mining techniques, using the same variables examined in this study 
as a baseline, would yield important benefits.  Most importantly, data mining would 
generate a much larger sample than was achieved by this archival study, because FOQA 
data are routinely collected during every flight, not just the operations that resulted in 
incidents or accidents, as was the case in this study.  The larger sample size would allow 
additional stratification variables to be incorporated in the CIRB model, which was not 
possible with this research because of the minimum sample size limitations of the BLR.  
FOQA and simulator data would also capture all the successful crew performance 
outcomes, which would minimize the self-selection bias towards unsuccessful outcomes 
inherent in accident and incident archival database research.  Finally, the application of 
the CIRB / BLR method to FOQA and simulator data would facilitate the objective 
quantitative evaluation of the benefits achieved from updated training practices or 
improvements in aircraft equipage. 
Future research directions.  The CIRB model should be further validated and 
extended using databases that were not incorporated into this study.  Domestic examples 
include the FAA Accidents/Incidents Data System (AIDS), airline Flight Operational 
Quality Assurance (FOQA) data, and ASRS / NTSB icing data for reciprocating engine 
aircraft that were excluded from the BLR analysis.  The model could also be further 
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validated and expanded using non-U.S. data sources such as the ICAO Accident and 
Incident Data-Reporting Database (ADREP).  ADREP contains mandatory reports of all 
aviation accidents to aircraft over 2,250 kg, in accordance with Annex 13, Chapter 7 of 
the Chicago Convention.  Zeppetelli & Habashi (2012) identified 323 relevant airborne 
icing occurrences since the ADREP’s inception in 1970.  Incorporation of ADREP data 
would therefore substantially expand the sample size that could be evaluated using the 
techniques presented in this study.  Transport Canada operates the Civil Aviation Daily 
Occurrence Reporting System (CADORS) which could further supplement the sample 
size, particularly in light of the prevalence of icing encounters in Canadian airspace due 
to the country’s climate and geography. 
There is also a wealth of proprietary untapped data that is not in the public 
domain to which the model could be applied and tested.  The CIRB / BLR methodology 
should be considered for applications outside the narrowly defined scope of this study.  
Examples include evaluations of the factors leading to non-icing related loss of control, 
runway incursions, or even applications in unrelated industries, such as nuclear power 
plant operational safety. 
Future researchers are encouraged to duplicate the use of dissimilar database 
archives, as was done for this study.  This beneficially increases the overall sample size 
to meet the demands of the BLR, and should also help to ensure that minimum group 
membership levels are achieved when the number of variable categories is increased.  
There is a risk of the BLR analysis failing to converge if these measures are not taken.  
Future research could be performed using additional stratification variables, such as crew 
qualifications, type of flight, etc., that could not be evaluated with the sample size 
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available for this study.  The use of dissimilar databases also increases the triangulation 
that can be achieved, with beneficial consequences to the reliability and external validity 
of the research. 
Given the analytically demonstrated validity and reliability of the basic and 
comprehensive CIRB models, the BLR coefficients derived in this study could be used 
for predictive purposes, and the preceding conclusions and recommendations should be 
valid and generalizable to the target population of U.S. turbine-powered, non-amateur-
built aircraft.  In a broader context, the SDT/BLR model can be generalized and applied 
to other human-in-the loop tasks, where its potential to simplify complex relationships 
would allow quantitative evaluations to be performed on otherwise intractable behavioral 
constructs, such as judgment and decision-making.  Collectively, the successful 
implementation of these recommendations should achieve the ultimate and overriding 
objective stated in the first chapter of this treatise: to save lives. 
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Appendices 
A. ASRS Query String 
APPENDIX A  
ASRS QUERY STRING 
SELECT DISTINCT AL1.ITEM_ID FROM QWPUBLIC.ALL_ITEMS AL1, 
QWPUBLIC.TEXT AL2, QWPUBLIC.ENVIRONMENT AL3, QWPUBLIC.TEXT 
AL4 WHERE (AL2.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID AND AL3.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID 
AND AL4.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID)  AND (CONTAINS(AL2.TEXT,'STALL%')>0 
AND AL3.ATTRIBUTE='Weather Elements / Visibility' AND AL3.VALUE='Icing') 
UNION  SELECT AL1.ITEM_ID FROM QWPUBLIC.ALL_ITEMS AL1, 
QWPUBLIC.TEXT AL2, QWPUBLIC.ENVIRONMENT AL3, QWPUBLIC.TEXT 
AL4 WHERE (AL2.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID AND AL3.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID 
AND AL4.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID)  AND (CONTAINS(AL2.TEXT,'STALL%')>0 
AND CONTAINS(AL4.TEXT,'ICE OR ICING OR ICED OR RIME OR RHIME OR 
FROZE OR FREEZ%')>0) UNION  SELECT AL1.ITEM_ID FROM 
QWPUBLIC.ALL_ITEMS AL1, QWPUBLIC.TEXT AL2, 
QWPUBLIC.ENVIRONMENT AL3, QWPUBLIC.TEXT AL4 WHERE 
(AL2.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID AND AL3.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID AND 
AL4.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID)  AND (AL1.ENTITY='Component' AND 
AL1.ATTRIBUTE='Aircraft Component' AND AL1.VALUE IN ('Stall Barrier System', 
'Stall Protection System', 'Stall Warning System') AND AL3.ATTRIBUTE='Weather 
Elements / Visibility' AND AL3.VALUE='Icing') UNION  SELECT AL1.ITEM_ID 
FROM QWPUBLIC.ALL_ITEMS AL1, QWPUBLIC.TEXT AL2, 
QWPUBLIC.ENVIRONMENT AL3, QWPUBLIC.TEXT AL4 WHERE 
(AL2.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID AND AL3.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID AND 
AL4.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID)  AND (AL1.ENTITY='Component' AND 
AL1.ATTRIBUTE='Aircraft Component' AND AL1.VALUE IN ('Stall Barrier System', 
'Stall Protection System', 'Stall Warning System') AND CONTAINS(AL4.TEXT,'ICE 
OR ICING OR ICED OR RIME OR RHIME OR FROZE OR FREEZ%')>0) 
 
 
Figure 11.  ASRS Query String. 
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B. ASRS Limitations 
APPENDIX B 
ASRS LIMITATIONS 
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C. Tables 
APPENDIX C 
Tables 
C1 ASRS Data Structure 
C2 NASA ASRS Final Sample Case Listing 
C3 NTSB Final Sample Case Listing 
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Table C1 
ASRS Data Structure 
 ASRS Variable  ASRS Variable (cont.) 
1. ACN 2. Date 
3. Local Time Of Day 4. Locale Reference 
5. State Reference 6. Relative Position.Angle.Radial 
7. Relative Position.Distance.Nautical 
Miles 
 
8. Altitude.AGL.Single Value 
9. Altitude.MSL.Single Value 10. Flight Conditions 
11. Weather Elements / Visibility 12. Work Environment Factor 
13. Light 14. Ceiling 
15. RVR.Single Value 16. ATC / Advisory 
17. Aircraft Operator 18. Make Model Name 
19. Propulsion 20. Aircraft Zone 
21. Crew Size 22. Operating Under FAR Part 
23. Flight Plan 24. Mission 
25. Nav In Use 26. Flight Phase 
27. Route In Use 28. Airspace 
29. Maintenance Status.Maintenance 
Deferred 
30. Maintenance Status.Records 
Complete 
31. Maintenance Status.Released For 
Service 
32. Maintenance Status.Required / 
Correct Doc On Board 
33. Maintenance Status.Maintenance 
Type 
34. Maintenance Status.Maintenance 
Items Involved 
35. Cabin Lighting 36. Number Of Seats.Number 
37. Passengers On Board.Number 38. Crew Size Flight Attendant.Number 
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 ASRS Variable  ASRS Variable (cont.) 
Of Crew 
39. Aircraft Component 40. Manufacturer 
41. Aircraft Reference 42. Problem 
43. ATC / Advisory 44. Aircraft Operator 
45. Make Model Name 46. Aircraft Zone 
47. Crew Size 48. Operating Under FAR Part 
49. Flight Plan 50. Mission 
51. Nav In Use 52. Flight Phase 
53. Route In Use 54. Airspace 
55. Maintenance Status.Maintenance 
Deferred 
56. Maintenance Status.Records 
Complete 
57. Maintenance Status.Released For 
Service 
58. Maintenance Status.Required / 
Correct Doc On Board 
59. Maintenance Status.Maintenance 
Type 
60. Maintenance Status.Maintenance 
Items Involved 
61. Cabin Lighting 62. Number Of Seats.Number 
63. Passengers On Board.Number 64. Crew Size Flight Attendant.Number 
Of Crew 
65. Location Of Person 66. Location In Aircraft 
67. Reporter Organization 68. Function 
69. Qualification 70. Experience 
71. Cabin Activity 72. Human Factors 
73. Communication Breakdown 74. ASRS Report Number.Accession 
Number 
75. Location Of Person 76. Location In Aircraft 
77. Reporter Organization 78. Function 
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 ASRS Variable  ASRS Variable (cont.) 
79. Qualification 80. Experience 
81. Cabin Activity 82. Human Factors 
83. Communication Breakdown 84. ASRS Report Number.Accession 
Number 
85. Anomaly 86. Miss Distance 
87. Were Passengers Involved In Event 88. Detector 
89. When Detected 90. Result 
91. Contributing Factors / Situations 92. Primary Problem 
93. Narrative 94. Callback 
95. Narrative 96. Callback 
97. Synopsys 98.  – 
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Table C2 
NASA ASRS Final Sample Case Listing 
ASRS ACN Event Year ASRS ACN Event Year ASRS ACN Event Year 
100792 1988 386766 1997 642483 2005 
104442 1989 389483 1997 643904 2004 
115422 1989 390641 1997 665350 2005 
189745 1991 391550 1998 682246 2005 
191028 1991 393189 1998 684037 2006 
200004 1992 393446 1998 692028 2006 
202249 1992 395823 1998 714794 2006 
211430 1992 403299 1998 760888 2007 
225830 1992 418260 1998 765665 2007 
231194 1993 419839 1998 765691 2007 
235939 1993 423056 1998 774091 2008 
250881 1993 423333 1998 832021 2009 
260890 1994 425239 1999 845030 2009 
264355 1994 441448 1999 849667 2009 
265218 1994 452162 1999 852531 2009 
268036 1994 456868 1999 881246 2010 
282950 1994 463853 2000 881955 2010 
286127 1994 470303 2000 924002 2010 
326726 1996 476789 2000 925811 2011 
327563 1996 479942 2000 1090560 2013 
327661 1996 495957 2000 1128912 2013 
327877 1996 519723 2001 1147583 2014 
330391 1996 522830 2001 1152737 2014 
357096 1996 541639 2002 1168045 2014 
357245 1997 565131 2002 1227048 2014 
366589 1997 589618 2003   
376201 1997 601072 2003   
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Table C3 
NTSB Final Sample Case Listing 
NTSB # Event Year NTSB # Event Year 
ANC00LA017 1999 DCA09MA027 2009 
ANC02FA020 2002 DCA15MA029 2014 
ANC05CA040 2005 DCA90MA011 1989 
ANC08LA027 2007 DCA91MA019 1991 
ANC10LA019 2010 DCA92MA025 1992 
ANC11TA031 2011 DCA93IA027 1993 
ANC98LA018 1998 DCA95MA001 1994 
ANC98MA008 1997 DCA97MA017 1997 
CEN09MA142 2009 ERA11LA344 2011 
CEN10LA090 2010 FTW03FA089 2003 
CEN11FA144 2011 FTW93MA143 1993 
CEN12LA095 2011 FTW95FA094 1995 
CEN12LA153 2012 FTW95FA129 1995 
CEN15LA091 2014 LAX02FA108 2002 
CHI02IA151 2002 LAX02LA030 2001 
CHI04IA056 2004 LAX06IA076 2006 
CHI06IA127 2006 LAX95IA128 1995 
CHI06LA058 2006 MIA98LA061 1998 
CHI07LA059 2007 NYC04LA044 2003 
CHI89IA034 1988 NYC04LA050 2003 
CHI89MA057 1989 NYC05MA083 2005 
CHI90IA106 1990 NYC07LA081 2007 
CHI93MA061 1993 NYC97FA045 1997 
CHI97FA047 1996 NYC98LA028 1997 
CHI98LA084 1998 SEA08FA042 2007 
DCA01MA031 2001 SEA95LA059 1995 
DCA09IA064 2009   
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D. SME Data Encoding Checklist 
APPENDIX D 
SME DATA ENCODING CHECKLIST 
Introduction 
You have graciously agreed to participate in a doctoral dissertation research study 
that examines the effect of stall warning system performance on crew behavioral 
outcomes during airborne icing encounters.  Airborne icing has been a major cause of 
aircraft accidents and loss of life since the earliest days of aviation and continues to cause 
aircraft accidents and incidents.  Airframe icing has been featured in the National 
Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) Most Wanted List of transportation safety 
improvements for 14 years (NTSB, 2012b).  The objective of this research program is to 
help increase the understanding of the complex interactions between aircrew, the icing 
environment, aircraft dynamics, and the aircraft systems during icing encounters.  The 
findings should result in improved guidelines for the design, certification, and operation 
of stall protection systems, with the overall objective of reducing accidents and saving 
lives. 
The research entails the selection and encoding of icing-encounter cases that meet 
strict criteria from the NTSB Aviation Accident database and the NASA Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) database.  This activity addresses both the selection and the 
encoding of the candidate cases for further study.  For a case to be included in the study, 
the record must contain unambiguous information about a number of critical variables.  
These include: the aircraft’s wing and / or tail stall state; the activation state of stall 
warning and / or stall prevention equipment (e.g. aural stall alerts, stick shaker, and stick 
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pusher systems); and whether the initial crew response was correct, according to specific 
criteria defined for the study.  The correct response criterion is used in a very specific 
manner in the study: It does not relate to the success or failure of the crew interventions 
nor is it intended to judge the competency of the crew.  In order for the study to be valid 
and reliable, very detailed procedures and criteria must be applied to ensure that the 
appropriate records are selected and that they are consistently encoded without 
introducing observer bias.  Any inclination to assess the accident or incident situations 
subjectively must be studiously avoided.  The next sections address the two principal 
archive processing activities: record selection and data encoding.   
Record Selection 
The ASRS records to be analyzed are contained in a tailored extract of 381 cases 
provided by NASA ASRS analysts, and the sample is ready for encoding as presented.  
The NTSB sample records must be downloaded from the NTSB on-line query page: 
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx using the criteria shown in 
Table D1.  Unlisted parameters must be left at their default values.  A separate extract 
will be required for each of the turbojet, turboprop, and turbofan engine types.   
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Table D1 
NTSB Database Search Criteria 
Characteristic Value 
Event start date January 1, 1988 
Event end date October 2, 2015 
AircraftCategory Filter Airplane 
AmateurBuilt Filter No 
EngineType Filter Turbine aircraft (turbojet, turboprop, 
turbofan).  Separate extracts will be 
required for each of these. 
WeatherConditions Filter  All 
Word search string "icing" or "freezing" or "rime" or "glaze" 
or "sleet" or "frost" 
 
Archive Encoding 
The ASRS and NTSB extracts must be evaluated for records containing the 
required aircraft, stall warning, and crew response information.  The resulting sub-
samples of conforming records must then be encoded for these variables.  Both processes 
are accomplished using the procedure shown in Table D2. 
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Table D2 
NTSB and ASRS Database Encoding Checklist 
Step Action Record 
1 Record Initial ASRS and NTSB sample sizes:  
1a Initial ASRS sample size 381 Cases 
1b Initial NTSB turbojet sample size ____Cases 
1c Initial NTSB turboprop sample size ____Cases 
1d Initial NTSB turbofan sample size ____Cases 
2 Perform ASRS and NTSB sub-sampling:  
Reject all records that were not related to airframe icing (e.g. 
engine issues related to ice crystal ingestion, runway overruns 
due to landing surface contamination, etc.). 
Reject all records for which the aircraft stall-state, stall warning 
system performance, and crew performance outcomesa cannot 
be unequivocally determined. 
Knowledge of the stall warning system state entails explicit 
evidence of aural stall warnings, stick-shaker, or stick pusher 
activation, with one exception: if a detailed crew narrative of 
the accident or incident is available and no indication or 
mention is made of a stall warning actuation, then the stall 
warning system state will be encoded None. 
 
   
2a Record ASRS sub-sample size ____Cases 
2b Record NTSB turbojet sub-sample size ____Cases 
2c Record NTSB turboprop sub-sample size ____Cases 
2d Record NTSB turbofan sub-sample size ____Cases 
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Step Action Record 
 For each remaining sub-sample:  
3 Encode the aircraft stall state (no stall, imminent or actual wing 
stall, imminent or actual tail stall, or system issueb). 
 
4 Encode the crew response outcome using the criteria in 
Table D3. 
 
5 Encode the stall warning system outcome into one of four 
states: Hit, Miss, False Alarm, or Correct Rejection using the 
criteria in Table D4. 
 
6 Record encoded cases in worksheet for further processing in the 
ASRS and NTSB Sample Data Entry Worksheet.  Duplicate and 
use as many sheets as necessary to record all of the sub-sample 
data.  Number each of the sheets and record your name at the 
bottom of each completed sheet.  Cross out and initial any 
incorrect entries and any unused rows on the last sheet. 
Complete 
Table D5 
Note.  aCrew performance outcomes are defined using the criteria in Table D3.  bA 
system issue is one that resulted in an icing stall event that was not caused by airframe 
icing.  An example would be loss of primary airspeed information due to a frozen pitot-
static system. 
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Table D3 
Crew Performance Outcome Evaluation Criteria for SME 
 Incorrect Crew Performance Correct Crew Performance 
1. The NTSB probable cause or 
contributing factor in a factual or final 
report indicates that the crew’s initial 
response was inappropriate (e.g. BEA, 
2012; NTSB, 1996b; NTSB, 2010a). 
The NTSB probable cause or 
contributing factor in a factual or final 
report indicates that the crew’s initial 
response was appropriate. 
2. The ASRS submitter indicated that the 
crew response was inappropriate. 
The ASRS submitter indicated that the 
crew response was appropriate. 
3. The crew first became aware of the 
impending stall or loss of control after 
their onset (i.e., the crew allowed the 
situation to degrade to the point where 
control was lost before recognizing this 
fact). 
The crew first became aware of the 
impending stall or loss of control before 
their onset and made positive efforts to 
avoid the event, regardless of the 
success of the outcome. 
4. An appropriate stall warning was not 
acted upon in time to avoid a true 
aerodynamic stall or loss of control. 
An appropriate stall warning was acted 
upon in a timely fashion, regardless of 
the success of the outcome. 
5. The crew response was markedly 
different from an accepted norm (i.e., 
adding power and firmly lowering the 
nose to prevent a wing stall) (e.g. 
NTSB, 2010a). 
The crew response conformed to the 
accepted norm, regardless of the 
success of the outcome. 
 
6. The crew appeared to be unaware of the 
stall-state of the aircraft or 
misdiagnosed its state (e.g. BEA, 2012).   
The crew appeared to be aware of the 
stall-state of the aircraft. 
7. There is overwhelming evidence from a 
subjective review of the record that the 
crew’s initial response was 
inappropriate. 
There is overwhelming evidence from a 
subjective review of the record that the 
crew’s initial response was appropriate. 
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Table D4 
Stall Warning System State Encoding 
Aircraft Wing or Tail  
Stall State 
Stall Warning System 
State preceding the 
aircraft event 
SDTa  
Classification 
No imminent or actual wing or 
tail stallb 
None Correct Rejection (CR) 
No imminent or actual wing or 
tail stall 
Alert False Alarm (FA) 
Imminent or actual wing stall None Miss (M) 
Imminent or actual wing stall Alert Hit (H) 
Imminent or actual tail stall None Miss (M) 
Imminent or actual tail stall  Alertb Hit (H) 
Note.  aSignal Detection Theory.  bImminent or actual stall can be inferred from airframe 
buffeting or vibration, wing or nose drop, marked control difficulties, or an inability to 
stop a descent, such as uncontrolled sink in the landing flare.   cThere are currently no 
artificial stall warning systems capable of detecting a tail stall, so this is a placeholder 
category only. 
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Table D5 
ASRS and NTSB Sample Data Entry Worksheet 
1. Duplicate and use as many sheets as necessary to record all of the sub-sample data. 
2. Number each of the sheets and record your name at the bottom of each completed sheet.  
3. Cross out and initial any incorrect entries and any unused rows on the last sheet. 
 ASRS 
ACN or 
NTSB ID 
# 
Event  
Date 
YYYYMM 
Pending 
Wing 
Stall 
(Y/N) 
Pending 
Tail 
Stall 
(Y/N) 
Stall 
Warning  
 
(Y/N) 
Correct 
Crew 
Response 
(Y/N) 
System 
Issue 
 
(Y/N) 
SDT 
Class 
(H, M, 
FA, CR) 
e.g.: 12345 200112 Y N N N N M 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
11         
12         
13         
14         
15         
16         
17         
18         
19         
20         
21         
22         
23         
24         
25         
 
SHEET ____ of ____             SME Name:_________________________________ 
 
 
